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have a property-like interest in a particular corpus of tort rules. The law of tort is always capable
of improvement, and legislatures have an obligation and the requisite authority to undertake
such improvements. Nonetheless, I do argue that tort law, understood as a law for the redress of
private wrongs, forms part of the basic structure of our government. And though the
Constitution does not confer on any particular individual a right to a specific version of tort
rules, all American citizens have a right to a body of law for the redress of private wrongs that
generates meaningful and judicially enforceable limits on tort reform legislation.
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF TORT LAW
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law.'
It is the duty of every State to provide, in the administration ofjustice, for the
redress ofprivate wrongs... 2
INTRODUCTION
Tort reform legislation abounds. Mostly it is issuing from state legislatures,
although Congress has also joined in.3 Typical reforms burden plaintiffs by
raising new procedural and evidentiary hurdles, narrowing grounds for
liability, and limiting damages.4 Plaintiffs have raised numerous constitutional
challenges to these laws, with mixed results.' One article counts 82 decisions
issued by courts in 26 states between 1983 and 2001 that have struck down tort
reform measures, usually on state constitutional grounds.6 However, the article
also identifies 14o decisions from courts in 45 states and the District of
Columbia upholding reforms in this same period.7 Lower federal courts appear
1. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
Z. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885).
3. See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, S. 397, lo9th Cong. (2005). Arguably, the
Supreme Court has engaged in tort reform of its own. See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL.,
TORT LAw: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 959-1038 (2004) (collecting recent decisions).
4. Such measures include setting caps on contingent fees; tightening statutes of limitations or
adopting statutes of repose; making certification of class actions more difficult;
restructuring trials (e.g., requiring bifurcation); narrowing substantive liability standards;
providing hard-look judicial review of jury findings; capping compensatory damages;
eliminating the collateral-source rule; eliminating or limiting joint and several liability; and
eliminating, capping, or "splitting" punitive damages. See Nat'l Ass'n of Mut. Ins. Cos.,
Tort Reform: An Overview of State Legislative Efforts To Improve the Legal System,
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/overview.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
5. These challenges have asserted violations of state constitutional provisions that, among
other things, guarantee open courts, a right to remedy, or a right to a jury trial; prohibit
special legislation; mandate separated powers; and guarantee due process and equal
protection. They have also asserted violations of the Jury Trial Clause of the Seventh
Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
6. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Judicial Nullification of Civil Justice Reorm Violates the
Fundamental Federal Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers: How To Restore the Right
Balance, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 939-51 (2001).
7. Id. at 952-76.
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to be largely unreceptive to federal constitutional challenges,8 and the Supreme
Court has not ruled directly on the subject in recent years. 9
State and federal decisions upholding a Virginia statute capping
compensatory damages in malpractice actions illustrate the predominant
approach." Under the statute, if a patient were to prove that a doctor's
malpractice proximately caused her injuries resulting in lifetime medical
expenses of $io million (this apart from any pain and suffering), she would
recover less than $2 million." Claimants who stood to receive awards above the
cap challenged the statute, but the courts adopted a deferential posture toward
the legislature.12 In particular, each decision reasons that, because the damage
cap is a piece of "social or economic" legislation that does not single out a
discrete minority or burden a recognized fundamental right, it should be
subject only to the rational basis versions of equal protection and due process
analysis.13 To impose any harder-look review would be to ignore the counsel of
Munn v. Illinois (quoted above) that individuals lack a vested interest in mere
8. See, e.g., Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215, 1225 (1oth Cir. 1991); Boyd v.
Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196-97 (4th Cir. 1989); Gronne v. Abrams, 793 F.2d 74, 78-79 (2d
Cir. 1986); Pitts. v. Unarco Indus., 712 F.2d 276, 279-80 (7th Cir. 1983).
9. See Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 474 U.S. 892, 893-95 (1985) (mem.) (White, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of appeal) (noting as an open question whether due process
forbids states from enacting damage caps without providing a quid pro quo to persons
whose claims are capped); infra text accompanying notes 313-345.
1o. See Boyd, 877 F.2d at 1191; Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, 509 S.E.2d
307 (Va. 1999); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
ii. The cap was originally set at $750,000, but has increased in annual increments. VA. CODE
ANN. 5 8.01-581.15 (2ooo). Virginia's cap probably has mattered and will matter in only a
handful of cases per year involving claimants who have suffered very severe injuries.
National data from state courts indicate median malpractice verdicts in 2001 of about
$5oo,ooo. Robert C. LaFountain & Neal B. Kaudern, An Empirical Overview of Civil Trial
Litigation 1, 3 (Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Caseload Highlights Vol. 11, No. 1, 2005),
http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/Highlights/VollNoi.pdf.
12. They did so not only with respect to the constitutional claims discussed in the text, but also
with respect to other claims of right. For example, the Pulliam court treated jury trial rights
as an entitlement to jury fact-finding only when the legislature defines, or permits courts to
define, a cause of action with elements raising factual questions. By capping damages, it
reasoned, the legislature had pronounced that there was no need for fact-finding on
damages above the amount of the cap. 509 S.E.2d at 313-14.
13. See Boyd, 877 F.2d at 1196-97; Pulliam, 509 S.E.2d at 318; Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 530-31.
Even if rational basis review has bite in some settings, it seems necessarily toothless as
applied to plaintiff-unfriendly tort reforms. Legislators are surely reasonable to suppose that
such reforms provide a rational means of protecting the activity being spared liability, as
well as the populace it benefits. But see Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d
440, 46o-61 (Wisc. 2005) (applying rational basis "with bite" to strike down, on equal
protection grounds, a cap on noneconomic damages for medical malpractice actions).
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common law rules. Stricter scrutiny, these judges worry, would resurrect
Lochner and its much-maligned constitutionalization of the common law.'
4
Contrary to the views expressed by these and other courts, this Article
argues for recognition of a right, grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, to a body of law that empowers individuals to seek redress
against persons who have wronged them. This right, in turn, generates the
prima facie duty described in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes (also
quoted above): the duty of each state to provide a law for the redress of private
wrongs."5 Recognition of this right need not entail the federalization of tort
law, or even require that tort law remain a part of our legal system. Instead,
this right can and should be judicially enforced by establishing meaningful but
capacious limits on the ways in which, and the reasons for which, legislatures
may undertake plaintiff-unfriendly tort reform. 6
In Parts I and II, I demonstrate that the right to a law of redress has deep
roots in Anglo-American law. The former focuses on influential English
sources that articulate the idea of a law for the redress of private wrongs and
confer on it fundamental significance. The latter discusses the reception of the
right in the Founding era and the antebellum period and offers evidence that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was likely
meant to guarantee the right. After discussing late-nineteenth-century U.S.
Supreme Court decisions that locate the right in the Due Process Clause, Part
II also reviews the emergence of the now-prevalent rational basis paradigm in
the late 1920S.
In Part III, I argue for judicial enforcement of the right to a law for the
redress of private wrongs via guidelines for decision' 7 that are more robust than
14. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987) (arguing that
Lochner's error was to treat common law entitlements as natural baselines for constitutional
analysis). But see David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2003)
(arguing against Sunstein's analysis).
is. My focus is on state tort reform legislation. The Fifth Amendment probably should be read
to guarantee a parallel right against the federal government. See infra text accompanying
notes 450-453. The right argued for here is a right to a body of law with certain
characteristics and a certain role to play. Whether that body of law is judge-made or
statutory is of no particular importance.
16. My analysis concerns the rights of persons who are not tort victims or litigants at the time at
which the legislative rule change takes effect. See, e.g., Susan C. Randall, Comment, Due
Process Challenges to Statutes of Repose, 40 Sw. L.J. 997 (1986) (arguing that persons pursuing
tort claims at the time of the rule change have vested interests that are entitled to heightened
due process protection).
17. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REv. 1, 61-63 (2004);
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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the rational basis test. First, I identify modern Supreme Court decisions that
are part of a broader recasting of the New Deal revolution in terms less rights-
and court-skeptical than those articulated by first-generation progressive critics
of substantive due process. I also deflect doctrinal objections to the idea that
individuals enjoy an affirmative right to the provision of a particular body of
law. In doing so, I identify a distinct branch of due process analysis that,
borrowing from Laurence Tribe, I dub "structural due process.""8
Second, I explain why, notwithstanding the dominant tendency among
modem scholars to treat tort law as an instrument for attaining public goals
such as loss-spreading or efficient precaution-taking, it is still best understood
as a law of redress. I also describe how a redress conception of tort differs from
corrective-justice and day-in-court conceptions and why a law of redress has a
unique and important role to play in our legal system.
Third, I develop and apply a set of guidelines for judicial review that will
permit courts to assess more intelligently the constitutionality of particular tort
reforms. Under these guidelines, a court should (1) consider the type of interest
protected by the tort at issue and the type of wrongdoing that the tort identifies
and enjoins; (2) gauge the extent to which the reform in question interferes
with the victim's ability to respond to the wrong; and (3) assess the legislative
justification(s) for the reform.
The claims in this Article run against the grain of conventional academic
wisdom. As a result, they necessitate a two-front campaign. To a skeptical
audience of constitutional scholars, I must make the case for recognition of an
affirmative constitutional right (albeit of a special sort), as well as for a holistic
conception of the Constitution that treats private law as integrally connected to
public law. To a skeptical audience of tort scholars, I must establish that
modem tort law is properly understood as a law of wrongs and redress.
The position I advocate here also does not mesh neatly with the views of
the camps currently waging war over tort law. If sound, it offers modest
support to those eager to ward off plaintiff-unfriendly tort reforms. However,
it does not justify routine judicial nullification. It also comes with baggage that
many in the pro-plaintiff camp will find intolerable -namely the idea that tort
law merits meaningful judicial protection against legislation only insofar as it
operates as a law of redress. If tort doctrines are conceived as a means by which
government indirectly punishes or deters wrongdoers on behalf of the public
18. Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, io HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975). Tribe uses
this phrase to refer to a requirement that certain controversial issues about governmental
power and individual rights be addressed through procedures that "structure" a meaningful
dialogue about them. Id. at 301. In my usage, the phrase conveys the idea that citizens enjoy
rights to certain political institutions and bodies of law.
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interest, my argument gains no purchase. 9 For their part, tort reform
advocates will be pleased to see that even an unconventionally robust
conception of due process leaves legislatures with substantial leeway. But they
will be displeased with the rejection of the idea that tort reform is a domain of
plenary power. A court applying the guidelines developed here could
reasonably strike down a provision such as the Virginia cap, even though many
less irresponsible tort reforms will withstand scrutiny.
In any event, my argument has implications beyond the extreme case of
judicial nullification. For one thing, it identifies a notion of due process that
might help capture the content of other rights that do not fit within
conventional categories. For another, it suggests that legislatures operate under
certain affirmative duties, including a duty to provide bodies of law that are
integral to liberal-constitutional government.
1. ENGLISH PROVENANCE
One can trace the idea that individuals enjoy a right to a law of redress for
private wrongs back to the work of influential seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century English jurists, including Coke, Hale, Locke, and Blackstone. This Part
briefly explicates their views.
ig. See, e.g., CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED
DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAw (2OOl); THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL
L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (20ol). Of course, as a law of redress, tort might at
times have the effect of bringing powerful malefactors to heel.
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A. Common Law Theory, Courts, and the Dispensing Power"°
Common law political and legal theory was developed in the seventeenth
century by lawyers such as Coke, Selden, and Hale in opposition to absolutist
theories proposed by the Stuart Kings and their supporters. For present
purposes, the significance of common law theory is twofold. First, it provides
an early version of structural constitutionalism in Anglo-American thought-
the idea that fundamental law establishing (and regulating the operation of) a
network of political and social institutions is essential to maintaining a stable,
prosperous, and free polity. Second, it treats the availability of redress to
victims of wrongs through courts as a vital component of that network. The
common lawyers maintained that the King was under an obligation both to
establish courts and not to interfere with their operation so that they might,
among other things, provide for the redress of wrongs.
1. The Ancient Constitution
Common law theory had its roots in medieval thought.2' It treated the
relation of ruler and ruled as one of a set of hierarchies built into the fabric of
the world.' It also drew on natural law theory, which viewed polities as no less
20. Others have linked common law theory to rights to law and redress. See, e.g., Steven J.
Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41
DUKE L.J. 507, 512-14 (1991); William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee's Open Courts Clause:
A Historical Reconsideration of Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L.
REV. 333, 357-61 (1997). Like these authors and others, I present common law theory as a
composite. See, e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part 1), 2
OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155, 157 (2002). For treatments of individual common
lawyers' thought, see PAUL CHRISTIANSON, DISCOURSE ON HISTORY, LAW AND GOVERNANCE
IN THE PUBLIC CAREER OF JOHN SELDEN, 161o-1635 (1996); ALAN CROMARTIE, SIR MATTHEW
HALE (1609-1676): LAW, RELIGION, AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY (1995); JAMES R. STONER,
JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, HOBBES, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
CONSTrrUTIONALISM (1992); and Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence:
Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651 (1994). It is worth stressing that the common lawyers
reasoned within a context quite alien to our own. They accepted as natural monarchical
government, a very limited franchise, and a patriarchal and profoundly inegalitarian social
order that doled out privileges on the basis of status and sanctioned various forms of
servitude. Although they addressed recognizably constitutional questions, they did so in the
absence of modern notions of separated powers. And, of course, their writings about redress
were not animated by concern over tort reform as we know it. For these reasons, inferences
from their work must be drawn with caution.
21. 5 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 491 (3 d ed. 1923).
22. See GLENN BURGESS, THE POLITICS OF THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1603-1642, at 132-38 (1992); J.P. SOMMERVILLE, ROYALISTS
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natural extensions of human nature than are plants extensions of seeds.23 Yet
the common lawyers also believed that a thick crust of national and local
custom lay atop the natural structure of ruler and ruled. Thus, when they
argued against absolutism they did not rely directly on principles of natural
law." Rather, their claim was that the English had developed a uniquely sound
variation on the natural phenomenon of government. 6 This mode of political
organization, which they referred to as "the Ancient Constitution," was
"nature's law for England. ,,2 7
The common lawyers' conception of this constitution approximated H.L.A.
Hart's later notion of a legal system.28 Through its public-power-conferring
rules, the constitution defined the offices and powers of government, including
King and Parliament.29 In addition, through primary rules (e.g., rules defining
AND PATRIOTS: POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN ENGLAND 1603-1640, at 20 (2d ed. 1999); James
Daly, Cosmic Harmony and Political Thinking in Early Stuart England, 69 TRANSACTIONS AM.
PHIL. SOC'Y 1, 5-13 (1979); David Harris Sacks, Parliament, Liberty, and the Commonweal, in
PARLIAMENT AND LIBERTY FROM THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH TO THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 85, 87
(J. H. Hexter ed., 1992) [hereinafter PARLIAMENTAND LIBERTY].
23- Calvin's Case, (16o8) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 392 (K.B.) (Coke, C.J.) ("[T]o command and to
obey is of nature, and... magistracy is of nature: for whatsoever is necessary and profitable
for the preservation of the society of man is due by the law of nature .... "). Some natural
law theorists traced the authority of specific governments to consent, but they did not argue
that authority as such was consent-based. See FRANCIS OAKLEY, POLITICS AND ETERNITY:
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL AND EARLY-MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 123, 96-137
(1999); see also SOMMERVILLE, supra note 22, at 20 ("Little was heard in early seventeenth-
century England of the doctrine that government is an artificial and not a natural
creation."); J.P. Sommerville, John Selden, The Law of Nature, and the Origins of Government,
27 HIST. J. 437 (1984) (criticizing the claim that Selden was a social contract theorist).
24. In this they again tracked medieval political theory. 3 FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY: LATE MEDIAEVAL AND RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY (PART I) 141-42, 215-16 (Image
Books ed. 1963) (1953); SOMMERVILLE, supra note 22, at 13-54, 69, 137.
25. Postema, supra note 2o, at 178.
26. 2 EDWARD COKE, THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE (1602), reprinted in 1 THE SELECTED
WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 37, 40 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) [hereinafter SELECTED
WRITINGS] (praising "the ancient Lawes of this noble Island [that have] excelled all
others"); MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 30 (Charles M.
Gray ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1971) (1713); Berman, supra note 20, at 1678-79. Supposedly
the best evidence of the law's excellence was that a succession of conquerors had left it alone.
See Charles M. Gray, Parliament, Liberty, and the Law, in PARLIAMENT AND LIBERTY, supra
note 22 at 1, 155-57.
27. Alan Cromartie, The Constitutionalist Revolution: The Transformation of Political Culture in
Early Stuart England, 163 PAST & PRESENT 76, 84 (1999).
28. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94-99 (2d ed. 1994).
29. See 12 EDWARD COKE, THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE (1656), reprinted in 1 SELECTED
WRITINGS, supra note 26, at 481 (reporting that Coke responded to James I's attempt to
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crimes and civil wrongs), private-power-conferring rules (e.g., rules of the writ
system and property law), and public-power-conferring rules (e.g., rules
granting jurisdiction to courts), it set the basic terms on which Englishmen
interacted. For the common lawyer, personal liberties and obligations, no less
than the powers and obligations of the King, were traceable to the Ancient
Constitution; it provided a comprehensive and constitutive normative
framework. Every activity in England took place within, and was shaped by,
the normative terrain it created."
The common lawyers thus credited the Ancient Constitution with
delivering the primary advantages thought to be enjoyed by the English. Its
structuring of political institutions warded off tyranny; its law of property
helped to ensure prosperity;" and its reluctance to enforce monopolies was
integral to the ability of (some male) citizens to pursue a livelihood.32 English
liberty was a condition achieved through law rather than a pre-legal freedom of
action: 3 To be free was to enjoy the benefits and privileges of the law,
particularly the protection afforded by the balanced political structure it
created. 4
English law was also linked to tranquility, prosperity, and liberty in a
second way: by providing a full menu of remedies for wrongful deprivations of
life, liberty, and property. Coke in particular saw in Chapter 29 of Magna Carta
an expression of the monarch's constitutional obligation to ensure that each
Englishman enjoyed his "best birth-right"- i.e., that "his goods, lands, wife,
children, his body, life, honor, and estimation are protected from injury, and
wrong."3" In principle, each person suffering wrongful injury at the hands of
intervene in litigation with Bracton's maxim that the King was answerable to no other man,
but only to God and the law); see also BURGESS, supra note 22, at 161 (stating that common
lawyers treated the common law as a master language for English politics); SOMMERVILE,
supra note 22, at 147 (noting John Eliot's assertion that the law is rex omnium).
30. Cromartie, supra note 27, at 88.
31. See, e.g., HALE, supra note 26, at 30-31. On the connection between property and liberty in
common law thought, see SOMMERvILLE, supra note 22, at 135-37.
32. Sacks, supra note 22, at 86, 99.
33. Id. at 93-95.
34. The common lawyers' conception of liberty echoed Roman republican thought. See
Heyman, supra note 2o, at 531; see also PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBuCANISM: A THEORY OF
FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 19-41 (1997).
35. EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1642),
reprinted in 2 SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 26, at 745, 873. Coke's rendition of the text of
Chapter 29 is as follows:
No Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or
Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed;
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another would "take his remedy by the course of the Law, and have justice, and
right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any deniall,
and speedily without delay." 6 Similarly, Coke maintained that the law
protected individuals from overreaching officials by requiring them to employ
fair procedures and by authorizing those unfairly detained, prosecuted, and
punished to bring civil actions against officers.3"
The order created by the Ancient Constitution was also deemed to be an
irreducibly yet harmoniously complex structure. At the center of this exquisite
scheme stood a complex institution: the King-in-Parliament.1' Each
constituent-King, Lords, and Commons-occupied a rightful place within
it.39 Complexity also characterized each subordinate unit. The monarchy, for
example, consisted of numerous sub-offices, including the royal courts. The
courts were, in turn, divided by jurisdiction: maritime, equitable, ecclesiastical,
and common law. Finally, the common law itself, particularly real property
law,4" was notoriously complex. The common lawyers argued that each of
these complexities was vital to the health of the polity, just as the health of each
organ in a complex organism ensures its well-being.
A third attribute of the Ancient Constitution was that the source of its
authority lay in tradition. The constitution was said to have no origin; it
nor will We not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his
Peers, or by the Law of the Land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or
defer to any man either Justice or Right.
Id. at 848. Coke regarded Magna Carta as a declaration of basic constitutional principles. See
infra note 41.
36. COKE, supra note 35, at 870. The law often fell short of this ideal. Peers, for example, often
trespassed on commoners' land with impunity. DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRrIIOUE OF
CONSENT THEORY 131 (1989).
37. COKE, supra note 35, at 859-64.
38. See EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND
(1644), reprinted in 2 SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 26, at 1053, 1O62, 1O67. Coke described
the power of King-in-Parliament as "so transcendent and absolute, (that] it cannot be
confined either for causes or persons within any bounds." Id. at 1133. Yet Coke also refused
to identify any institution of English government as "sovereign," for to attribute sovereignty
to an institution would have suggested that it stood outside the law. See Edward Coke,
Address Before Parliament in Defense of the Petition of Right (May 20, 1628), reprinted in 3
SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 26, at 1285; see also STONER, supra note 20, at 27-29.
39. BURGESS, supra note 22, at S; CROMARTIE, supra note 2o, at 58-73. The relationship of these
units was not that of mechanistic counterweights. Gray, supra note 26, at 184-85. Rather,
they were to function as members of a joint venture. Sacks, supra note 22, at 89-93.
40. Gray, supra note 26, at 179.
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reached back into the mists of time.4 Although its content had changed,42 these
changes occurred within a unitary tradition that permitted one to speak, as
Americans do today, of a singular constitution. 43 It claimed authority by
custom44- a concept that invoked notions of habituation, 45 wisdom, 46 and
consent.47 The common lawyers were thus hardly political radicals. They
endorsed monarchy, 4s and maintained that the monarch was entitled to broad
discretion in the formulation of policy. 49 Subjects owed him allegiance,s" and
41. Coke and other common lawyers treated foundational documents such as Magna Carta as
declaratory rather than constitutive. STONER, supra note 20, at 21; Corinne C. Weston,
England: Ancient Constitution and Common Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL
THOUGHT 1450-1700, at 374, 379 (J.H. Bums & Mark Goldie eds., 1991).
42. Coke was perhaps most prone to claim that the content of the constitution had remained
constant. Postema, supra note 20, at 169; J.P. Sommerville, The Ancient Constitution
Reassessed: The Common Law, the Court and the Languages of Politics in Early Modern England,
in THE STUART COURT AND EUROPE 39, 47 & n.22 (R. Malcolm Smuts ed., 1996). Yet even
he acknowledged alterations. BURGESS, supra note 22, at 22; SOMMERVILLE, supra note 22, at
85.
43. Postema, supra note 20, at 169, 173 (treating this view as likely dominant among common
lawyers); see also CHRISTIANSON, supra note 20, at 61-62 (discussing Selden's views);
CROMARTIE, supra note 20, at 36 (discussing Hale's views). Hale invoked the example of the
Argonauts' ship, which, despite having been overhauled during its long voyage, was still
recognizable as the Argo when it returned. Postema, supra note 20, at 173; see also HALE,
supra note 26, at 40.
44. SOMMERVILLE, supra note 22, at 84-87.
4S. The longevity of the scheme suggested that significant innovation would meet resistance
and failure or cause substantial disruption of expectations and ought to be presumed
against. BURGESS, supra note 22, at 26.
46. Coke argued that the constitution contained the nearly unfathomable wisdom of the ages.
Postema, supra note 20, at 169-72. The idea here is Burkean-the fact that existing
institutions had survived the test of time suggested that they were better adapted to serve
the public good than any de novo scheme. See SommERvtLL, supra note 22, at 84-85, 87; see
also CHRISTIANSON, supra note 20, at 17; CROMARTIE, supra note 20, at 11o.
47. Hale viewed the constitution as a continuous but regularly revised covenant between the
English King and his subjects, the existence of which was evidenced by the populace's
acceptance of traditional law. CROMART1E, supra note 20, at 49-50; Gerald J. Postema,
Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part 11), 3 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1, 23-25
(2003); see also GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 21-27
(1986).
48. SOMMERVILLE, supra note 22, at 102, 220; Cromartie, supra note 27, at 103.
49. CORINNE COMSTOCK WESTON & JANELLE RENFROW GREENBERG, SUBJECTS AND
SOVEREIGNS: THE GRAND CONTROVERSY OVER LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY IN STUART ENGLAND 10-
11 (1981).
5o. Calvin's Case, (16o8) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 382 (K.B.) (Coke, C.J.) ("[Lligeance and obedience
is an incident inseparable to every subject: for as soon as he is bom he oweth by birth-right
ligeance and obedience to his Sovereign."); see David Martin Jones, Sir Edward Coke and the
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in return he was to protect them from foreign enemies and each other."1 Yet in
describing the constitution as rooted in tradition, the common lawyers did not
treat it as a matter of mindless ritual. Rather, its content was forged by the
interplay of custom and reason through the exercise of "artificial reason." 2 In
contrast to natural reason- reasoning logically from first principles -artificial
reason was practical, cumulative over time, intersubjective, and coherentist in
its conception of validity. 3 Although it was identified with the application of an
existing body of principles and rules, it was not equated with the modern
notion of stare decisis s4 Instead, it referred to a process whereby lawyers read
precedents and statutes with an eye toward rendering them coherent with one
another and with the basic precepts of justice built into the law."5 By
interpreting the law in this synthetic manner, lawyers sought continually to
revise, reconstruct, and maintain the constitution.5
6
2. Implications for the Right to a Law of Redress
The common lawyers constructed their account of the Ancient Constitution
in response to particular royal acts and policies s' and to the theories by which
royalists defended them.s8 A brief examination of the type of act and claim to
Interpretation of Lawful Allegiance in Seventeenth-Century England, 7 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 321,
325-31 (1986).
51. SOMMERVttLE, supra note 22, at 9-1o (noting that domestic and international religious
disputes posed significant threats to social stability); Sacks, supra note 22, at 85 (describing
the King's responsibilities).
52. STONER, supra note 20, at 23. On artificial reason, see Postema, supra note 47, at 1-11.
53. Postema, supra note 20, at 178. Fortunately for us, Hale rejected Coke's view that the
common law's wisdom could not be systematized. CROMARTiE, supra note 20, at 21, 45-46.
54. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist
Court, 52 VAND. L. REv. 647, 66o (1999); Postema, supra note 47, at 12-13.
SS. Gray, supra note 26, at 16o ("Legal expertise in the highest sense... [was regarded by the
common lawyers as] knowing how to recognize distant relationships and subtle coherences
in the law's fabric."). The labyrinthine property law was the paradigm of a subject that
could only be mastered by artificial reason. Id. at 179. The relevant precepts of justice were
contained in familiar maxims, such as one ought not judge one's own cause; one ought not
be imprisoned without cause; and one ought not use property to the damage of another.
56. SOMMERViLLE, supra note 22, at 88-89; STONER, supra note 20, at 26.
S. These included James I's unilateral taxation of imported goods, Charles I's dissolution of
Parliament and his refusal to resummon it, and Charles's imposition of the Forced Loan and
his imprisonment of dozens who refused to pay it. ANN LYON, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM 200-16 (2003).
5S. This is not to say that the common lawyers were always at odds with the Smarts. Many
served as royal officials, and alignments and ideologies shifted. See HERZOG, supra note 36,
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which they responded will fill out our understanding of common law theory.
More importantly, it will demonstrate that the common lawyers were
concerned with, and indeed denied the legality of, monarchical attempts to
interfere with the ordinary operation of law for the redress of wrongs.
Royalists maintained that the King's recognized prerogative included the
power to circumvent ordinary legal and political constraints when he deemed
such action necessary for the public good. 9 The common lawyers argued that
this asserted need for elbow room was part of a plot to replace the harmonious
complexity of the constitution with a tyrannical regime,60 and that it
hubristically claimed superiority for the monarch's individual reason over the
collective wisdom of generations of lawyers. Political decisions, they argued,
are always legal decisions, 6' and, as such, they demanded the application of
artificial reason .6 Hence the King, his ministers, and MPs would always do
best to heed the advice of their lawyers.6 3
In addition to impugning the motives and assumptions underlying the
royalist position, the common lawyers argued vigorously for the autonomy of
other political institutions from the monarchy. They conceded to the King the
power to call or dissolve Parliament. But they also maintained that he could not
adjourn ongoing proceedings,6 4 meddle with election results, or regulate
at 115 (noting that positions polarized in reaction to particular events and personalities);
Richard Cust & Ann Hughes, Introduction: After Revisionism, in CONFLICT IN EARLY STUART
ENGLAND: STUDIES IN RELIGION AND POLITICS 1603-1642, at 1, 17-18, 27-40 (Richard Cust &
Ann Hughes eds., 1989) (canvassing explanations for the hardening of views).
59. SOMERVILLE, supra note 22, at 159, 162-63; Clive Holmes, Parliament, Liberty, Taxation, and
Property, in PARLAMENT AND LIBERTY, supra note 22, at 122, 124-37.
60. See, e.g., SOMMEvxVmuL, supra note 22, at 147, 159-6o (the power to make forced loans would
entail the power "'to annihilate acts of parliament, and parliaments themselves.'" (quoting
Sir John Eliot)).
61. Gray, supra note 26, at 181-82. The common lawyers' application of a unitary conception of
artificial reason to all governmental decisionmaking (whether political or judicial) in part
reflected the absence of separated powers. See Derek M. Hirst, Freedom, Revolution, and
Beyond, in PARLIAMENT AND LIBERTY, supra note 22, at 252, 258 (noting the intermingling of
government functions).
62. POSTEmA, supra note 47, at 9; see also CROMARTIE, supra note 20, at 55 (noting that lawyers
were "ideal politicians, the spokesmen of reason itself"); Gray, supra note 26, at 184 (stating
that each political actor was well-advised to proceed by "accept[ing] the justice and
sufficiency of the ancestral law and concentrat[ing] on understanding it deeply to the end of
applying it correctly in the present").
63. This claim of lawyerly competence was not an argument for supreme judicial competence.
True, the application of artificial reason was central to the task of adjudication. But it was
equally central to the work of the lawyer serving as royal counselor or as MP.
64. SOMMvRLLE, supra note 22, at 65.
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parliamentary speech.6 6 That all appropriations had to commence in the House
of Commons likewise served as a critical counterweight to the King's power to
call and dissolve Parliament. 67 In a similar fashion, they insisted that the King
was obliged to respect his courts. True, they did not argue for an independent,
coequal judicial branch: The King was the font of justice and individual judges
worked for him. Yet they maintained that his delegation of authority to the
courts was irrevocable -that he was "immanent if not dissolved" within
them,68 and he would step out of his proper place if he were to assume the
power to adjudicate individual cases. 6" To interfere with the course of justice
would upset the structure of government, and entail a substitution of the
King's natural reason for lawyers' artificial reason. Similarly, they argued that
it was not within the King's authority to grant executive courts (e.g., Star
Chamber) jurisdiction that properly belonged to common law courts.
70
The common lawyers not only argued for the autonomy of the courts, but
also for limits on the "dispensing power"-the King's prerogative to exempt
particular persons from legal rules and penalties.7' For example, if Parliament
65. According to the common lawyers, the House of Commons retained the exclusive right to
determine qualifications of its members, rendering void attempts by the King to render
disfavored persons ineligible for service (e.g., by appointing them to some other office). Id.
at 63-64, 73.
66. Id. at 70-71, 74-76; see also J.H. Hexter, Parliament, Liberty and Freedom of Elections, in
P iLAMENT AND LIBERTY, supra note 22, at 21, 25-51 (describing the "Humble Answer" and
"Apology" drafted by members of the House of Commons to James I as early assertions of
parliamentary privileges). I do not mean to cast these MPs as modem-day civil
libertarians- they frequently took it upon themselves to punish members who defended
royalist positions.
67. SOMMERVIIIE, supra note _2, at 66-67. The common lawyers were against not the
impositions per se, but rather the King's assertion of unilateral power to impose them. Id. at
145 & n.24.
68. Cromartie, supra note 27, at 112.
69. COKE, supra note 38, at 1169 ("[T]he King hath wholly left matters of judicature according
to his lawes to his Judges."). Hobbes took this argument to be of sufficient import to
warrant a rebuttal. THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT
OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 89 (Joseph Cropsey ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1971)
(1681).
70. STONER, supra note 20, at 30.
p. The dispensing and pardoning powers were distinct. The latter spared a wrongdoer from
punishment for having done wrong. 12 EDWARD COKE, THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE
(1656), reprinted in i SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 26, at 439. The former relieved the
beneficiary of any obligation to comply with the law. Because pardons did not purport to
annul the wrong, they could be granted in situations when dispensations could not. See
WESTON & GREENBERG, supra note 49, at 22-34; Paul Birdsall, "Non Obstante": A Study of the
Dispensing Power of English Kings, in ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY 37, 60 (Carl
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enacted a law setting a one-year term of office for sheriffs, the King could
dispense with the law as it applied to a particular sheriff.72 According to
common law theory, the dispensing power, like every royal power, was subject
to significant legal restraints. For example, it could not be used to suspend the
application of laws applicable to whole classes of persons, nor could it be
invoked to exempt individuals from common law obligations (as opposed to
statutory directives). It also could not license an act malum in se: The King
could not grant a man dispensation to commit murder, although he could
pardon him from being punished for it.73
Most saliently, "the king [could] never exercise his prerogative of
dispensation in such a way as to prejudice the more specific rights of his
subjects, those of property or of personal security."74 Thus, he had no power to
dispense "if in doing so he allowed one subject to dispossess another, do
another injury, or deprive another of recourse to a private suit or action." s7 The
King could not grant an individual immunity from liability for an action to
recover a debt.76 To do so would be to tread on "[o]ne of the subject's most
fundamental rights," namely, the right to have "his cause tried by the known
rules of the common law in the common law courts."7 Nor could the King
immunize a subject from being enjoined to eliminate a nuisance. By definition,
a nuisance interferes with the property rights of another citizen whose interest
in the matter the King had no power to waive.78 The pardon power was
similarly limited. The King could pardon a felon, but that pardon only
concerned the royal interest in punishment. If the felony also constituted an
Wittke ed., 1967); Carolyn A. Edie, Tactics and Strategies: Parliament's Attack upon the Royal
Dispensing Power 1597-1689, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197 (1985).
72. Likewise, the King could grant an exemption to laws limiting trade in certain goods.
WESTON & GREENBERG, supra note 49, at 25-26; Birdsall, supra note 71, at 46-47. This was so
even if such a law contained a clause purporting to block the King from dispensing with it.
Birdsall, supra note 71, at 46-47.
73. Birdsall, supra note 71, at 55-56; Edie, supra note 71, at 199.
74. Birdsall, supra note 71, at 56.
75. Edie, supra note 71, at 199.
76. Birdsall, supra note 71, at 57.
77. SOMMERViLLE, supra note 22, at 169; see also Birdsall, supra note 71, at 6o.
78. See WESTON & GREENBERG, supra note 49, at 11, 24 (discussing this limitation in connection
with the King's pardon power); Cromartie, supra note 27, at iio (noting Glanville's
assertion that the dispensing power cannot be used to "take from... subjects that birthright
and inheritance which they have in their liberties by virtue of the common law and of...
statutes [incorporated into it]").
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injury to another, the King could not annul the victim's right to prosecute an
appeal of felony against the defendant as redress for the wrong done to him.
79
B. Locke on the Inalienability of the Right To Redress Injuries
As described in the previous Section, one finds within common law theory
the idea that the King's responsibilities, as defined by the Ancient Constitution,
include an obligation to establish courts and not to interfere with their
operation so that they might, among other things, provide for the redress of
wrongs. John Locke took a similar position as a matter of normative social
contract theory in his Second Treatise on Government.80 In it, Locke maintained
that an individual's delegation of governing power to the state does not include
a renunciation of his right to obtain redress from one who has wrongfully
injured him. Instead, the individual consents only to channel the exercise of
that right through the law, and, in return, the government is placed under an
obligation to provide such law. Locke, like the common lawyers, thus insisted
that the sovereign has no authority to extinguish a victim's claim to recourse
against an injurer.
The opening pages of the Second Treatise reveal a political theory based on
modern rather than medieval premises.S Expressly rejecting the idea that the
relationship of ruler and ruled is one of natural subordination, the Second
Treatise famously posits that political power is unnatural and therefore in need
of justification.2 This, in turn, requires an account of how a government
constructed by persons who stand in a natural relation of equality can claim the
79. See WESTON & GREENBERG, supra note 49, at 23. An appeal of felony was a private
prosecution brought at the behest of the victim of a felony, or surviving kin, in lieu of an
action for damages. See David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early
Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 59, 61-68 (1996). Even Hobbes thought it would be
inequitable - though of course not unlawful - for the sovereign to relieve wrongdoers of the
obligation to make reparations to victims. HOBBES, supra note 69, at 76.
So. For recent analyses of the significance of Locke's thought for the idea of redress, see Ann
Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REv.
689, 696-97 (2004); and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 637-40 (Jules Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., 2002).
81. See HERZOG, supra note 36, at 19, 39-71 (arguing that modern consent theories of political
legitimacy emerged in conjunction with the emergence of new nonhierarchical forms of
interaction in Stuart England).
82. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT 265,
267-68 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
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right to coerce and even kill.8 ' To develop this account, Locke employed the
now-familiar concepts of the state of nature and the social contract.
In Locke's view, the state of nature is governed by the law of nature. 
4
Under it, persons are equal and free to pursue any course of conduct, so long as
they do not harm another's life, health, liberty, or possessions. They also bear
obligations, including duties not to transgress against one another, that come
with preemptive and after-the-fact enforcement mechanisms. First, each
person has a right and a duty of self-preservation,"s which include a right to
defend oneself against transgressions by others.8 6 Second, breaches of the
obligation not to wrong others are punishable."s The authority to judge and to
punish resides equally in each individual.88 Judgment and punishment are thus
sought not for the benefit of the victim, but in the name of mankind. True, the
wrongdoer deserves his punishment: His transgression renders him eligible for
it. But the fact that punishment can be inflicted by anyone is evidence that
Locke did not conceive of it as revenge or retribution. Moreover, the degree of
punishment to be visited on the wrongdoer is only that which will suffice to
"make.. [the wrongdoer] repent" for his violation of the law and to set an
effective example by which to deter others.8s
Although Locke's conception of punishment centered on the vindication of
public interests, he also recognized that victims of wrongdoing stand in a
special relationship to wrongdoers:
Besides the Crime, which consists in violating the Law, there is
commonly injury done to some Person or other, and some other Man
receives damage by his Transgression, in which Case he who hath
received any damage, has besides the right of punishment common to
him with other Men, a particular Right to seek Reparation from him
that has done it.90
83. Id. at 268.
84. Id. at 271.
8s. Id.
86. Id. at 271, 28o.
87. Id. at 271-74.
88. Id. at 271-72.
89. Id. at 272.
90. Id. at 273.
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In other words, wrongs tend to have a public aspect and a private aspect. They
are a trespass 9 ' against the whole species (crimes) and a trespass against
particular victims (injuries). 92 As crimes, wrongs are punishable by anyone in
furtherance of the law and public safety. As injuries, they warrant redress or
satisfaction for the victim.93
With the transition from the state of nature to civil society, individuals
delegate to government the task of defining wrongs and of responding to
them.94 Locke, of course, argued that this delegation is revocable upon conduct
by governors evidencing a breach of the trust placed in them.95 He also argued
that it is incomplete. Individuals do hand over completely their right to act as
judge and executioner; but they do not give up their right of self-preservation
or their related right to redress wrongs.
The latter point is most apparent in cases of self-defense: When one man
sets upon another with an evident intent to rob him, Locke supposed that the
intended victim may kill the other.96 Yet the right is also in play in situations in
which the wrong committed -such as a theft that involves no risk of personal
injury-does not justify an immediate response from the victim. In civil
society, this sort of victim must look to the law for reparations.97 But, in return,
the government must provide such law. True, by entering civil society each
individual wholly gives over to government his right to punish, and it follows
that government enjoys the power to decline to punish when, in its judgment,
punishment will not serve to vindicate the law or deter.9' But with respect to
the private aspect of wrongs, Locke reasoned, the government enjoys no
such power:
91. Id. at 272. "Trespass" in this usage roughly corresponds to our notion of "tort"-i.e., a
wrong involving a transgression against another. GOLDBERG ETAL., supra note 3, at 3; see also
id. app. B (briefly describing the old trespass concept).
92. "Injury" refers not to the bad outcome for the victim, but to the fact of having been wronged
by another. Hence the import of the legal aphorism damnum absque injuria, which identifies
instances in which an actor causes harm to another yet cannot be said to have acted
wrongfully toward that other. WuLA BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *118 (equating
"private wrongs" with "civil injuries").
93. Others could assist the victim in obtaining reparations, but only the victim is entitled to
them. LocKE, supra note 82, at 272.
94- Id. at 353.
95. Id. at 367, 406-28.
96. Id. at 28o-81, 390.
97. Id. at 28o-8i, 324-25.
98. Id. at 273-74.
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[T]he Magistrate, who by being Magistrate, hath the common right of
punishing put into his hands, can often, where the publick good
demands not the execution of the Law, remit the punishment of
Criminal Offences by his own Authority, but yet cannot remit the
satisfaction due to any private Man, for the damage he has received.
That, he who has suffered the damage has a Right to demand in his
own name, and he alone can remit: The damnified Person has this
Power of appropriating to himself, the Goods or Services of the
Offender, by Right of Self-Preservation .... 99
In other words, even in civil society, the natural right of self-preservation
includes not only the right to defend oneself against forcible attacks when
subsequent appeal to law would be useless, but also the right to remedial self-
help-the right of "appropriating to himself, the Goods or Service of the
Offender."'00 This right is defeasible: If the law provides an effective avenue by
which redress can be secured, the victim must forego private remedial self-help
and proceed by the mechanisms provided by the law. But the law cannot
extinguish the right to obtain reparations from one's wrongdoer by refusing to
provide such mechanisms. In that event, the individual is once again entitled to
help himself.
In sum, Locke's social contract theory claims that victims of wrongs possess
a natural right to reparations from wrongdoers, and that government, as
custodian of individuals' rights, owes it to them to provide a law of
reparations.'' In noting this feature of his thought, I do not mean to suggest
that Locke had views on tort reform. Still, Locke does provide a political theory
with modern premises that posits a basic governmental obligation to provide a
law of redress for private wrongs. Moreover, he extends the scope of this duty
by invoking it not only against the specter of arbitrary monarchy but, more
broadly, against the specter of arbitrary government.
99. Id. Locke's reasoning echoes and expands upon one of the recognized limits on the King's
dispensing power. See supra text accompanying notes 71-79.
loo. LOCKE, supra note 82, at 274. Note Locke's striking argument that enslavement of the
wrongdoer can be an appropriate remedy for a private wrong. Id. at 284.
1o0. Locke cited as one ground for the dissolution of a commonwealth the failure of the executive
power within it to administer justice. Id. at 410-11.
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C. Blackstone's Synthesis: Private Wrongs and the English Constitution
Although hardly bedfellows in the seventeenth century, common law and
social contract theories would join forces by the end of the eighteenth. °2 The
chief architect of this merger was William Blackstone." 3 In Blackstone's work
we see a more fully formed rendition of the common lawyers' and Locke's
notion that Englishmen enjoy a right to a body of law that enables them to
redress "injuries" or private wrongs. This rendition, in turn, would prove
influential among early American elites, as I will discuss in Part II.
In this Section, I first offer a hurried overview of the Commentaries that
aims to defend them against stock charges of incoherence. 1°4 1 then show that
they offer a constructivist conception of rights that treats laws granting
1o. Hobbes, the father of social contract theory, was a vicious critic of common law theory,
ridiculing as nonsensical and pernicious the ideas of law that binds the sovereign, artificial
reason, and virtuous complexity. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 199, 201, 240-44
(Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier Books 1962) (1651). Locke seems to have been unmoved by
appeals to custom, artificial reason, and the common law as a font of justice. See Peter
Laslett, Introduction to LOCKE, supra note 82, at 77-79.
103. STONER, supra note 20, at 162-75; Heyman, supra note 20, at 517.
104. See, e.g., DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 4-6 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1996) (1941) (arguing that the
Commentaries form an incoherent and self-serving apology for the mid-eighteenth-century
status quo); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 85 (1955) (reprinting articles from 1928-1929) (describing
Blackstone's work as "the very exemplar and model of legalistic and judicial obscurantism").
The standard view owes much to Bentham's overwrought early critiques. See J. H. Burns &
H.L.A. Hart, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A
FRAGMENT ON GOVERIMENT, at xix-xxix (j. H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977) (describing
Bentham's critiques of Blackstone); W. S. Holdsworth, Blackstone, 17 N.C. L. REV. 233, 238-
40 (1939) (briefly describing the bases for Bentham's hostility toward Blackstone's work).
In this country, it also traces back to Blackstone's rejection of popular sovereignty and of the
idea that American colonists enjoyed the rights of Englishmen. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note
92, at *105, *157; see i JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 14-20 (James DeWitt
Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896) (criticizing Blackstone for rejecting the
doctrine of popular sovereignty); Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New
American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 748-49 (1976)
(noting that Jefferson came to associate Blackstone with forces of reaction).
For more charitable modem readings of Blackstone, see DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE
PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN
29-68 (1989); S.F.C. MILSOM, The Nature of Blackstone's Achievement, in STUDIES IN THE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 197, 197-208 (1985); Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering
Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1996); J.M. Finnis, Blackstone's Theoretical Intentions, 12 NAT.
L.F. 163 (1967); W. S. Holdsworth, Some Aspects of Blackstone and His Commentaries, 4
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 261 (1932); Richard A. Posner, Blackstone and Bentham, 19 J.L. & ECON. 569
(1976).
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individuals the power to redress wrongful invasions of those rights as a vital
structural feature of the English Constitution. I conclude by rebutting the
objection that the Commentaries cannot be treated as a source for a fundamental
right to a law of redress because they treat all rights as mere positive rights that
are subject to legislative revision.
1. Rights and Wrongs
The Commentaries consist of brief prefatory and introductory remarks
followed by a mass of materials organized under the headings of Rights and
Wrongs.' Each of these headings is in turn bisected into two books, creating
the following scheme: I - Rights of Persons; II - Rights of Things; III - Private
Wrongs; and IV-Public Wrongs.1" 6 Although long a source of criticism,
10 7
this organization is coherent. Its intelligibility hinges on Blackstone's broad
(and loose) use of the term "rights." By it he referred to all laws that declare
and confer on natural or artificial persons rights, statuses, privileges, or
powers."' This is why Book I places under the same heading a discussion of
Magna Carta, the respective legal powers of King and Parliament, and the rules
of family and corporate law. Laws such as Magna Carta -themselves reflective
and generative of English practices and beliefs- construct the individual as a
rights-bearer by declaring him to be such a being and by directing persons to
respect his rights.1°9 Governmental institutions, the Anglican church, and
105. Blackstone's scheme builds on one devised earlier by Hale. WILLAM BLACKSTONE, AN
ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, at vii-viii (photo. reprint 1996) (3d ed. 1758).
Blackstone's introduction treats social contract theory much like the common lawyers
treated natural law, i.e., as setting the basic parameters in which national ("municipal") law
operates. In this view, social contract theory captures the fundamental but abstract idea that
individuals are holders of basic rights to life, liberty, and the ownership of property, which
leaves to particular systems of municipal law almost all of the work of defining and
enforcing these rights. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *38, *43-44, *47, *125, *130.
lo6. Using modem categories, one can assign the following topics to each book: Book I-
constitutional law, administrative law, family law, and corporations; Book II-property,
trusts and estates, and contracts; Book III-torts and civil procedure; Book W-criminal
law and procedure.
107. See GARETH JONES, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE LAW: SELECTIONS FROM BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, at xxvi (1973); MICHAEL LOBBAN, THE COMMON
LAw AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 1760-1850, at 12, 27-41 (1991); Duncan Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 223-64 (1979); Alan Watson,
The Structure ofBlackstone's Commentaries, 97 YALE L.J. 795, 796 (1988).
io8. With the exception of the remedial or second-order powers that the law confers on persons
who have been wronged. See infra text accompanying notes 119-141.
lo9. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *123-24.
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municipal and business corporations"'are similarly constructed: Each of these
artificial persons, no less than natural persons, owes its status and powers to
the law."1 Book II belongs under the heading of rights for the same reason. It
addresses the parts of English law that empower individuals to own things. In
Blackstone's view, the only natural component of ownership is God's grant to
mankind of the run of the planet, which is a communal rather than an
individual right. Thus, for example, it is only by virtue of English law that an
owner gains the ability to control the transfer of his property upon death."' In
sum, just as Book I canvasses how English law, through its declaratory and
directive provisions, constructs individuals as bearers of rights of life and
liberty, confers on political institutions powers of governance, and grants to
fathers privileges with respect to their families, so Book II explains how that
same body of law is responsible for constructing the relationship of
Englishmen to land and goods as one of private ownership."3
After discussing the rights and powers conferred by English law, the
Commentaries in their remaining two books attend to the prohibitory and
remedial parts of the law- those that, in light of the rights articulated in Books
I and II, enjoin or demand certain conduct, and provide remedies to victims of
misconduct and sanctions for those who engage in it. Book III begins with
Locke's sharp distinction between private and public wrongs. 4 Insofar as
misconduct amounts to a "violation of public rights and duties, which affect
the whole community, considered as a community," it is a public wrong or
crime. " s By contrast, insofar as conduct involves "an infringement or privation
of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as
11o. 1 id. at *142-353 (discussing Parliament and King); 1 id. at *364-83 (clergy); 1 id. at *421-54
(families); 1 id. at *455-73 (corporations).
m1. Blackstone's treatment of the institutions of English government under the Rights-of-
Persons heading also emphasizes his view that Englishmen enjoy a right to forms of
government conducive to the protection of their rights. See infra text accompanying notes
131-136.
112. Under natural law, the death of the initial acquirer of property would return it to humanity
in common, with ownership then vesting in the first person to grab it. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 92, at *13; see also 2 id. at *11 ("[Inheritance] is certainly a wise and effectual, but clearly
a political, establishment; since the permanent right of property, vested in the ancestor
himself, was no natural, but merely a civil, right."); 1 id. at *134 (staring that rights of
ownership and transfer "are entirely derived from society").
113. 1 id. at *6-7. Blackstone's treatment of property also sheds light on his immediate aspiration
for the Commentaries: By getting his students to grasp that their rights -and particularly
their wealth -depended on the law, he hoped to induce in them the sense that it was not
only their duty, but in their interest, to serve as guardians of the constitution.
114. 3 id. at 2.
11S. 3 id.
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individuals," it is a private wrong or civil injury., 6 The private wrongs
recognized by English municipal law are defined by the common law writs of
trespass and case. These actions articulate clusters of relational duties-
obligations that require one to act, or refrain from acting, in specified ways
toward others so as to avoid interfering with their rights or interests.
117
Blackstone, as Locke had, treated each breach of such a duty as an injuring of
that other-i.e., a deprivation of the other's right. "s He also followed Locke in
seeing tort law as a grant to victims of special remedial privileges or powers by
which to respond to their injuries. The primary avenue " 9 of redress for victims,
he explained, is the common law courts; in particular their recognition, under
the writs of trespass and case, of "personal actions"'20 for "torts" and
"contracts.... Blackstone's list of personal tort actions is today entirely
recognizable, including assault, battery, defamation, false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, medical malpractice, nuisance, and trespass to land."
Each of these actions permitted victims to vindicate one or more of his absolute
rights to life, liberty, and the use of property. Other actions stood to vindicate
"relative" rights. For example, a man in his capacity as husband could (in
Blackstone's time) obtain redress for loss of his property in his wife's services
from one who abducted her or enticed her away.
2 3
The immediate purpose of the typical common law suit was to permit the
victim to obtain a pecuniary satisfaction " from the wrongdoer as an
"equivalent""'5 to a literal restoration of his rights."26 The equivalence here
116. 3 id.
117. For an elaboration of the idea of relational duties, see infra text accompanying notes 377-388.
118. This analysis also applied to the "contract" writ -the action on the case for an assumpsit,
which identified certain promises or undertakings as imposing a duty to perform on the
promisor for the benefit of the promisee. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *157.
iig. In some instances, the law would authorize self-help, as in cases of self-defense and
recapture of chattels. 3 id. at *3-6. Individuals might also arrange for private dispute
resolution, 3 id. at *15-16, or pursue claims arising out of certain wrongs in courts other than
common law courts, 3 id. at *61-70, such as military, ecclesiastical, and maritime courts.
120. 3 id. at *117-18. In addition to personal actions were "real" actions, by which courts ordered
restoration of ownership in realty of which the victim had been deprived, and "mixed"
actions, which included landlords' actions for waste against tenants. 3 id.
121. 3 id. at *117.
122. 3 id. at*120-28, *138.
123. 3 id. at *138-43.
124. 3 id. at *117, *121, *128, *138-39, *22o.
125. 3 id. at *146; see also 4 id. at *7. An example of a literal restoration of right via a personal
action would be court-ordered specific performance.
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concerns rights rather than harm or loss. The point of these actions was not (or
not only) to compensate for the loss suffered by the victim, although the loss
was usually compensated. Rather, the aim was to provide the victim with
satisfaction-a payment that, from the perspective of an objective observer,
would permit the victim to vindicate himself as against the injurer.
Accordingly, a jury would ordinarily be asked to assess damages based on the
gravity of the wrongdoer's misconduct toward the victim as well as its
consequences for the victim. 2 7
2. The Right to Law for the Redress of Private Wrongs:
Blackstone's Constitution
The Commentaries define a private wrong as a breach of a duty owed by the
wrongdoer to the victim and, hence, a mistreatment of ("injury to") the victim
by the wrongdoer. For this class of wrong, Blackstone explained, the law
confers on the victim (or his or her survivors) a special privilege to respond to
the wrongdoing, consisting typically of a power to invoke the writ of trespass
or case to obtain damages from the wrongdoer. This power, Blackstone
insisted, is not "merely" a common law entitlement, but rather a right
guaranteed by England's unwritten constitution.
The Commentaries' organization -in particular, the framework of Rights
and Wrongs - attests to the general importance of both remedy and sanction to
Blackstone's conception of law. A legal system content merely to issue
declarations and directives could not claim to be one which offered its citizens
the protection of the law:
126. Blackstone placed his discussion of the appeal of felony in Book IV rather than Book III. 4
id. at *3o8-12. As noted above, the appeal was a private prosecution that, like actions for
trespass and case, was not terminable by officials, but that, in principle, would result in
punishment of the offender rather than payment of damages. See supra note 79. (I say "in
principle" because "appealed" defendants seem often to have reached monetary settlements
with their accusers.) There were at least two considerations at work here. First, the appeal
was already a relic by the mid-eighteenth century. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *308.
Second, the appeal's availability hinged on the commission of a felony, and therefore
arguably was best presented in the Book devoted to specifying the content of that category
of wrongs.
127. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *121, *397-98 (noting juries' discretion to set damages in
light of numerous considerations, including the losses suffered by the victim as well as the
nature of the defendant's conduct); see also John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort
Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. (forthcoming 2006) (arguing that
tort damages conceived as redress or satisfaction warrant fair compensation, a measure
distinct from the notion of make-whole compensation).
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[I]n vain would rights be declared, in vain directed to be observed, if
there were no method of recovering and asserting those rights, when
wrongfully withheld or invaded. This is what we mean properly, when
we speak of the protection of the law. When, for instance, the
declaratory part of the law has said "that the field or inheritance, which
belonged to Titius's father, is vested by his death in Titius," and the
directory part has "forbidden any one to enter on another's property
without the leave of the owner;" if Gaius after this will presume to take
possession of the land, the remedial part of the law will then interpose
it's office; will make Gaius restore the possession to Titius, and also pay
him damages for the invasion. 's
The basic connection between laws recognizing rights and laws providing
remedies and sanctions is likewise expressed in Blackstone's treatment of
slavery as a condition of legal disability rather than mere physical
domination. 2 9 A person is a slave, he said, when the law fails to declare him a
rights-holder, and when its remedial and sanctioning powers are unavailable to
him, for then he is without "the protection of the law." A slave, in other words,
is just a person who may be beaten, confined, and otherwise abused without
the violation of a legal directive, liability, or punishment.130
These general observations are repeated and sharpened when the
Commentaries turn to the specifics of English law. Book I commences by
declaring that each person enjoys absolute rights to security of person, freedom
of movement, and use of property. Again, Blackstone insisted that this
declaration would be "in vain" if the "constitution had provided no other
method to secure their actual enjoyment."13" ' The constitution "has therefore
established certain other auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve
principally as barriers to protect and maintain inviolate the three great primary
rights . . ,. . Blackstone identified five such rights: (i) the right to
parliamentary government; (2) the right to clear limits on the royal
prerogative; (3) the right to apply to the courts of justice for redress of injuries;
128. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *55-5 6 .
129. 1 id. at *412; see also i id. at *122 ("[W]here there is no law, there is no freedom.").
Blackstone did not include in his rejection of slavery the rejection of contracts binding one
man to serve another for his lifetime. 1 id. at *412-13.
13o. English law, Blackstone claimed, rendered slavery an impossibility by treating all persons
subject to it as entitled to its protection. Thus, "a slave or a negro, the moment he lands in
England, falls under the protection of the laws, and with regard to all natural rights becomes
eo instanti a freeman." 1 id. at *123.
131. 1 id. at *136.
132. 1 id. (emphasis added).
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(4) the right to petition the King, or either house of Parliament, for redress of
grievances; and (5) the right of the individual to bear arms for self defense.'33
The first two acknowledge that English citizens are entitled to a structure of
government that had proven relatively effective in reducing the risk of rights
violations by government itself.34 The third supplements them by offering
protection to the individual primarily against private transgressions. It in turn
is supplemented by the last pair of auxiliary rights-the right to petition the
King for redress of grievances not cognizable in the courts,1 3 and the right to
arm oneself for protection against certain forms of violence when protection is
not provided by government.' 36 In sum, the rights to access common law
courts, petition, and bear arms are presented on the same plane as the right to
be governed by King-in-Parliament. Each is a "structural" right that
Englishmen possess so that they can enjoy their primary rights.
As to the substance of the third auxiliary subordinate right, there can be no
mistake: It gives expression to the "settled and invariable principle in the laws
of England, that every right when with-held must have a remedy, and every
injury it's proper redress."'37 It likewise instantiates Coke's maxim that every
subject, "'for injury done to him in bonis, in terris, vel persona, by any other
subject... may take his remedy by the course of the law, and have justice and
right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any denial,
and speedily without delay.""13' As such, it generates a corresponding
affirmative duty on the part of the King to provide law and courts. At least for
those wrongs "committed in the mutual intercourse between subject and
subject," he "is officially bound to [provide] redress in the ordinary forms
of law." '39
133. 1 id. at *136-41.
134. See 1id. at *15o-51.
135. In modem categories, the petition procedure fell somewhere in between a mere right to
complain and a full-blown right to an adjudication. See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial
Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right To Petition, 66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2153,
2169 (1998); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right To Petition: Toward a First
Amendment Right To Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. L. REv. 899, 903-
26 (1997).
136. See Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights and the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 237,
252-60 (2000) (interpreting Blackstone's view of the right to bear arms).
137. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *19. Hence the importance of the miscellaneous action for
trespass on the case, which permitted the articulation of new wrongs and remedies. 3 id. at
*122-23.
138. 3 id. at *137 (quoting COKE, supra note 35, at 870).
139. 3 id. at *115-16. Here Blackstone set aside for separate treatment claims against the King and
his officials. See infra text accompanying notes 143-144 (discussing sovereign immunity).
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Against these seemingly forthright endorsements of a fundamental right to
a law for the redress of private wrongs, a skeptic might raise two kinds of
objections. First, she might focus on eighteenth-century usages or doctrines
that seem inconsistent with ascribing fundamental importance to tort law.
Second, she might claim that the right Blackstone had in mind is a limited
right that holds only against what we would today call executive branch
interference, not legislative interference. I will address each of these in turn.
One might argue that Blackstone could not have attributed great
significance to tort law because the subject of torts was not identified by that
name until the mid-nineteenth century.140 This objection confuses labels for
substance. Blackstone understood the law of private wrongs to be largely
coextensive with the category of personal actions. (As noted above, at one point
he divided these into claims for "torts" and claims sounding in "contract."'41)
Labels aside, plaintiffs were able to invoke the writ system to obtain redress for
conduct that would today constitute familiar torts. To counter this observation
by arguing that the law of the writs was procedural not substantive, and
therefore could not count as a law of redress, is to engage in anachronism. In
sum, the absence of late-eighteenth-century treatises devoted by name to torts
in no way entails the absence of a law for the redress of private wrongs. 4 2
A second variant on this sort of objection derives from three doctrines that
substantially curtailed the availability of redress. The first of these was
sovereign immunity. How could Blackstone have supposed that English law
regarded access to a law of redress as fundamental if victims of wrongs
14o. See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1230, 1256-81 (2OO1) (noting
that the first American treatise devoted to "torts" was published in 186o, and contending
that torts only achieved the status of a substantive subject in the 188os, when Holmes
defined it as the law of accidents).
141. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *117. Likewise, the fact that Blackstone's law of private
wrongs emerged unsystematically out of the patchwork of actions cognizable under the
trespass and case writs hardly provides a basis for refusing to treat it as a category of law to
which Englishmen could claim an entitlement. It was one of Blackstone's great
achievements to find a fitting conceptual category for what had been a motley collection of
actions.
142. The illegality of contingent fees and the absence of liability insurance made personal injury
law less prominent in eighteenth-century England than it is in twenty-first-century
America. Still, it was hardly invisible. For example, in the late seventeenth century, early
tabloids began covering the trials of actions by husbands for the seduction of their wives.
LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987, at 248-51 (199o). Tort law's
relatively narrow scope of operation did not induce Blackstone to dismiss it as
insignificant -he gave tort at least as much attention as contract. Presumably it would be a
mistake to infer from the brevity of the latter treatment that there was no law of enforceable
agreements in eighteenth-century England; it would equally be a mistake to infer that there
was no functioning law of redress.
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perpetrated by royal officials could not sue them? The simple answer is that
sovereign immunity did not bar such suits. Although the doctrine did prevent
the imposition of liability on the King, it did not bar tort suits against
individual royal officials - at least not inferior officers charged with ministerial
rather than discretionary tasks. 43 In short, sovereign immunity blocked the
application of respondeat superior to government. As such, it poses no obstacle
to my reading of Blackstone.'"
Another doctrine, encapsulated in the actio personalis maxim, held that if a
tort victim (or tortfeasor) died prior to judgment, the action evaporated.
14
How could a legal system committed to the idea of redressing wrongs permit a
wrongful killing to go unredressed? The explanation lies partly in the law's
refusal (still largely intact) to attribute to decedents a postmortem interest in
obtaining redress, and partly in its unwillingness to treat the typical wrongful
killing as a separate wrong to the decedent's survivors. Suppose wagon driver
D negligently ran down and killed H, W's husband, as H was walking by
himself. In wronging and harming H, D had also harmed W. But, in the eyes
of the law, D had not wronged ("injured") W. D's act was legally wrongful as
to H because it constituted a breach of a duty owed to persons such as H to be
careful while driving to avoid causing physical harm to them. But D did not
breach any such duty as to W, or commit any other recognized wrong as to
her. , 6 True, English law could have defined a wrong that would have
permitted W to sue D for the killing of H. But the common law's failure to do
143. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77-HARv. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1963). Blackstone is often cited for the infamous maxim that "the king can do no
wrong." 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *254. Yet by this phrase he did not mean that the
King stood outside the law. Rather, his point was twofold: (i) that only the King's
ministers, not the King himself, could be held to answer in a court of law for official
misconduct; and (2) that the King's prerogative was inherently limited by the principle that
he must always act for the good of his people and therefore may not "do any injury" (i.e., do
wrong) to them. 3 id. at *255.
144. Certain claimants could also seek relief via recognized petitions, such as the petition of right.
However, at least by the mid-nineteenth century, courts had ruled that petitions were
unavailable to tort claimants, perhaps on the theory that recovery would impute
wrongdoing to the monarch. Jaffe, supra note 143, at 8.
145. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 341.
146. In other words, a tort action empowers the victim of a certain kind of wrong to obtain
redress against the wrongdoer for having been wronged; that an innocent victim suffered
harm because of the wrongful conduct of another is not sufficient to support a cause of
action. See John C.P. Goldberg, Rethinking Injuty and Proximate Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1315, 1332-43 (2003) (interpreting the duty and proximate cause components of negligence as
setting a requirement of wronging). Even today, post-mortem interests of the decedent-
e.g., her interest in sharing the wealth she would have generated with her family but for her
tortiously caused death- are not recognized as surviving death.
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so does not establish that it failed to function as law of redress, only that it
refused to recognize a particular (and expansive) cause of action.
47
Finally, brief consideration is required of the so-called felony merger
doctrine. In the eighteenth century, felony convictions frequently earned the
felon the death penalty and forfeiture of his land and goods to the crown. As
Blackstone noted without apparent concern, 14  victims of felonies were
therefore often unable to pursue tort claims. If Blackstone believed that the law
of redress was fundamental, what explains this lack of concern? The answer is
that Blackstone did not regard the felony-merger doctrine as a rule of law. Here
is how he described it:
In these gross and atrocious injuries the private wrong is swallowed up
in the public: we seldom hear any mention made of satisfaction to the
individual; the satisfaction to the community being so very great. And
indeed .. it is impossible afterwards to make any reparation for the
private wrong; which can only be had from the body or goods of the
aggressor.'4 9
The emphasis on empirics - the frequency with which one "hears" about
recoveries, and the "impossibility" of satisfaction- suggests that Blackstone
was identifying practical limits on the reach of the law of redress. This reading
is bolstered by evidence of seventeenth-century decisions that permitted
victims to sue felons who had avoided death and forfeiture by invoking benefit
of clergy."' Blackstone was probably aware of these decisions, which may
explain why he did not describe the extinguishing of tort claims against felons
as a doctrine or a rule of law. If this interpretation is correct, then there are no
grounds for the current objection. A right of redress is a right as against the
wrongdoer. The availability of assets owned by the wrongdoer-or the
147. To cast D's acts as a wrong to W would require the articulation of a cause of action that
would hold an actor liable for causing distress or economic loss to persons who were not put
at foreseeable risk of physical harm by the actor's conduct. Even modem courts have been
reluctant to recognize such a broad cause of action. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV.
657, 670-72 (2001) (reviewing relevant duty doctrine). The need for courts to articulate this
sort of wrong was obviated by the enactment of wrongful death statutes in the nineteenth
century.
148. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *6.
149. 4 id.
15o. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 331-33. Holdsworth noted a 1791 opinion treating the issue
as open. 3 id. at 333.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115:524 2005
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF TORT LAW
availability of his body, in a system that permits punitive forms of redress-
will always set a limit on victim recoveries.1"'
The second category of objection mentioned above does not deny that
Blackstone regarded Englishmen as enjoying a right to a law of redress that
includes much of what we today term tort law. Instead, it maintains that the
right he had in mind was a limited right to pursue one's claims free of royal
interference, not a right that would block legislative revision or abolition of this
part of the common law.
This category of objection has some validity. Blackstone did insist that the
entitlement to seek redress for private wrongs was, in part, an entitlement
against royal interference. Thus, like the common lawyers before him, he
maintained that the victim, not royal officials, determined whether to set the
law of redress "in motion"152 and that, once an action for redress was
commenced, no one, not even the King, had the right to call it off.'53
Furthermore, he described the right to apply to the courts for redress of
injuries as a right to "the law of the land,"'-' which he defined as a body of
substantive rules that is "fixed, and unchangeable, unless by authority of
parliament."' He also insisted that Englishmen enjoy an entitlement not only
to a substantive law of redress, but also to common law procedure, which
151. Even if one were to construe Blackstone as endorsing felony merger as a doctrine, it would
stand only for the proposition that, for a certain class of wrongs deemed egregious, the
victim's right to redress must give way to the public's right to impose sanctions on the
wrongdoer for the common good. To grant priority to this interest is to set out a relatively
narrow ground for suspending the law of redress. See infra text accompanying note 431
(articulating a burden of justification on governments seeking to alter the law of redress).
152. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *22. Locke and Blackstone sharply distinguished torts from
crimes even though in their times the job of litigating fell either to the victim or to the
victim's kin. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 11 (2003).
In the absence of the modem division of labor between tort plaintiffs and government
prosecutors, Locke and Blackstone distinguished between suits brought by victims of
wrongs qua victims and suits brought by victims qua prosecutors.
153. By this time, the King's dispensing power, see supra text accompanying notes 71-79, had
been eliminated by statute, see i BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *138, in part because James II
had dared to invoke it to insulate Catholics from discriminatory laws. 4 id. at *433. The
King's pardon power remained intact, but could not be invoked to waive private causes of
action. 4 id. at *391.
154. 1 id.at *137.
155. 1 id. (emphasis added).
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"cannot be altered but by parliament.", s6 Both italicized phrases seem to
envision a right against royal, but not legislative, interference.
5 7
In fact, these passages are only the tip of the iceberg, for Book I famously
contains others that seem to reject outright the idea that the English
Constitution sets limits on parliamentary power. One ascribes to Parliament ss
"omnipotence," i.e., "a sovereign and uncontrollable authority to change any
facet of the English political system."5 9 Another rejects the notion that English
law confers on Englishmen a residuum of sovereignty over their political
institutions, insisting that "[s]o long... as the English constitution lasts...





To avoid misapprehending in these passages a commitment to legislative
supremacy, 6, one must attend closely to Blackstonian usage. Following
Hobbes, he defined the sovereign as that office or institution that operates as
the uncommanded commander within a political system,162 and municipal law
as the command of the sovereign. 63 It follows from this way of thinking that,
although a constitution can be attested to by law, it cannot be law. Instead, a
constitution is a precondition of law; the terms on which the sovereign creator
of law is itself created. Given these definitions, Blackstone thought it
unintelligible to speak of popular sovereignty. Yet he did not reject Locke's
claim that governments can commit breaches of trust, or that a people might
justifiably withdraw their support for a regime. 6 4 Instead, he argued that any
such withdrawal could not properly be described as an exercise of sovereignty.
Rather, it was an invocation of "those inherent (though latent) powers of
society," acting as a collective, to disband the polity.,6s Given the claim that
sovereignty is the ultimate decision-making power within a legal system, once
1S6. 1 id. at *138 (emphasis added).
157. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The Ongoing Search To Understand
the Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 32 RuTGERS L.J. 1005, 1011-13 (2001) (offering this
reading).
ss. Recall that the term Parliament is short for King-in-Parliament. The powers ascribed to it
are thus powers possessed by a mixed institution with checks and balances. i BLACKSTONE,
supra note 92, at *50-51.
is9. 1 id. at *156-57.
16o. 1 i. at *157.
161. CORWIN, supra note 104, at 83-85; see 1 WILSON, supra note 104, at 200.
16z. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *49.
163. 1 id. at *46.
164. For instances of Blackstone treating government as holding power in trust for the good of
the people, or as under a duty to provide for that good, see 1 id. at *12, *52-53, *156, *257.
16S. 1 id. at *238.
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the system is disbanded, there can be no sovereignty. By the same token, it was
impossible for a body of law actually to confer on citizens a legal right to revolt,
for any such conferral would be a dissolution of government that would render
the law no longer a law.
Another way to grasp the foregoing points is to ask what it was, in
Blackstone's view, that rendered Parliament the English sovereign. His answer,
of course, was the English Constitution. This is why he stated in the second of
the seemingly anti-constitutionalist passages quoted above that Parliament
would remain sovereign "so long... as the English constitution lasts." Again,
the idea is not that the rejection of parliamentary government would never be
warranted. Rather, it is that any such change would be "at once an entire
dissolution of the bands of government; and the people would be reduced to a
state of anarchy, with liberty to constitute to themselves a new legislative
power. )2166
Although Blackstone thus did not confer on the English Constitution the
status of fundamental law, he nonetheless did regard it as setting standards
against which to evaluate parliamentary enactments and royal conduct. Indeed,
it was perfectly intelligible for him to say, as he at times did say, that
Parliament had acted unconstitutionally, even though it enjoyed the power to
so act under the English Constitution.167 But of what did these constitutional
standards consist? The short answer is: a set of structural guarantees, some of
which bleed over into the recognition of individual rights. Here, Blackstone
again followed Hobbes, who distinguished between fundamental and non-
fundamental features of a legal system. 68 What counted as fundamental for
Blackstone? The answer resides in his list of auxiliary subordinate rights:
Parliament on its then-current design (bicameral, regularly convening), a
monarch with limited prerogative, relatively independent courts prepared to
provide redress for injuries under principles of common law, the availability of
petitions for grievances, and the bearing of arms for self-defense. Blackstone
identified each of these as a "right" precisely because of its importance to the
proper functioning of the polity. An act of Parliament abolishing the House of
Commons would upset fundamental checks and balances provided by the
English Constitution and therefore would be unconstitutional. The same
166. 1 id. at *52; see also LIEBERMAN, supra note 104, at 52 (emphasizing that Blackstone allowed
for the extralegal dissolution of parliamentary sovereignty).
167. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *51-52 (noting that Parliament's creation of a unitary
government would be the "end of our constitution").
168. HOBBES, supra note 102, at 214 ("(A] fundamental law in every commonwealth is that, which
being taken away, the commonwealth faileth, and is utterly dissolved; as a building whose
foundation is destroyed.").
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would be true of legislation or a royal decree purporting to abolish the
common law courts. 6 9 Imprisonment by royal officials of an individual
without cause was unconstitutional, not only because it amounted to a
transgression of a subject's right to liberty, but because it entailed a claim by
the King to a discretionary power that, if granted, would pose a grave threat to
everyone's rights.'
To be sure, the significance of deeming a law unconstitutional within this
frame of thought was not that the law could be declared void by a judge.
Instead, it signaled that the officials who enjoyed their powers by virtue of the
English Constitution had dissolved it and had erected a new form of
government. At this point, the people had to decide whether to acquiesce or
resist. While the notion of a people resisting a structural political change might
today strike us as far-fetched, it was hardly unimaginable to Blackstone.
Indeed, at one point he described the Glorious Revolution as a successful
popular rejection of James II's efforts to enslave the country under a new
regime.'
7'
In sum, there is no basis for inferring from Blackstone's recognition of
Parliament's authority to revise the common law that his conception of the
right to a law of redress was a right against only royal interference. Nor, in the
end, should this be a surprise. The Commentaries nowhere suggest that the
genius of the English system of government is that it permits King-in-
Parliament to do whatever it wants. Rather, the system aspires to define and
preserve individual rights. 72 True, Parliament, as sovereign, has the power to
trample on these rights; but that risk, Blackstone thought, is present in all
systems of governance simply because any system has to place sovereignty-
the extralegal power to make laws-somewhere. That Parliament has the
ability to run roughshod over rights does not negate their existence; if that
were the case, there would be no rights to extinguish.
In Blackstone's work, then, we see a more fully formed rendition of the
notion articulated by the common lawyers and by Locke that Englishmen enjoy
a right to law that enables them to redress "injuries" or private wrongs-
wrongs done to them by others. His rendition is particularly noteworthy for
four reasons. First, it grounds Locke's abstract and prescriptive account of the
169. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *422 (describing such a law as "unconstitutional").
170. 4 id. at *432 (noting that for officials unjustifiably to imprison a subject is to
"unconstitutionally misuse him"); see also 1 id. at *170 (describing a limit on the franchise as
"unconstitutional").
171. 4 id. at *433.
172. 1 id. at *141 (positing "political or civil liberty" as the "direct end of [England's]
constitution").
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right to a law of redress in the legal practices of the eighteenth century. In
doing so, it demonstrates that the content of the law in question substantially
overlaps with what we think of as tort law. Second, it deems access to a law of
redress as significant in part because that law gives content to, and helps make
real, the law's declaration that Englishmen possess rights to life, liberty, and
the use of property. In this way, Blackstone quite self-consciously treated
private law as having comparable significance to public law within a
constitutional frame of government. Third, his account treats the right to a law
of redress as a structural right-a right to court-access and law no different in
kind from the right to the institutions of representative government. Indeed, in
his views, it is precisely because access to a law of redress figures centrally
among the norms and practices by which Englishmen are constituted as rights-
bearers that the English Constitution guarantees them institutions that will
provide that body of law. Fourth, as I will now show, there is good reason to
suppose that, notwithstanding his opposition to the American Revolution,
Blackstone's ideas on this subject, like most others, were influential among
early American elites.
II. RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO A LAW OF REDRESS IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
One would expect the right to a law for the redress of private wrongs to
appear in early American law. The colonists claimed for themselves the rights
of Englishmen and justified their revolution on principles of English
constitutionalism. 173 In Section A, I demonstrate that lawyers of the Founding
era did in fact recognize this right. I also describe pre-Civil War state court
decisions in which the right was enforced against legislation depriving persons
of access to common law actions, and marshal evidence that Section i of the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to guarantee that states would attend to
basic governmental duties, including the duty to provide a law of redress. In
Section B, I review U.S. Supreme Court decisions issued between 187o and
1920 that locate the right to a law of redress in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, and that understand it to set a ceiling over, and a floor
under, state tort law. In principle, the ceiling empowered courts to strike down
laws that effected a naked redistribution of wealth under the guise of
expanding redress. The floor, meanwhile, enabled them to strike down laws
173. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 14 (abr.
ed. 1995); see also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 36-37, 267 n.9 (2004); GARRY WILLS, INVENTING
AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 54-55, 64 (1979).
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that deprived individuals of the ability to vindicate wrongful invasions of basic
interests, such as bodily integrity. In Section C, I discuss Truax v. Corrigan,
174
the disastrous 1921 decision in which the Supreme Court for the last time held
a state statute unconstitutional on the ground that it violated a victim's due
process right to a law of redress. I also review the Court's hasty retreat to
rational basis analysis.
A. 1776-1875: Reception
1. The Founding Era
With certain heresies excised, 7 the Commentaries provided the basic text
for late-colonial and early-American legal education and practice. , 6 American
jurists were thus quite familiar with the principle that government owes its
citizens laws and institutions for declaring and vindicating basic rights,
including the right to a law for the redress of wrongs. It is no surprise, then,
that a majority of the original states explicitly incorporated this right into
constitutional documents. Five early state constitutions included explicit
guarantees of redress. 77 Article 17 of the 1776 Maryland Declaration of Rights
was typical. Borrowing from Coke's reading of Magna Carta, it stated that
"every freeman, for any injury done him in his person or property, ought to
have remedy, by the course of the law of the land, and ought to have justice
and right freely without sale, fully without denial, and speedily without delay,
according to the law of the land." lz7 Similar language was endorsed by two
other states-Virginia and North Carolina-at their conventions for the
174. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
175. American scholars believed that Blackstone's erroneous denials of popular sovereignty and
of American colonists' rights could be severed from the core insights of his work. See, e.g., 1
ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES iv-vi (Philadelphia, Birch & Small
1803) (praising the perspicuity and organization of the Commentaries, while noting the need
for supplementation to reflect distinctive features of American and Virginia law).
176. On Blackstone's influence, see Nolan, supra note 1o4; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 225-30 (1998); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE
ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 16 (1975) ("It is impossible to
overemphasize the impact of Blackstone on legal education in America.").
in. See DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 9; MD. DECLARATION OF RGHTS AND CONST. of 1776, art.
XVII; MASS. CONST. of 178o, art. XI; N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. 14; VT. CONST. of 1786, art.
IV. Others contained due process, law of the land, and open court provisions that may have
been understood to incorporate a right to a law of redress. See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, § 26
("All courts shall be open, and justice shall be impartially administered without corruption
or unnecessary delay ....").
178. MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND CONST. of 1776, art. XVII.
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ratification of the Federal Constitution. In addition to a set of revisions, the
1788 Virginia convention proposed that a separate declaration of twenty
"essential and unalienable Rights" be added to the Federal Constitution. 179 The
twelfth of these stated that
every freeman ought to find a certain remedy by recourse to the laws for
all injuries and wrongs he may receive in his person, property or
character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely without sale,
comple[te]ly and without denial, promptly and without delay, and that
all establishments or regulations contravening these rights, are
oppressive and unjust. 
8
o
While it was not clear exactly what these guarantees entailed, the same was
true for most, if not all, of the rights enumerated in documents such as these.
Although Madison worked from the Virginia convention's proposals when
drafting what became the Federal Bill of Rights, he excluded Article 12 and
several others.' He may have regarded it as redundant with extant text or
other proposed amendments.8 2 More likely, he thought that it did not belong
179. See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BiLL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 182 (1957).
18o. See id. at 182; see also id. at 198, 200 (reproducing identical language proposed by the North
Carolina convention). The Confederation Congress's 1787 ordinance establishing the
Northwest Territory similarly recognized that inhabitants "shall always be entitled to the
benefits of... judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law." Ordinance
of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, i Stat. 50 (1789), reprinted in 1 U.S.C. LI
(2000).
181. See Koch, supra note 20, at 374. After the House approved articles of amendment and sent
them to the Senate, Virginia's Anti-Federalist senators moved to insert all the provisions
that had been proposed at the Virginia convention but omitted by Madison, including the
right-to-redress article. DUMBAULD, supra note 179, at 47. For reasons not preserved, their
motion-which may have been as much an effort to derail the Bill of Rights so as to prevent
Federalists from blunting Anti-Federalist critiques of the Constitution as a sincere effort to
improve it-was defeated. See id. at 23-24 & n.43 (noting Madison's concern that inclusion
of all of the Virginia convention's proposed changes would be unacceptable to the
Federalist-dominated Congress); id. at 34 (noting Anti-Federalists' recognition that
adoption of amendments would undermine their criticisms). On the centrality of federalism
concerns to the Bill of Rights, see AMAR, supra note 176.
182. At least from the time that Coke linked them together in his interpretation of Article 29 of
Magna Carta, the rights to due process, to open courts, to have one's rights determined by
the law of the land, and to obtain remedies for wrongs were regarded as close cousins, if not
substantially overlapping. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and
Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 320-25 (1999).
Bushrod Washington would later take the view that Article TV's Privileges and Immunities
Clause granted individuals a right that imposed on states an obligation to provide a law of
redress. See infra text accompanying note 19o.
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in a set of provisions designed to assure Anti-Federalists that the new
Constitution was committed to constraining the power of government, as
opposed to identifying rights that generated functions to which government
would be obligated to attend.' In particular, the amendments aimed to limit
the power of a federal government that was not intended to be a font of law
governing the ordinary interactions of citizens. 1 4 Especially given Madison's
original drafting plan, which called for integration of what became the Bill of
Rights into the original articles of the Constitution,' the inclusion of right-to-
remedy language ran the risk of falsely implying that Congress or the federal
courts enjoyed the authority to enact a national body of common law. 8 6 On
this rationale, the exclusion of a right to remedy provision from the Bill of
Rights was entirely consistent with recognition of the right as a limit on state
govemments.
81
185. DUMBAULD, supra note 179, at 34.
184. Heyman, supra note 20, at 525. Madison's one provision pertaining to state governments was
killed in the Senate. DUMBAULD, supra note 179, at 37, 46.
18s. DUMBAULD, supra note 179, at 39.
M86. See James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions to the House of Delegates (1798),
reprinted in 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATEs ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
546, 561-67 (photo. reprint 1941) (2d ed. 1836) (criticizing as destructive of the
Constitution's design the notion that Congress enjoys the power to enact any law pertaining
to a matter that had been regulated at common law); cf. AMAR, supra note 176, at 37-39
(explaining that Madison's assumption that Congress's powers were already limited by
Article I explains why he left out various proposals from the Virginia convention). If Amar's
account of the interaction of the Fourth and Seventh Amendments is accurate, Madison and
Congress were explicitly solicitous of the right to a law of redress in one area in which they
perceived a real threat of federal interference with state tort law. These provisions, he
argues, were meant, among other things, to prevent federal judges from using warrants to
effectively immunize federal officials from tort liability for trespassory searches. AmAR, supra
note 176, at 70-71. As indicated below, antebellum courts at times invoked the no-takings-
without-compensation principle in a similar fashion. See infra text accompanying notes 191-
195.
187. Madison and other members of his generation accepted that individuals enjoyed
unenumerated rights, particularly those that were mainstays of English constitutionalism.
See AMAR, supra note 176, at 147-56; Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution,
54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1156-67 (1987). The inclusion of the Contracts Clause in the Federal
Constitution indicates that the Framers were aware of the possibility that states might
sometimes renege on their duties to provide basic categories of law. In theory at least,
Madison or other members of Congress could have attempted to convert standard right-to-
remedy language of the sort found in the twelfth article proposed by the Virginia ratifying
convention into a "Torts Clause" stating, roughly, that no state shall impair the operation of
tort law. That no one thought to undertake this sort of innovative drafting hardly supports
an inference that the latter type of interference was of no concern. (Recall that the
Constitution as ratified also did not specify a bar, applicable to the states, against taking
private property without compensation.)
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Although "tort reform" was rarely considered by the federal courts in the
early years of the republic, the notion of a right to a law of redress still made
some prominent appearances. When Chief Justice Marshall asserted in
Marbury v. Madison that Marbury's right in his commission entitled him to a
remedy, he was not mouthing a tautology. 88 Rather, he was invoking
Blackstone for the idea that "the very essence of civil liberty... consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives injury," and that "[o]ne of the first duties of government is to afford
that protection. " "" Significantly, given the attention it would later receive,
Justice Bushrod Washington's description of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause in Corfield v. Coryell explicitly read into it the right "to institute and
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state" as a fundamental piece
of" [p] rotection by the government" for the individual's "enjoyment of life and
liberty.'19
0
In the face of legislative abuses - many of which involved interferences with
individuals' ability to collect on debts or obtain redress for invasions of
property 9'-state judges began to exercise judicial review,' 92 particularly on
the strength of "due process" and "law of the land" provisions in state
constitutions. 93 As Robert Brauneis has explained, the requirement of just
compensation for takings of private property was articulated by some of these
courts as a limit on the ability of legislatures to reform tort law.194 Specifically,
they invoked the just-compensation principle to nullify provisions in charters
granted by legislatures to turnpike, canal, and railroad corporations that
purported to immunize them from tort suits for trespass.19 Other state courts,
as Steven Heyman has observed, explicitly invoked right-to-remedy provisions
to invalidate legislation denying judicial relief to certain classes of claimants.
188. 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (1803).
189. Id. at 163; see Heyman, supra note 20, at 534-35.
19o. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)
(No. 3230); see also Douglass v. Stephens, 1 Del. Ch. 465, 470-71 (1821) (describing the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art IV, Section 2 as encompassing Blackstone's
auxiliary subordinate rights for the vindication of the rights to life, liberty, and property).
191. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 91-92 (1975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 436,453-63 (2d ed. 1998).
192. WOOD, supra note 191, at 404-07, 453-63; Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State Constitution-
Making in the American Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911, 922-25 (1993).
193. Ely, supra note 182, at 327-38.
194. Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Centuty
State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57 (1999).
19s. Id. at 83-97.
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For example, after the onset of the Civil War the Minnesota legislature enacted
a law denying "all persons aiding the rebellion against the United States" the
right to maintain judicial proceedings in the state's courts.9 6 The state's high
court struck it down, offering the following emphatic endorsement of the right
to a law for the redress of injuries:
We would never for one moment suppose that the Legislature has the
power under the constitution, to deprive a person or class of persons, of
the right of trial by jury, or to subject them to imprisonment for debt,
or their persons, houses, papers and effects, to unreasonable searches;
or their property to be taken for public use without just compensation;
and yet neither of these is more sacred to the citizen, or more carefully
guarded by the constitution, than the right to have a certain and
prompt remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs to person,
property or character.197
2. Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment
Although Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment aimed to incorporate
rights guarantees against the states, there is considerable disagreement over
which rights it incorporated and how.' 98 Perhaps this uncertainty is inevitable,
given that the Amendment was debated in abstract terms.1 99 Nonetheless,
there is good reason to conclude that it was meant to guarantee that states
would attend to basic obligations, including the duty to provide law for the
redress of wrongs, and that federal courts were meant to enforce that
guarantee.
196. Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 15 (1862); see also Heyman, supra note 2o, at 560 n.352.
197. Davis, 7 Minn. at 18.
198. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 176, at 181-230 (arguing that Section 1 incorporated only the
"individual" rights that were recognized in the Bill of Rights and English
constitutionalism); MICHAEL KENT CuRTIs, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) (arguing that Section i incorporated the Bill of
Rights against the states); WILLIaM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988) (arguing that Section i identified federal
rights against state interference while placing significant responsibility for enforcement of
those rights on the states); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
1l YALE L.J. 1385 (1992) (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the
Bill of Rights through an equality principle that required states to grant rights equally rather
than selectively).
199. NELSON, supra note 198, at 7, 8o (arguing that the abstractness of the debates over the
Fourteenth Amendment permits multiple interpretations); see also AMAR, supra note 176, at
193 (crediting Professor Fairman with perceiving that there was no single understanding of
the rights protected by Section 1).
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Fourteenth Amendment proponents repeatedly invoked Corfield v. Coryell -
which explicitly lists the power to maintain court actions - as providing a
useful summary of the rights that Section I was meant to secure."' Proponents
of the Amendment had reasons to focus on access to courts and law: The
inability of African-Americans to avail themselves of the law, whether by
entering into contracts or by obtaining redress for wrongs, was among the
hallmarks of slavery and the Black Codes." 1 This is why the 1866 Civil Rights
Act guaranteed to citizens of any race the "same right, in every State... to full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens .. .."'0'o In offering to Congress his
Section 1 prototype, Representative Bingham justified it in part on the ground
that it was needed to ensure that all citizens would enjoy access to law. 03
Section i's proponents also tied the content of its Privileges or Immunities
Clause to the auxiliary subordinate rights that Blackstone had attributed to
Englishmen." 4 Invoking the fifth auxiliary right to bear arms along with the
Second Amendment, they argued that citizens should enjoy a federal
entitlement to carry arms to protect themselves against both official and private
violence."' Likewise, they drew on the right to petition and the First
Amendment to argue for a federally protected right to make formal and public
demands on government." 6 Given the incorporation of these Blackstonian
rights, it would be odd if his third auxiliary right-the right to a law for the
2oo. NELSON, supra note 198, at 70, 81.
2oi. Id. at 18-19 (noting abolitionist condemnations of slavery as the denial of the protection of
criminal and civil laws); see also Heyman, supra note 2o, at 546-51 (emphasizing the salience
of slaves' lack of access to the law to the thinking of Republicans who framed and passed the
Fourteenth Amendment).
2oa. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, S 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (2000)). Representative Bingham, the drafter of Section i of the Fourteenth
Amendment, argued that the Amendment was necessary to ensure that Congress had
sufficient authority to enact the Civil Rights Act. CuRTIs, supra note 198, at 8o. In
Bingham's view, the original Federal Constitution's recognition of slavery meant that it
could not be read to guarantee all persons the protection of the law. This is because,
following Blackstone, he believed that the absence of such protection was the very definition
of slavery. Conversely, abolition meant that states had been placed under a new federal-law
obligation to provide law. Id. at 1o, 107.
203. CURTIS, supra note 198, at 69.
2o4. See AMAR, supra note 176, at 225-30, 26o-61; CURTIS, supra note 198, at 74-75 (citing
Congressman Wilson's invocation of Blackstone); supra text accompanying notes 165-166
(discussing Blackstone on auxiliary rights).
205. AMAR, supra note 176, at 262-64.
2o6. Id. at 245-46.
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redress of wrongs-was excluded. As we have seen, that right was no less
tightly linked than those other rights to the protection of person and property.
That Section I, particularly the Privileges or Immunities Clause, was meant
to recognize the affirmative right of all citizens to a law of contract, a law of
property, a law of crimes, and a law of redress is further evidenced by critics'
complaints that its adoption would entail the complete destruction of
federalism. While this objection was hyperbolic, it was by no means
unmotivated. If persons were to enjoy a right to these bodies of law as part of
their national citizenship, the national government would presumably enjoy a
corresponding power to enact these laws. Tellingly, when confronted with this
objection, Bingham did not disavow its premise, but rather its conclusion:
The care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen, under
the solemn sanction of an oath imposed by your Federal Constitution,
is in the States, and not in the Federal Government. I have sought to
effect no change in that respect in the Constitution of the country. I
have advocated here an amendment which would arm Congress with
the power to compel obedience to the oath, and punish all violations by
State officers of the bill of rights, but leaving those officers to discharge
the duties enjoined upon them as citizens of the United States by that
oath and by that Constitution.
0 7
In Bingham's view, state governments had always been under a Blackstonian
obligation to provide citizens with the protection of the law. However, because
of the unholy compromise underwriting the Federal Constitution, that
obligation had been neither grounded in federal law nor enforceable by the
federal courts. The Civil War Amendments eliminated the states' leeway in this
regard. Otherwise, they left the obligation where it had always resided. Section
1, in other words, was meant to set boundaries within which the states could
operate, not to displace them.2"'
The main opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases provide further support for
this account. They reveal, first, that there was in fact no debate among the
207. Cong. Globe, 39 th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1866), quoted in CURTiS, supra note 198, at 123.
208. My argument differs from Professor Harrison's argument that the Clause was meant to
impose only a requirement of formal equality. Harrison, supra note 198, at 1422. Harrison
rightly emphasizes that Section 1 required that state laws be "impartial" in the requisite
sense, and courts would soon be reviewing statutes that expanded tort liability to see if they
amounted to "special" or "class" legislation. See also HowARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTrruTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA PoLIcE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 61-76
(1993). But Harrison errs in implying that states were understood to enjoy complete
discretion to provide (or not to provide) laws as they saw fit. Rather, they were taken to be
under a duty to provide basic categories of law.
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Justices as to whether citizens of the states enjoyed the right to various bodies
of law, including a law for the redress of wrongs. Both Justice Miller's majority
opinion and Justice Bradley's dissent endorsed Corfield v. Coryell's list of the
fundamental privileges of citizenship.20 9 Thus, the dispute proceeded from a
shared recognition that the privileges in question generated an affirmative
obligation on the part of government to provide law. Miller reasoned that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause could not have meant to federalize the basic
rights articulated in Corfield and elsewhere, including the right to a law of
redress, because that would have entailed transferring to the national
government the power to fashion national laws of contract, tort, and crime.21
Reasoning backward from this unthinkably radical result, he concluded that
the Clause could only refer to a distinct set of rights tied to issues appropriately
addressed by the national government.21'
For his part, Justice Bradley understood this argument and pointed out its
fallacy, just as Bingham had done before him. Miller's concern, he rightly
noted, was that a reading of Section 1 that interpreted it to incorporate
Corfield's broad list of rights
will lead to enactments by Congress interfering with the internal affairs
of the States, and establishing therein civil and criminal codes of law for
the government of the citizens, and thus abolishing the State
governments in everything but name; or else, that it will lead the
Federal courts to draw to their cognizance the supervision of State
tribunals on every subject of judicial inquiry, on the plea of ascertaining
whether the privileges and immunities of citizens have not been
abridged. 2
These fears, he responded, rested on an erroneous blurring of the question of
whether Section i created a federal right to the protection of the law with the
separate questions of who would enforce that right and on what terms:
209. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 76 (1872) (invoking Corfield's description of
the rights that state governments "were created to establish and secure"); id. at 119 (Bradley,
J., dissenting) (noting that each U.S. citizen enjoys "the privilege of resorting to the laws for
redress of injuries").
2io. Id. at 77-78 (majority opinion) ("Was it the purpose of lthe Clause] . . . to transfer the
security and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the States to
the Federal government? . . . All this and more must follow, if the proposition of the
plaintiffs in error be sound.").
211. Id. at 78-81.
2ni. Id. at 123 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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Very little, if any, legislation on the part of Congress would be required
to carry the amendment into effect. Like the prohibition against passing
a law impairing the obligation of a contract, it would execute itself. The
point would be regularly raised, in a suit at law, and settled by final
reference to the Federal court."3
Identifying a federally guaranteed set of civil rights, including rights to law, did
not entail a federal takeover of basic lawmaking. Instead, it required court
supervision of state legislative and judicial decisions to ensure that states were
living up to the obligations imposed on them by the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. 1875-1920: Due Process as Ceiling and Floor
Bradley's dissent proved prophetic. Prompted by litigants, the federal
courts in the period from 1875 to 1920 ruled on the extent to which the
Fourteenth Amendment-and more specifically its Due Process Clause-
limited the ways in which a state could fashion its law of redress. Because the
tort reforms of this era tended to expand liability, these cases usually raised
"ceiling" rather than "floor" challenges. As I will now discuss, the Court
consistently rejected these challenges, but it did so on the merits. Moreover,
the Court insisted that, in substance, due process provides not just a ceiling but
a floor-an affirmative duty grounded in federal law to provide a law of
redress. And just as it envisioned laws that would exceed the due process
ceiling, the Court identified laws that fell below this floor.
1. Railroads and Ships
The era of modem Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis opened
with Munn v. Illinois, 14 in which the petitioner challenged a statute setting
maximum charges for grain storage. The Court rejected the challenge using the
language quoted at the outset of this Article:
[A] mere common-law regulation of trade or business may be changed
by statute. A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of
the common law .... Rights of property which have been created by
the common law cannot be taken away without due process; but the
law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will, or even at
213. Id. at 123-24.
214. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional
limitations.21
This passage could be read to endorse unfettered legislative discretion to
expand or shrink tort law, but that was not its meaning. The Court in Munn
and subsequent cases repeatedly addressed due process challenges on the
merits, albeit with deferential review. For example, in ceiling cases, the Justices
asked whether the statute in question had departed so substantially from the
terms of regulation at common law as to evidence an attempt at outright
redistribution.21 6 Thus, in Munn itself, the Court emphasized that price ceilings
were not so far removed from the common law's requirement of reasonable
rates as to suggest an effort to take from A and give to B.
The Court deployed this mode of analysis a decade after Munn in Missouri
Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes. 1 7 Humes's mule was killed by the defendant's
train. He sued and recovered $270 under a statute imposing double damages
on railroads for harms to livestock caused by a failure to maintain fencing along
tracks. Justice Field's opinion for a unanimous Court rejected the railroad's due
process challenge to the damages multiplier, but not because it denied the
existence of a ceiling on expansions of liability. Rather, the Court reasoned
that, because the jury had discretion to award damages above pecuniary loss at
common law, the state was at liberty to set a multiplier such as this one. It also
emphasized that the interest at stake was ownership of tangible property, that
the railroad's conduct likely amounted to gross negligence, and that, in the
absence of the multiplier, there might be insufficient incentive for victims to
seek redress. s
In Humes, Justice Field and his colleagues explicitly presumed that due
process not only set a ceiling on a state's efforts to expand liability, but also
generated a federal-law obligation to provide a law of redress: "It is the duty of
every State to provide, in the administration of justice, for the redress of private
215. Id. at 134.
216. John Witt has observed that a similar line was drawn by state courts confronted in this
period with challenges to statutory expansions of tort liability. See John Fabian Witt, State
Constitutions and American Tort Law: A History, 58 RUTGERs L. REv. (forthcoming 2005); see
also GILLMAN, supra note 2o8, at 86-126 (emphasizing the centrality of norms against
"special interest" or "class" legislation to late-nineteenth-century constitutional law and
theory).
217. 115 U.S. 512 (1885). State safety regulation of railroads began in earnest in the 184os. State
court decisions issued prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment routinely upheld
such regulations against the claim that they violated the Contracts Clause by amending the
railroads' charters. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140 (1854).
218. Humes, 115 U.S. at 521-23.
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wrongs. .... ,219 Although dictum, Humes's recognition of this duty was not an
isolated aside. As Ann Woolhandler has noted, in Poindexter v. Greenhow, " °
decided a year earlier, the Court held that Virginia was constitutionally
obligated to provide its citizens with a trespass action by which to obtain
redress against individual officials for wrongful seizures of private property. As
to the existence of the due process floor, Poindexter could not have been more
clear. "No one," the Court held, "would contend that a law of a State,
forbidding all redress by actions at law for injuries to property, would be
upheld in the courts of the United States, for that would be to deprive one of
his property without due process of law."'
Between 1885 and 1915, the Court invoked the Munn-Humes framework for
analyzing tort reform legislation on several occasions, although each of these
involved ceiling rather than floor challenges. For example, in Missouri Pacific
Railway Co. v. Mackey," it upheld the abolition of the fellow servant rule for
suits by railroad employees against employers, emphasizing that vicarious
liability was a well-established feature of the common law. In St. Louis & San
Francisco Railway Co. v. Mathews, ' 3 it upheld a statute imposing strict liability
on railroads for causing fire damage, but also granted them the right to obtain
insurance for such liabilities, observing that the common law had long been
willing to impose strict liability for use of fire causing property damage, and
that the legislature had granted the railroad a special privilege to insure itself.2
219. Id. at 521 (emphasis added).
220. 114 U.S. 270, 303, 306 (1884); see Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of
Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 120-21, 123 (1997).
221. Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 303; see also Woolhandler, supra note 220, at 121. Poindexter speaks in
terms of redress for invasions of property rights, which were the rights at issue in that case.
Given comparable yet more general statements in decisions like Humes and Corfield, as well
as the longstanding treatment of rights to life and liberty as no less sacred than rights of
property ownership, there is every reason to suppose that the Justices assumed that a law of
redress also had to be made available for wrongful invasions of the former rights.
222. 127 U.S. 205, 2o8-o9 (1888). The fellow servant rule denied employees the ability to invoke
respondeat superior to hold their employers vicariously liable for injuries caused to them by
the negligence of co-employees.
223. 165 U.S. 1 (1897). State courts followed Mathews in rejecting challenges to such statutes.
Witt, supra note 216.
224. Mathews, 165 U.S. at 22-24; see also Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R Co. v. McGuire, 219
U.S. 549, 571 (1911) (holding that states may void contracts that purport to reinstate the
fellow servant rule); Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1907)
(holding that states may treat employees' willful misconduct as a basis for imposing
vicarious liability); Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Zernecke, 183 U.S. 582, 587-88
(1902) (holding that states may impose strict liability on railroads for injuries to
passengers); Bernstein, supra note 14, at 22-25.
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During this period, the Court handled Fifth Amendment challenges to federal
legislation on the same terms. "' St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway
Co. v. Taylor"6  involved a question of statutory interpretation with
constitutional implications. The 1893 Safety Appliance Act empowered the
Interstate Commerce Commission to set standards for equipment used on
trains operating in interstate commerce. Taylor, a railroad employee, was killed
on the job. His estate sued under the Act, which saved its administrator the
trouble of proving negligence by permitting recovery on a showing that the
equipment at issue was not up to code. The Court upheld judgment for the
estate, rejecting the defendant's argument that Congress did not intend to
impose strict liability. The plaintiffs reading of the Act was, in the Court's
view, "intelligible, and, to say the least, not so unreasonable as to require us to
doubt that it was intended .... -
One final decision worthy of note is Guy v. Donald.' Guy, a member of the
Virginia Pilots Association, carelessly piloted his steamer into a schooner. The
steamer's owner sued the members of the Association seeking indemnification
for his liability to the schooner's owner. The Court concluded that maritime
law ought not be construed to permit the action. While American law had long
recognized vicarious liability," 9 here the Association had none of the control
over its members' conduct that would evidence a principal-agent
relationship.23 Because members could not select, control, or discharge a pilot,
they could not be made to answer for his tort. To hold otherwise would be to
"press[] [the law] to the verge of general principles of liability. It must not be
2s. In doing so, the Court incorporated the Fourteenth Amendment's right of due process
through the Fifth. See infra text accompanying notes 45o-454 (arguing that the right to
redress, although not understood by the Framers to be guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment,
should now be so understood).
226. 210 U.S. 281 (19o8).
227. Id. at 296.
228. 203 U.S. 399 (19o6).
229. Id. at 4o6.
23o. As Holmes explained with typical flair:
If we imagine... a pilot performing his duties within sight of the assembled
association, he still would be sole master of his course. If all of his fellows passed
a vote on the spot that he should change [course] and shouted it through a
speaking trumpet, he would owe no duty to obey, but would be as free as before
to do what he thought best.
Id. at 407.
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pressed beyond the point for which we can find a rational support."23'
Although Guy construed federal law to avoid constitutional difficulty, it
presented an occasion to identify the sort of law that would violate the due
process ceiling-namely, a law holding D liable to P for wronging P even
though A, an autonomous actor over whom D exercised no control, was the
actor whose wrong harmed P. As such, Guy stands as an early progenitor of
modem decisions like State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Campbell.232 The
notion in both seems to be that a law that purports to hold D liable to P for
having wronged P, yet cannot plausibly link the redress that P stands to receive
to a wrong committed by D against P (or by another actor for whose actions D
can be deemed responsible), exceeds the ceiling set by the Due Process Clause
and thus violates D's federal constitutional rights.
2. Workers' Compensation: Ives and White
A final and important source of due process challenges to tort reform in this
period stemmed from as the rapid enactment of workers' compensation laws
from 1910 to 1920.233 Typically, these laws imposed strict liability on certain
employers for workplace injuries, but also limited workers' recoveries to
scheduled damages. The decisions addressing these laws deserve attention for
several reasons. First, they required the Supreme Court to apply both the floor
and ceiling components of its due process framework. Second, they provided
the first important instances in which courts were required to consider how the
emergence of administrative alternatives to tort law would affect the right to a
law for the redress of wrongs. Third, in one very notable instance-Ives v.
South Buffalo Railway Co. 34-a state court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment blocked the adoption of such administrative alternatives, thereby
helping to launch the progressive indictment of due process analysis as the
handmaiden of laissez-faire economics. This was an unfortunate and
unnecessary development given that other courts, including the Supreme
231. Id. Similarly, state courts in this time struck down statutes that imposed on railroads funeral
costs faced by the survivors of passengers who died in transit, even if the railroad's actions
had nothing to do with the death. Witt, supra note 216.
232. 538 U.S. 4o8, 422-23 (2003) (finding that due process bars the imposition of punitive
damages on an actor for conduct and injuries unrelated to the actor's tortious acts); see infra
text accompanying notes 363-367.
233. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WiDows, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERIcAN LAW 126-27 (2004).
234. 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911); see also Bernstein, supra note 14, at 25 n.129.
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Court, applied traditional due process analysis with a good deal more flexibility
than the Ives court.
In Ives, the New York Court of Appeals held that the state's 191o workers'
compensation law violated state and federal guarantees of due process by
imposing on employers strict liability for economic losses incurred by
employees injured on the job. The majority conceded that a legislature could
impose safety obligations on an employer unknown to the common law (e.g.,
ordering the installation of fire escapes or ventilation equipment),23 and that it
could expand the terms on which workers who were wrongfully harmed could
obtain redress from wrongdoers.236 But New York's legislation did not specify
new duties of safe conduct for employers, and employers were being made to
pay for injuries without regard to fault. Thus, according to the court, the law
achieved nothing more than taking from A and giving to B, thereby violating
the employer's due process rights.
37
Ives's analysis is filled with errors and gaps. For example, the court failed to
consider that the imposition of strict liability might actually be a means of
imposing liability for wrongs (e.g., by tipping close cases under a fault
standard in favor of plaintiffs). Nor did it recognize the inaptness of the
"taking from A and giving to B" formula. Even the faultless employer has
something to do with an injury that befalls its worker while on the job. (At a
minimum, it plays a causal role in bringing about the injury and stands to
benefit materially from the operation in which the employee was involved.)
But the most interesting thing about the Ives court's analysis is that there is
little reason to believe that its mistakes were traceable to the court's acceptance
of due process ceilings and floors on states' ability to modify tort law.
We know this for two reasons. First, the court misconstrued Supreme
Court precedents, which had not suggested that the imposition of strict
liability was of itself offensive to due process. In fact, Mathews and Taylor
explicitly said otherwise.3' Second, the Supreme Court undercut Ives's
reasoning from within the same framework of analysis. 9 Thus, in New York
Central Railroad Co. v. White, 40 the Court unanimously rejected a federal due
process challenge to a second New York workers' compensation law. The
235. Ives, 94 N.E. at 442.
236. Id. at 444.
237. Id. at 44o.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 223-227. Ives distinguished Mathews on the ground that
railroads, as chartered corporations and common carriers, were a special kind of business
entity. Ives, 94 N.E. at 447.
239. On Ives and its influence, see WiTT, supra note 233, at 152-86.
240. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
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Court granted that employers and employees had raised legitimate concerns
about the statute: employers because of the imposition of strict liability and the
elimination of certain defendant-friendly common law doctrines; employees
because of the lost ability to seek tort compensation for injuries traceable to
employer fault.2' Still, it upheld the law, observing that the state's substitution
of a scheme of broader no-fault liability and scheduled damages for uncertain
tort liability was a "just settlement of a difficult problem." 2 In doing so, it
again invoked the Munn-Humes model of analysis:
Nor is it necessary, for the purposes of the present case, to say that a
State might, without violence to the constitutional guaranty of "due
process of law," suddenly set aside all common-law rules respecting
liability as between employer and employee, without providing a
reasonably just substitute.... [I]t perhaps may be doubted whether the
State could abolish all rights of action on the one hand, or all defenses
on the other, without setting up something adequate in their stead.243
The Court wedded traditional due process analysis and a politically
progressive result in other workers' compensation cases. In the Arizona
Employers' Liability Cases' the Court upheld a scheme that did not give
employers the benefit of scheduled damages, but instead held them strictly
liable for full tort damages. In Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,14' it rejected
the argument that a compensation scheme violated employers' due process
rights by requiring contributions even from employers whose employees
suffered no injuries, noting that liability was distributed in proportion to the
number of employees at, and the relative risks of, each business. 46
Finally, in an important decision on the floor side of due process analysis,
the Court in Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co.24 rejected the contention that
workers' compensation schemes violated workers' rights by denying them the
possibility of full tort compensation. Humes, Poindexter, and White had
241. Id. at 196.
242. Id. at 202.
243. Id. at 2oi; see also id. at 205 ("[A State may] impose upon the employer the absolute duty of
making a moderate and definite compensation in money to every disabled employee... in
lieu of the common-law liability confined to cases of negligence. This, of course, is not to
say that any scale of compensation, however insignificant on the one hand or onerous on the
others would be supportable.").
244. 250 U.S. 400 (1919).
245. 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
246. Id. at 229-32, 244.
247. 249 U.S. 152, 163 (1919).
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indicated that the Due Process Clause would likely bar states from abolishing
entirely rights of action on behalf of employees suffering physical harm because
of wrongs attributable to employers. However, the Middleton Court concluded
that the scheduled compensation that workers would receive would not differ
so dramatically from tort compensation as to render redress for injuries that
were caused by employer wrongs merely theoretical.
C. 192o-1976: Recognition and Retreat
1. Truax v. Corrigan and the Arrival of Rational Basis Review
Unfortunately, the moderate and relatively progressive cast of White's and
Middleton's due process analysis would soon give way to hard-look
enforcement of the due process floor in Truax v. Corrigan. 4 When Corrigan
and other unionized workers picketed Truax's restaurant, Truax sued to enjoin
them, claiming that they were using abusive and threatening language to chase
off customers and circulating libelous handbills. Corrigan and his co-
defendants obtained dismissal by virtue of a state statute that barred the
issuance of injunctions against "peaceful" picketing. As interpreted by the state
supreme court, the law not only barred injunctions, but rendered such conduct
entirely immune from suit. 49 Chief Justice Taft, writing for a bare majority,
struck the statute on two grounds. He first assumed that it should be read to
immunize wrongful-but-peaceful picketing from any legal sanction. So
understood, it violated Truax's due process rights. The Due Process Clause,
Taft observed, had always been understood to "make[] a required minimum of
protection for every one's right of life, liberty and property, which the
Congress or the legislature may not withhold.""' He argued: "To give
operation to a statute whereby serious losses inflicted by such unlawful means
are in effect made remediless, is, we think, to disregard fundamental rights of
liberty and property and to deprive the person suffering the loss of due process
of law."25s Taft next considered the statute as barring only injunctive relief. On
248. 257 U.S. 312 (1921). Currie once noted that Truax seems to imply that the Federal
Constitution might require governments to afford protection of life and liberty through law.
David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 877
(1986).
249. Truax, 257 U.S. at 328-29.
250. Id. at 332.
251. Id. at 330.
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this reading, he concluded, it violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying
injunctive relief only to employers seeking to enjoin picketing by employees.' 2
Four Justices dissented, including Holmes and Brandeis. Holmes argued
that the majority had erred in treating Truax's interest in future profits as
"property" protected by the Due Process Clause. 53 He also thought that the
legislature was entitled to address the specific problem of labor relations by




According to Brandeis, the question facing the Court was whether it was better
social policy to let businesses operate free of nonviolent union interference or
to let unions peacefully interfere. To his mind a state was entitled "to select for
its citizens [the position] ... which its legislature and highest court consider
will best meet its conditions and secure the public welfare."
s2 5
Truax is explicable only in light of the majority's concern over the rise of
organized labor and perceived threats of socialism and communism.2 s6 The
Court clearly overreached in its equal protection holding. Whatever one's view
on the merits of anti-strike injunctions, it is a stretch to suppose that a state
would violate employers' constitutional rights merely by withholding equitable
relief (which by definition is discretionary), yet leaving them to pursue
compensatory and possibly punitive damages. Moreover, as Holmes noted, the
owner's underlying tort claim (for "civil conspiracy") fell well outside the core
of traditional tort law in that it sought remedy for interference not with bodily
integrity, tangible property, or even contractual rights, but with an economic
expectancy. In any event, Brandeis's dissent would mark the Court's future
course. Truax's overreaching, combined with other notorious decisions, such as
Lochner and Ives, and with brewing changes in prevailing economic, political,
and jurisprudential environment, meant that the idea of a right to a law for the
redress of wrongs was about to fall victim to the progressive assault on due
process and the judiciary.
The first Court decision heralding the arrival of rational basis analysis was
the 1927 case of Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yedell. 7 The estate administrator
of a person who was killed by the negligence of the defendant's employee sued
252. Id. at 334-39.
253. Id. at 342 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 343.
zss. Id. at 372 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
256. Frankfurter supposed that Taft had, by means of formalist methodology, deluded himself
into thinking that his decision reflected the plain meaning of due process, as opposed to the
pro-business biases of his generation. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, The Same Mr. Taft, in LAw
AND POLITICS 41, 44-47 (1939).
257. 274 U.S. 112 (1927).
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and obtained an award of $9500. The defendant argued that Alabama's
wrongful death statute was unconstitutional because it permitted the jury to
impose punitive damages on a finding of simple negligence. Humes had already
noted that juries had been permitted at common law to impose damages at
levels above "full" compensation,5 s yet Justice Stone chose a different point of
emphasis in rejecting the defendant's challenge. He concluded that the law was
justified because it bore a rational relationship to the goal of "making homicide
expensive" so as to encourage precautions by those who "are able.., to guard
against the evil to be prevented."" 9
The second and more important decision, rendered in 1929, was Silver v.
Silver, 6o in which the Court dispatched with a floor challenge. Mae Silver
brought suit against her husband Benjamin for carelessly crashing his car and
injuring her as she rode in the front passenger seat. 61 Under the terms of
Connecticut's guest statute, she could only recover on a showing of at least
reckless driving. Finding no evidence of recklessness, the trial court directed a
verdict for Benjamin. 6' The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting
Mae's equal protection argument that the application of the heightened liability
standard unfairly burdened automobile passengers in contrast to others who
stood to prevail upon proof of negligence. 63
Even under traditional modes of analysis, Silver seemed an easy case. Guest
statutes aim to ward off collusive litigation: Because a guest passenger tends to
enjoy an amicable relationship with the driver, in the event of an accident, they
sometimes arrange to have the passenger sue the driver to enable the passenger
to collect from the driver's liability insurer, even if there is no fault or injury.
Given this rationale, and that the Connecticut statute adopted an incremental
approach to the problem that meshed well with existing common law
doctrine, 64 the statute seemed to operate well above the due process floor.
Perhaps because it was a slam-dunk case, Justice Stone seized on Silver as
another occasion for reshaping due process analysis, even though no such claim
was before the Court:
258. See supra text accompanying note 218.
259. Yeldell, 274 U.S. at 116.
260. 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
261. Silver v. Silver, 143 A. 24o, 241 (Conn. 1928), affd 280 U.S. 117 (1929). Mr. Silver testified as
a witness on behalf of his wife. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 242-43.
264. Social guests injured on a host's property usually had to establish something more than
negligence to recover for their injuries. The Connecticut statute essentially applied that rule
to cars. Silver, 280 U.S. at 122-24.
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[O]ur review will be limited to the [equal protection claim] . . .
considered in the opinion of the court below. We need not, therefore,
elaborate the rule that the Constitution does not forbid the creation of
new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law,
to attain a permissible legislative object.265
With this aside, Stone fused due process and equal protection analysis within
the rational basis framework. In place of the Munn-Humes approach, he
substituted Brandeis's notion that laws of this sort must be upheld unless a
court could say with confidence that "there are no evils to be corrected or
permissible social objects to be gained by the present statute. ''266 He also killed
off Truax's equal protection holding, stating that legislatures were free to go
about piecemeal tort reform, "strik[ing] at the evil where it is felt and
reach[ing] the class of cases where it most frequently occurs. "267
Silver was one of many precedents that Stone subsequently relied upon in
United States v. Carolene Products Co. to support the use of rational basis review
for constitutional challenges to social and economic legislation.268 More
generally, this use of rational basis review corresponded to the effort, on
display in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,69 to eviscerate substantive due
process. Indeed, West Coast Hotel arguably turned the concept on its head by
claiming that due process stood for the power of government to limit rights in
the name of the public good: "Liberty under the Constitution," the opinion
explained, "is ...necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and
regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interests of the community is due process."
2 7
Decisions such as Silver, Carolene Products, and West Coast Hotel signaled
the arrival of a roughly fifty-year period in which the Supreme Court
abandoned this particular corner of constitutional law. For most of it, the
Court simply declined to entertain due process objections to tort statutes.2 7' In
1976, however, it returned to the ceiling issue in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
z65. Id. at 122 (citation omitted).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 124.
268. See 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938) (citing Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Broumell, 294
U.S. 58o, 584 (1935), "and cases cited [therein]," which include Silver).
269. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
270. Id. at 391.
2p. By 1928 the Court had substantial control over its docket. Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning
Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill, 1oo COLUM. L. REV. 1643,
1705-o8 (2000).
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Mining Co.,2 2 which involved a challenge by mining companies to Congress's
imposition of retroactive liability for disability and death benefits of miners
who had left their employment prior to the passage of the statute. True to the
New Deal paradigm, the Court treated the law as falling within the category of
statutes that aim merely to "adjust[] the burdens and benefits of economic
life."273 It then upheld the scheme as "a rational measure to spread the costs of
the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their
labor- the operators and the coal consumers." 7 4
While in this period some state courts invalidated automobile guest
statutes, statutes codifying charitable immunity, and "anti-heartbalm" statutes
eliminating actions such as breach of promise to marry, alienation of affections,
and seduction, 7 more commonly these challenges failed.7 6 The 1950 decision
of the California Supreme Court in Werner v. Southern California Associated
Newspapers is emblematic.27 Werner claimed that he had been defamed by a
report in defendant's newspaper. Because he neither requested a correction nor
offered proof of "special damages, ''27s his suit was dismissed under a retraction
statute that specified that a defamation plaintiff suing over a newspaper report
or radio broadcast could recover only special damages unless he demanded and
did not receive a published or broadcasted retraction. Justice Traynor's
majority opinion upheld the law as a rational means of combating unfounded
litigation and excessive damage awards flowing from the common law rule of
272. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
273. Id. at 15.
274- Id. at 18.
275. See, e.g., Emberson v. Buffington, 3o6 S.W.2d 326, 331 (Ark. 1957) (invalidating guest
statute); Heck v. Schupp, 68 N.E.2d 464, 466 (I. 1946) (invalidating anti-heartbalm
statute), superseded by statute as recognized in Martin v. Kiendl Constr. Co., 438 N.E.2d 1187,
119o (Ill. App. 1982); Neely v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 391 P.2d 155, 16o
(Kan. 1964) (invalidating charitable immunity).
276. See, e.g., Sanner v. Trs. of the Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D. Md.
1968) (upholding charitable immunity granted by Maryland law); Langdon v. Sayre, 168
P.2d S7, 59-6o (Cal. Ct. App. 1946) (upholding heartbalm abrogation); Gallegher v. Davis,
183 A. 620, 626 (Del. Super. Ct. 1936) (upholding guest statute); Rotwein v. Gersten, 36 So.
2d 4 19 (Fla. 1948) (upholding heartbalm abrogation); McMillan v. Nelson, 5 So. 2d 867, 870
(Fla. 1942) (upholding guest statute); Pennington v. Stewart, lo N.E.2d 619, 622 (Ind. 1937)
(upholding heartbalm abrogation); Naudzius v. Lahr, 234 N.W. 581, 583-84 (Mich. 1931)
(upholding guest statute); Hanfgarn v. Mark, 8 N.E.2d 47, 48 (N.Y. 1937) (upholding
heartbalm abrogation).
277. 216 P.2d 825, 828 (Cal. 1950).
278. To prove special damages, a plaintiff faces the onerous task of tracing specific economic
losses to the defendant's publication of remarks defaming him.
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presumed damages.2 79 Quoting Holmes and Brandeis, he also held that it was
enough that the legislature could have concluded that the measure was a
rational means of promoting news dissemination.28
Justice Carter dissented in Werner. Where, he wondered, was the evidence
of the flood of litigation necessitating the statute?28 1 He also did not see why
the state's interest in promoting the dissemination of news extended to
intentional and malicious defamation.28, In his view, the statute's exclusive
applicability to newspaper stories and radio broadcasts was the product of
special interest lobbying that produced a "wholly unreasonable and arbitrary"
exemption from defamation law."8 3 In concluding that the statute should be
struck down, he offered the following analogy: "If the Legislature should
abolish causes of action of replevin and conversion .. . leaving me thus
remediless for the loss of my car, I would consider that I was being deprived of
my property without due process of law .... ,,184 No other Justice, however,
joined his dissent (although one dissented in part on other grounds).
2. Rights-Skepticism, Court-Skepticism, and Wrongs-Skepticism
Decisions like Silver and Werner were part of a broader popular, lawyerly,
and scholarly reaction to business-friendly decisions like Ives and Truax. Some
saw the latter as proof of the inanity and inherent regressivity of the idea of
individual rights against government. Others were less moved by rights-
skepticism than by the sense that, at least with respect to rights such as the
right to a law of redress or the right against naked redistribution, courts were
in a relatively poor position to second-guess legislatures and thus should
require no more of them than a good faith effort to accomplish some plausible
policy objective. s5 This, at any rate, seemed to be the message of Carolene
Products and its two-tiered conception of searching review for special cases in
which rights could be usefully protected by courts and pro forma review for
other laws.
279- Werner, 216 P.2d at 829-30.
280. Id. at 830-31.
281. Id. at 836-37 (Carter, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 838.
283. Id. at 835.
284. Id. at 839.
285. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1733, 1778-89 (1998) (reviewing attacks raised by Boudin, Cohen, Corwin, Croly,
Frankfurter, Hand, Powell, and Thayer, and explaining the linkage perceived by
progressives between rights and political regressiveness).
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But the familiar story of the emergence of rights-skepticism and court-
skepticism in the New Deal period provides only half of the explanation for the
emergence of the rational basis paradigm in this area. The other half consists of
a contemporaneous attack on the idea that tort law ought to be understood as
law for the redress of private wrongs. That idea, progressive and realist
scholars argued, had to give way to an understanding of tort law as public,
regulatory law. The emergence of this competing conception of tort completed
the case for rational basis review: Once tort was depicted as just another form
of regulation, it could only qualify for minimal judicial protection in the post-
New Deal era. Justice Traynor's opinion in Werner vividly displays that rights-
skepticism and a certain brand of wrongs-skepticism formed two sides of the
same coin. Traynor learned his constitutional law from Thomas Reed Powell,
the great rights skeptic.28 6 Along with Fleming James, William Prosser, and
Leon Green, he was also among the most important of the private-wrong
skeptics.2
87
While hardly of one mind, Traynor, James, Prosser, and Green each
supposed that twentieth-century tort law had grander aspirations than
attending to the humdrum and faintly barbaric matter of settling accounts.
Although nominally private disputes, tort cases were, in their view, occasions
for public lawmaking 8S: an exercise by judges and juries of regulatory
authority delegated to them by legislatures through the creation of the court
system. 8 '9 Thus, in 1941 Prosser unabashedly described tort law as "social
engineering" - i.e., the adoption of liability schemes that would produce a
desired policy outcome.290
Members of the tort-law-as-public-law movement differed as to what end
judges and juries were regulating. For present purposes, they can be
categorized into three broad groups. James and Traynor saw tort suits as a
means of achieving localized disaster relief. When consumers sued
manufacturers, or drivers sued other insured drivers, tort functioned to spread
losses, thereby enabling victims to avoid ruin.2 9' The fact that tort law tended
286. James R. McCall, Roger Traynor: Teacher, Jurist, and Friend, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 741, 743
(1984).
287. See William L. Prosser, Book Review, 27 CoR1LL L.Q. 292, 294-95 (1942) (singling out
Powell for praise).
2as. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise (pt. 2), 38 TEx. L. REV. 257 (196o).
289. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEo. L.J. 513, 521-28 (2004).
29
o
. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS S 3, at 15, 17 (1941).
291. See John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just Compensation: Weinstein on Torts,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2045-50 (1997); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise
Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL
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to require victims to prove that someone else was at fault for their injuries to
obtain compensation was a mere vestige of the older conception of tort law as a
law of redress. In any event, they argued, the supposed dominance of
negligence in accident law was more apparent than real. Respondeat superior
held "faultless" firm owners liable for injuries caused by the actions of
employees. In addition, negligence law's centerpiece -the objective reasonable
person standard-often operated as a strict liability standard, especially when
supplemented by doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur and implemented by lay
juries. Moreover, thanks to Traynor, negligence was being replaced in
important areas such as products liability by a rule of strict liability.292 For all
these reasons, they believed that the common law of tort was a way-station to
legislative schemes that would provide consistent no-fault compensation with
lower transaction costs.
Although as a restatement reporter he was among the fathers of strict
products liability,2 9 Prosser was less programmatic than Traynor and James
and more tolerant of the idea of fault-based liability. Still, he rejected any
linkage of tort to the Locke-Blackstone notion of private wrongs and redress . 94
Tort was instead, he argued, a means of balancing several intermediate goals,
including the shifting of losses from innocent victims to antisocial actors, and
the deterrence of antisocial conduct 9s In striking this balance, judges and
juries would, in turn, achieve the utilitarian objective of "the greatest happiness
for the greatness number. ,296
A third strand of public law thinking about tort law, one which emerged a
generation after that of the initial wrong-skeptics, is the efficient deterrence
conception now associated with Judges Calabresi and Posner. On this model,
like Prosser's, tort law sets standards by which the law specifies when conduct
generates social costs exceeding social benefits. The social value of tort suits (to
STUD. 461 (1985). For Traynor's views, see Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 366, 369, 375-76 (1965). Traynor
allowed that the tort system might play a residual role as a vehicle by which victims who had
received the guaranteed quantum of need-based compensation could pursue claims of
justice against tortfeasors who had wrongfully injured them (subject to offsets for
compensation already received).
292. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963); Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 44o-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
293. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (articulating a cause of action for
products liability that does not require proof of unreasonable conduct).
294. PROSSER, supra note 290, § 1, at 9-1o (arguing that modem tort law sanctions conduct for
being "socially unreasonable," i.e., for generating more social costs than benefits).
295. Id. at 4.
296. Id. 5 3, at 17.
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the extent they have any) resides not in loss-spreading or loss-shifting, but
solely in the fact that successful plaintiffs operate as private attorneys general
who penalize and deter antisocial conduct on society's behalf.
29 7
Whether couched in terms of James-Traynor loss-spreading, Prosserian
utilitarian balancing, or Calabresi-Posner efficient deterrence, tort law has,
since the late 1930s, been widely understood by academics to be just another
way in which government regulates conduct for the public good. The rise of
these views has threatened to render unintelligible the idea of a right to a law
for the redress of private wrongs. After all, if the part of the common law that
was most obviously a candidate for judicial protection as a law of redress
cannot even be characterized as such, then it is difficult to suppose that the Due
Process Clause confers a judicially enforceable right to such law.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF TORT LAW AS A LAW FOR THE
REDRESS OF PRIVATE WRONGS
The right to a law for the redress of wrongs is ripe for resuscitation. In
Section A, I review recent developments in constitutional law and theory
suggesting that its reanimation is already underway. I also fend off certain
doctrinal objections to the recognition of such a right. In Section B, I offer an
interpretive and normative argument for why, even today, tort is best
understood and justified as a law of redress, and why, as such, it has a unique
and important role to play in our legal system. In Section C, I provide
guidelines for judicial analysis that are more appropriate than the rational basis
test for gauging whether legislatures have run afoul of the right by enacting
plaintiff-unfriendly tort reform. Finally, in Section D, I briefly canvas some
implications of my analysis, including the continued propriety of enforcing due
process as a ceiling on liability, the applicability of due process limits to federal
tort legislation, and the extent to which judicial recognition of the right to a
law of redress promises to prevent state and federal governments from moving
to a "post-tort" legal system.
A. Due Process Revisited
1. Skepticism's Skeptics
Insofar as mid-twentieth-century progressives sought a reflective
equilibrium between doctrinal principle and progressive results, they had every
297. See Goldberg, supra note 289, at S44-4 8, 555-56.
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reason to embrace rational basis analysis. The period from 1925 to 1976 saw a
steady expansion of tort liability at the hands of judges and legislatures.29 s
Strict products liability emerged. In negligence law, courts and legislatures
rejected or loosened traditional "limited duty" rules, adopted broader
conceptions of proximate cause, shifted to national standards in medical
malpractice, began the move from contributory negligence to comparative
fault, expanded the reach of respondeat superior, abolished charitable
immunity, and partially waived sovereign immunity.2 99 Even plaintiff-
unfriendly tort reform often partook of progressive values, as Werner
demonstrates."°
By the mid-197os, however, the scene was shifting at the level of theory and
doctrine. The centrality of rights to constitutional law and the potentially
progressive role of courts could not be so easily ignored once issues of race,
criminal procedure, and sexual liberation were front-and-center, as decisions
like Brown,"' Miranda,30 2 and Griswold3°3 attest. In political theory and law,
rights discourse was reinvigorated in the academy,304 and it again became
respectable to talk about judicial enforcement of constitutional rights to liberty,
privacy, and equal treatment. 35 Soon it would be possible for even moderate
Justices to embrace substantive due process openly.3
°6
Not coincidentally, the idea of tort as a law of private wrongs began to
reemerge at this time. At the doctrinal level, the need for a law of remedies to
respond to abuses of official power prompted a wave of litigation under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, as well as the recognition of Bivens actions.30 7 For similar
298. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REv.
963, 964-70 (1981).
299. Id.
300. Progressive approaches to tort law and constitutional law were not always perfectly aligned.
For example, in Brown v. Merlo, 5o6 P.2d 212, 217 n.4 (Cal. 1973), the progressive California
Supreme Court struck down a guest statute that it viewed as resting on archaic notions of
status-based liability and intrafamily immunities. Here, the court's commitment to
modernizing the law of tort overrode its commitment to rational basis review.
301. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
302. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
303. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
304. As evidenced by, among other works, JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); and
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
3os. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 285, at 1790-98.
3o6. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
307. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971) (recognizing an implied right of action against federal agents for violations of Fourth
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reasons, this period saw the emergence of a robust law of redress for acts of
race discrimination in employment.,8 Jurists influenced by anti-utilitarian
theories of justice reanimated the idea of tort law as a law of wrongs.3 9 By the
turn of the twenty-first century, historically minded torts scholars would
marvel at "the unexpected persistence of negligence" -the idea that tort law did
not, as many had predicted, evolve into a scheme of enterprise liability." '
Of equal importance was the changing economic and political landscape,
which disrupted the comfortable alignment between the rational basis
approach and the content of tort reform. Starting with the malpractice
insurance "crisis" of the mid-197os, reforms emerged that curtailed tort
liability at its core. By the mid-198os, doctors, insurers, businesses, and the
Republican Party embraced the cause of tort reform, and legislatures began in
earnest to enact these measures. Progressives were now being forced to choose
between allegiance to judicial deference and allegiance to tort.
2. Doctrinal Sightings
The intellectual climate out of which rational basis review emerged has
come and gone. Whatever its problems, the discourse of rights and the idea of
judicial enforcement of them is no longer widely regarded as inane or
necessarily regressive. Likewise, there is not today a national economic crisis
that might warrant the weakening or suspension of rights-based restrictions on
redistribution and regulation. The administrative state is far too well
established to face a serious risk of being dismantled. It is not surprising, then,
that notions of individual constitutional rights, including due process rights
that pertain to the availability of tort law, have resurfaced. As noted in the
Introduction, most of the action to date on the specific issue of tort reform has
been at the state-court level. By contrast, in the federal judiciary adjustments
have occurred at the margins. Just as some of the substance of the Privileges or
Amendment rights); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (ruling that state
officials acting outside the bounds of their offices can be deemed to have acted under color
of law for purposes of§ 1983).
308. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (defining a prima facie case
under Title VII).
309. For important early articles interpreting tort law as instantiating notions of justice and
rights, see Jules L. Coleman, On the Moral Argument for the Fault System, 71 J. PHIL. 473
(1974); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); and
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972).
31o. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERIcA: AN INTELLEcruAL HISTORY 244-9 o (expanded
ed. 2003); Anthony J. Sebok, The Fall and Rise of.Blame in American Tort Law, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 1031, 1046-53 (2003).
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Immunities Clause emigrated to the Due Process Clause following the
Slaughter-House Cases,"1' and just as substantive due process analysis
reappeared under the aegis of a right to privacy,312 so too the idea of a right to
law of redress has found expression in alternative doctrinal outlets.
In the 1978 case of Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc.,"' the Supreme Court rejected a due process challenge to the Price-
Anderson Act's imposition of a $56o million aggregate ceiling on damages
caused by a nuclear incident. Quoting Usery, the Court deferred to Congress's
decision regarding the liability cap because it was "a classic example of an
economic regulation -a legislative effort to structure and accommodate 'the
burdens and benefits of economic life.' 1 4 Faced with the objection that the Act
violated due process for failing to provide those who stood to lose their
common law rights with a quid pro quo, the Court expressed skepticism that
due process "in fact requires . .. a reasonable substitute remedy."31 Yet the
Court did not leave matters there, instead bolstering its analysis with the
observation that the Act's conferral on claimants of the right to recover without
proof of negligence and without undertaking the expense of litigation-
especially given the likelihood that claims arising out of this sort of event
would end up being discharged in bankruptcy- amounted to the provision of a
sufficient quid pro quo.3"6
In other lines of cases the Court has likewise recognized access to redress
for wrongs as a constitutional norm or value, even if not an inviolable right. In
Bivens, the issue was whether the Fourth Amendment generates a right of
action by which a victim can obtain redress from federal officers who had
violated the victim's right not to be subjected to an unreasonable search and
seizure.317 Justice Brennan's lead opinion speaks the language of a public law,
deterrence-based conception of tort.3" But it also invokes, as does Justice
Harlan's concurrence, the notion of a right to redress for conduct that is not
merely antisocial as a general matter, but a special way in which officials
mistreat citizens by abusing their unique power to batter, trespass, and
311. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITUTIoNAL LAW §§ 7-2 to -4, at 548-59 (2d ed. 1988).
312. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
313. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
314. Id. at 83 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
315. Id. at 88.
316. Id. at 90-92.
317. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 388
(1971).
318. Id. at 394-95.
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imprison. 19 Not surprisingly, post-Bivens decisions have focused on whether
alternative schemes for dealing with official deprivations of a victim's
constitutional rights permit the victim adequately to vindicate her rights.32 In
Bush v. Lucas, for example, a federal employee alleged an adverse employment
action amounting to a First Amendment violation. The Court refused to
recognize the claim, but only because it deemed adequate the existence of an
administrative process that entitled successful claimants to reinstatement and
back pay.321 Reasoning very much within the late-nineteenth-century
framework, the Court has essentially asked in these cases whether Congress
has attended sufficiently to its obligation to provide a law of redress for victims
of constitutional torts.3"
A norm of redress also lurks in cases dealing with § 1983 claims alleging
deprivations by government officials of life, liberty, and property without due
process. As is discussed below, decisions such as Board of Regents v. Roth,323
Paul v. Davis,3 4 and Davidson v. Cannon32s make clear that the Due Process
Clause does not guarantee the availability of a federal cause of action for
redress against injurious misconduct by state officials. Nonetheless, the Court
has refrained from holding that states are therefore free to immunize their
officials from all liability for private wrongs. Indeed, they have defined the
scope of § 1983 in part on the assumption that, in standard cases, state law will
provide relief. In Ingraham v. Wright,326 for example, the Court upheld the
dismissal of a procedural due process claim brought on behalf of students who
had been subject to paddling at school. The availability of a state-law action for
battery was critical to the Court's conclusion that no pre-punishment hearing
was required. In declining to add this constitutional overlay to existing tort
law, Justice Powell acknowledged that due process incorporated the right
"'generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,"' and that, among
319. Id. at 395-97; id. at 407-08 (Harlan, J., concurring).
320. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 428-29 (1988); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
388-90 (1983); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983); Carlson v. Green 446 U.S. 14,
18-21 (1980).
321. Bush, 462 U.S. at 388-90.
322. This is not to say that tort reforms must always be accompanied by the introduction of an
alternative remedial scheme. That will depend on various considerations, including the
nature of the interest being vindicated by the tort action. See infra Section III.C.
323. 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972).
3z4. 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976).
325. 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986).
326. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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those liberties was "a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for,
unjustified intrusions on personal security."
32 7
Although it in some ways marks the apogee of New Deal constitutionalism,
the Court's preemption analysis has also tended to reflect a default norm of
redress. Modem preemption doctrine has generally functioned as a massive
grant of power to the federal government against both the states and
individuals.32 In particular, cases such as Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.32 9 seem
to suggest that Congress is free to supplant any manner of state regulatory or
tort law so long as it acts within the scope of its enumerated powers.33°
Formally, at least, the only question for courts is whether there is enough
evidence that Congress has so chosen. 33' Yet even in this doctrinal area,
concerns about redress have surfaced. For example, RuckeIshaus v. Monsanto Co.
made clear that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause circumscribes
Congress's preemption power.332 Further, the Court at least purports to apply a
presumption against preemption.33 This presumption, I would suggest,
reflects not only a concern for federalism, but also for the right to a law for the
redress of wrongs. This explains why one finds the Court at times alluding to
the presence or absence of alternative remedies under the guise of attempting
to divine congressional intent. For example, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.334
treated Congress's "failure to provide any federal remedy for persons injured"
by nuclear accidents as proof that it did not intend to preempt such actions.
3
1
327. Id. at 673 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). Note, however, that
Justice Powell misconstrues due process as providing protection only against governmental,
not private, wrongdoing.
328. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 803-05 (1994)
(discussing the rise of modern preemption analysis).
329. 331 U.S. 218, 229-30, 236 n.9 (1947).
330. Lower federal courts seem to have rejected due process challenges to preemption. See, e.g.,
Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1995).
331. See Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (holding that a provision in the Medical
Devices Act preempting conflicting state "requirements" extends to negligence claims); CSX
Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (holding that reference in the Federal
Railroad Safety Act to any state "law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad
safety" indicates that the provision applies to common law negligence liability); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992) (Stevens, J.) (holding that preemption of any
contrary state "requirement" covers torts because tort law is a form of state regulation).
332. 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984).
333. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 ("[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States [are] not to be superseded . .. unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." (citations omitted)).
334- 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
335. Id. at 251.
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"It is difficult to believe," wrote Justice White, "that Congress would, without
comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal
conduct."" 6 In a similar fashion, the Justices have sometimes declined to
extend statutory language that, under certain precedents, could be construed to
preempt common law, as limited in application only to ex ante state
regulation.337
The idea of a right to a law of redress has also continued to receive
expression within takings analysis. In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,"38
for example, the Court entertained a mall owner's argument that California
had taken his property by preventing him from relying on the common law to
exclude peaceful pamphleteers from its premises. The Court dismissed the due
process challenge under rational basis analysis, then ruled that no taking had
occurred because the mall owner had already opened its property to the
public.33 9 Concurring, Justice Marshall insisted that the Court's prior decisions
"demonstrate that there are limits on governmental authority to abolish 'core'
common-law rights, including rights against trespass, at least without a
compelling showing of necessity or a provision for a reasonable alternative
remedy. 3 40 Such reasoning garnered majority support in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission.34' There, the defendant conditioned the issuance of
building permits to owners of beachfront properties on the owners' granting of
a right to beachgoers to traverse the properties. The Court deemed the
imposition of this condition to be a taking of private property because it
effectively denied the owners their basic right to exclude. In other words, the
Commission had enacted unconstitutional "property reform" by disabling
owners from vindicating-by self help or at law-their right of exclusion as
against even intentional trespassers.
Most recently and strikingly, a majority of the Justices have self-consciously
revived the nineteenth-century idea of a due process ceiling on states' ability to
impose liability on an actor under the guise of providing redress. In BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore 42 and its progeny,3 43 the Court has struck down
336. Id.; see also Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987) (noting that the decision to
give preemptive effect to the Clean Water Act does not leave plaintiffs without a remedy at
common law).
337. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486-87 (1996) (arguing that preemption of state
"requirements" does not cover common law causes of action).
338. 447 U.S. 74 (198o).
339. Id. at 83 n.7 (citing Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893)).
340. Id. at 94 (Marshall, J., concurring).
341. 483 U.S. 825, 834-36 (1987).
342. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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punitive damages awards deemed excessive relative to the defendant's
wrongdoing. The Court's chief complaint seems to be that the state courts, by
authorizing huge awards based in part on evidence of unrelated bad acts
occurring in other states, are attempting to regulate or redistribute under the
guise of providing redress.'" A state might be within its authority to impose a
$2 million fine on an automobile manufacturer for not disclosing a cosmetic
defect to its customer, or a $145 million fine on an insurance company for bad
faith in handling claims, but doing so requires legislation or the promulgation
of regulations. What the states cannot do is achieve these forms of aggressive
regulation surreptitiously, by means of a scheme in which the purported
justification for sanctioning the defendants is that it provides a plausible
measure of the redress to which tort victims are entided.S
Gore's revival of the due process ceiling on state tort law is noteworthy for
two reasons. First, it raises an issue of consistency. Just as it would be
disingenuous to revive only doctrines that confer powers and privileges on
states without the responsibilities to which those powers were once inseparably
linked, it would be ahistorical and one-sided to resurrect defendant-friendly
ceilings without the plaintiff-friendly floors that go with them. Second, in
articulating the constitutional ceiling on punitive damage awards, the court has
refused to adopt a mechanical test or bright-line formula, instead setting
"guideposts" that reference the nature of the defendant's wrong and the way in
which states have regulated similar misconduct.346 As I will argue, the floor set
by due process likewise ought to be instantiated in a manner sensitive to the
substance of the tort being reformed, and the nature of and justifications for
the reform.
3. Affirmative Rights, Rights to Law, and Structural Due Process
My effort to reinvigorate the right to a law for the redress of wrongs might
be thought to run afoul of certain modem constitutional doctrines. For
example, a critic might argue that its recognition is incompatible with Erie.347
However, the acknowledgement of this right would no more entail a general
343. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 4o8,429 (2003).
344. Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEx. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005).
345. See John C.P. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest of Us): Private Law in Disguise,
28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 3, 7-10 (2004).
346. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574.
347. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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common law of tort than does the recognition, in cases like Gore, of
constitutional rights that limit tort claims. 4
A second line of decisions that might seem to pose an obstacle to the
present analysis -exemplified by Daniels v. Williams349 and Davidson v.
Cannon s0 - addresses the scope of government officials' liability under § 1983.
They hold that the rights conferred on individuals by the Due Process Clause
do not include a right against being physically injured by mere carelessness on
the part of state officials. In stating this rule, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that it applies even if the unavailability of a § 1983 claim leaves the
injured victim remediless because the relevant state's law has immunized the
official against tort liability. Thus, the Court has concluded that "[w]here a
government official's act causing injury to life, liberty, or property is merely
negligent, 'no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required.'
3
3
The liability of government actors to private citizens for wrongs involving
the abuse of governmental authority has always been treated as a special
category of private wrong." 2 Thus, at a minimum, it would be unwarranted to
generalize from these decisions to ones in which one citizen sues another. More
fundamentally, the Court is not asserting in these cases a proposition about
states' discretion to provide a law by which victims of officials' wrongs can be
redressed. 313 Instead, it has taken that discretion for granted in establishing
that the scope of the constitutional concept of deprivation does not depend on
348. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75 (holding that due process forbids the imposition of excessive
punitive damages); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that
the First Amendment bars imposition of defamation liability on a publisher for statements
about a public official absent proof of actual malice). Recognition of the right, if coupled
with judicial decisions overstating its content, could threaten Erie. See John C.P. Goldberg,
Judging Reputation: Realism and Common Law in Justice White's Defamation Jurisprudence, 74
U. COLO. L. REV. 1471, 1476-78 & n.28 (2003) (observing the potential of Sullivan and Gore
to generate general common law).
349. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
350. 474 U.S. 344 (1986); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (holding that injury to
reputation alone cannot support a constitutional tort action).
351. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added in Daniels)). Daniels denied a § 1983 action to a prisoner
claiming injury caused by a prison official's carelessness.
352. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text (discussing sovereign immunity, and its
limits, in Blackstone's time). But see supra text accompanying notes 220-221 (discussing
Poindexter v. Greenhow's holding that states must provide trespass actions to citizens whose
property is wrongfully seized by officials).
353. In Daniels, for example, there was no analysis of whether Virginia's sovereign immunity law
was unconstitutional insofar as it immunized both the government and individual officers
from liability for their wrongs.
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the content of state law. Negligence on the part of an official toward a citizen,
the Court has insisted, is not transformed from an ordinary wrong into a
deprivation of a constitutional right simply because the relevant state's law
does not provide a separate avenue of redress. At most, then, the Court has
assumed for purposes of interpreting the scope of a federal statute that a state
legislature could immunize officials from liability for their constitutional
wrongs.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,3s4 and the
recent case of Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,35 also demand mention in this
context. In DeShaney, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against state social
workers and their agency for failing to take adequate steps to protect her son
from physical abuse by his father. A majority rejected the claim, reasoning that
the defendants failed to affirmatively provide a benefit to the boy rather than
depriving him of a constitutional right. 3 6 Likewise, faced with a claim by the
mother of three children killed by her husband after he took custody of them in
violation of a protective order, the Court in Castle Rock declined to recognize a
procedural due process right to have police enforce protective orders in strict
accordance with the enforcement terms that they specify.3s7 Neither holding
bears directly on my argument; I am not suggesting that individuals enjoy a
substantive due process right to reasonable efforts by officials to protect them
from private violence, nor a procedural due process right to efforts at
protection in accordance with the terms of a court order. Nonetheless, Deshaney
has been - and presumably Castle Rock now will be - treated as emblematic of a
broader idea that the rights enjoyed under the Federal Constitution are
negative, not affirmative. Recognition of this distinction might be taken to cast
a cloud over my argument. After all, the right I argue for here demands, at least
in the first instance, the creation and maintenance of a body of law, including
the institutions necessary to administer it.
The slogan that the Constitution is exclusively a "charter of negative ...
liberties '' 3s8 is just that-a slogan.35 9 Constitutional rights sometimes do
354. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
355. 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
356. 489 U.S. at 196-97.
357. Castle Rock, 127 S. Ct. at 2800-03, 281o.
358. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 ( 7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).
359. See Heyman, supra note 20 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to
encompass affirmative rights); see also Currie, supra note 248, at 886-87 (1986) (discussing
doctrines running counter to the no-affirmative-rights slogan). Even if the various
affirmative rights I discuss can be described as negative rights, their amenability to that
description only confirms the pliability of the slogan. Readers who cannot stomach the
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generate duties to act. If a guard is aware that a prisoner is choking to death,
his failure to provide aid deprives the prisoner of life without due process. 6 °
The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to the provision of legal
services., 6' Governments must also pay for divorce petitions filed by persons
unable to afford court fees.362 Each of these duties is heavily conditioned. The
first, for example, is only triggered when government takes on the role of
jailer. 363 The point, however, is not to reason from these cases to a general right
of assistance. Rather, it is to establish the falsity of the broad claim that the
Constitution never requires government to act for the benefit of an individual.
Apart from DeShaney, the decisions most often taken to establish the no-
affirmative-rights principle are those declining to recognize a fundamental
right to the provision by government of housing,364 education,36 ' and welfare
payments. 366 But to cite them for a general principle is to avoid asking whether
there is something special about the rights claimed in those cases that
distinguishes them from other kinds of affirmative rights. In fact, there are
important differences between those asserted rights and rights to law;
differences that the Court has implicidy recognized.
For example, the Court has held that individuals are entitled to some
version of the law of private property by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Suppose, improbably, that a state government repealed its law
of private property in order to establish communal ownership of land and
chattel within its borders. In doing so, it would presumably act
unconstitutionally by failing to provide a law enabling the private use and
notion of rights to law could re-characterize my argument as advocating recognition of a
secondary right to compensation for interferences with one's primary negative rights to
person, liberty, and property. See RiCRARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 96-98 (1985). In my view, however, the attempt to treat
the right to sue for wrongs as a species of property creates more confusion than clarity.
360. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-5 (1976) (holding that deliberate indifference to an
inmate's medical needs by prison officials violates the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights).
361. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Currie, supra note 248, at 873 (noting
this example); see also David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229 (2002) (noting that many criminal procedural rights are
conditional on actions that the government likely will not forego).
362. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971).
363. See Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-200 (1989).
364. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
365. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-36 (1973).
366. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970).
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transfer of property. 6, In the same vein, imagine that a state government, fed
up with dysfunctional families, enacted a statute providing that no adult may
prevent a competent minor over the age of eleven who resides with that adult
from choosing to live with another adult. Now suppose that C, the thirteen-
year-old child of X and Y, has moved in with other adults who have offered C a
larger inheritance. X and Y sue to regain custody, arguing that the statute is
unconstitutional. As applied to X and Y, the law does not trench on their
negative liberty. Yet in failing to provide them with powers necessary to the
maintenance of a recognizably familial relationship, the law arguably deprives
them of a right to be parents within conventional meanings of that concept.
The statute's defect seems to be that it denies persons law that is due to them -
law without which they will lack the ability, in principle, to maintain
families. 6 ' In sum, by lumping together rights to benefits with rights to law,
the negative-affirmative distinction reveals its crudity. The standard distinction
between procedural and substantive due process likewise fails to make space
for the idea of a right to law.
The problem is not with the idea of such rights, but with our reliance on
simple dichotomies. I suggest instead that we should posit a third branch of
due process that, to borrow Tribe's phrase, should be designated as "structural
due process." 36 9 Following Blackstone,370 I would place in this category a set of
related guarantees pertaining to the basic structure of government. These
consist, primarily, of rights to a system of separated powers, recognizably
representative political institutions, and bodies of law that fit certain
367. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998) (states cannot redefine
"property" so as to permit confiscation without compensation); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (states cannot sidestep takings analysis by declaring that
the use being regulated adversely affects the public interest); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,
717 (1987) (Congress lacks the power to abrogate the right to transfer property to one's
heirs); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984) (Congress may not by ipse
dixit transform private property into public property). If the Constitution does grant a right
to a law of private property, that grant owes its existence, in part, to the Takings Clause.
The absence of a "right to redress" clause may suggest a reason to doubt the existence of a
comparable right to a law of redress. But the issue of whether one can find rights in the
Constitution other than those identified with a high degree of specificity in the text is
distinct from the present issue of whether it contains any affirmative rights. As I have
argued, the right to a law of redress has firm roots in the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 198-214.
368. This conclusion seems a fair inference from decisions articulating the right of parents. See
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-67 (2000) (reviewing decisions).
369. See Tribe, supra note 18.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 168-173.
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descriptions, including laws of ownership, familial relations, and enforceable
agreements, as well as law for the redress of wrongs.
As I conceive of them, structural due process rights are distinct from other
due process rights in at least three respects. First, they involve entitlements to
services uniquely associated with government. Whatever their merits,
assertions of rights to education, housing, or a minimum income do not
demand things as to which government has historically claimed a monopoly.
By contrast, government has tended to insist that it has the final say on setting
standards of conduct and resolving disputes (although it is often willing to
delegate that authority). Indeed, it is in part because of government's
monopoly over the mechanisms for redressing wrongs that there is a good case
to be made for recognition of a right to a law of redress.
Relatedly, structural due process rights demand of government something
different from familiar negative rights or other affirmative rights. For example,
the right against being forcibly deprived by government officials of one's
liberty makes a relatively specific demand on such officials: They must take
steps to ensure that any confinement is reasonable. Similarly, the right to
housing, were it recognized, might obligate governments to tailor their
budgets or tax policies to fulfill the responsibilities inherent in its recognition.
As we will see, the identification of a duty on the part of legislatures to provide
a law for the redress of wrongs can and should leave them with substantial
discretion in shaping the contours of that law.
Finally, as holders of structural due process rights, individuals do not
necessarily enjoy the kinds of claims often associated with being a right-holder.
Standard individual rights, such as the right not to be incarcerated without
justification, tend to generate a claim in the right-holder to obtain redress
against those who violate it. Other affirmative rights, such as the right to
housing, might likewise empower citizens to obtain positive injunctive relief
for violations of it, whereby a court, at the behest of a single citizen, would
make what have tended to be discretionary taxation and spending decisions. In
either case, the fact that the recognition of the underlying right tends to confer
on individuals remedial claims that may interfere with executive branch
operations or legislative policymaking constitutes a reason for caution in
establishing the right. By contrast, recognition of a right to a law of redress
need not and should not generate a claim in right-holders for damages against
the government or its officials. It also need not entail a claim for injunctive
relief that calls for judicial intrusion into core exercises of discretionary
policymaking. Instead, it need only mean that judges can sometimes nullify
statutory provisions that limit citizens' ability to obtain redress for wrongs.
True, one can imagine a situation in which a litigant could claim that the right
to a law of redress requires recognition of a cause of action. For example, a
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litigant in a state that does not permit actions for invasions of privacy could
argue that due process requires their creation. Yet even this suit would not ask
the courts to order the political branches to enact legislation or change
budgetary priorities. Instead, the claim would be directed at the courts
themselves, demanding that they remedy the rights violation by exercising
their power to define new wrongs.37'
B. Tort Law Revisited
The emphasis on history in Parts I and II of this Article might create the
impression that my argument rests on the sort of appeal to historical
understandings that is characteristic of originalist approaches to constitutional
interpretation. Although originalists should recognize the existence of a due
process right to a law of redress, I do not mean to offer a purely backward-
looking claim that turns only on the views held by eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century American jurists. Constitutional rights are not like ornery aunts and
uncles who, on certain occasions, can demand that you attend to them simply
because a distant relative years ago decided to make them part of your family.
Thus, while it is important to establish that those who framed, ratified, and
contemporaneously interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment probably
understood it to guarantee access to a law for the redress of wrongs, it is no less
important to determine whether this guarantee continues to cohere with other
values and commitments embedded in our Constitution.
In Section A of this Part, I argued that the Supreme Court has, in various
contemporary constitutional decisions, implicitly acknowledged that it does. In
this Section, I aim to reinforce the Court's intuitions by outlining a theory of
tort law that, building on work stretching from Locke and Blackstone to my
own prior work and that of Benjamin Zipursky, attempts to update and
reinvigorate the idea of a law for the redress of private wrongs. First, I identify
three basic features of tort law-relational duty, injury, and actions for
redress -that, taken together, attest to the propriety of understanding tort as a
law of redress and that capture what is distinctive about tort. I then explain
how this kind of law articulates and advances some of the basic commitments
of our constitutional regime.
3r. If a state's courts refused to recognize a new cause of action to which the litigant had a
constitutional right, a federal court could perhaps order them to recognize it. Cf. Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1947) (holding that the Supremacy Clause requires state courts
to entertain claims authorized by federal law).
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1. A Law of Wrongs
It might seem banal to point out that that courts' granting of relief in tort
cases has something to do with the commission of a wrong. Yet, as discussed
above, Traynor and James argued that the tort system has been detaching itself
from any notion of wrongdoing. This is not the occasion on which to engage
their claims fully. Instead, it will suffice to show that this claim is not
particularly compelling. For starters, tort doctrine has not evolved in the
manner they predicted. If anything, courts have pulled back from strict
liability, as in cases alleging defective product designs.3 72 Statutory torts
alleging intentional wrongs, in particular § 1983 and Title VII claims have
flourished. And various common law actions linking liability to wrongdoing,
ranging from battery to fraud to intentional interference with contract, remain
vibrant. Tort, in short, continues to function as a diverse gallery of wrongs,
rather than trending toward strict or enterprise liability.
James's claim that various features of modem negligence law amount to the
imposition of strict liability were and are highly contentious. The fact that
negligence turns on an objective standard of reasonable care does not entail
that it somehow fails to instantiate notions of wrongdoing. To fail to act like a
person of ordinary prudence, when under a duty to another to so act, is to fail
to live up to a norm of right conduct set by judges and juries based on
considerations of morality, fairness, and administrability. To say this is not to
say that negligence is about wrongs only because it gets to define what counts
as wrong. Rather, it is to say that the legal concept of fault tends to track, but
not exactly match, ordinary notions of fault, in part because of special
considerations that come into play when a moral norm of conduct is given the
stature of a legal norm. Likewise, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not
obviously best cast as a species of strict liability. Alternatively, it can be taken at
face value as a principle of agency law, whereby acts of an agent on behalf of a
principal are imputed to the principal. This is presumably why the doctrine is
limited in application to acts by employees undertaken within the scope of
employment, a limitation that is not easily explained by a Jamesian concern for
loss-spreading.
It is also worth noting that many causes of action with a strict liability
component are entirely intelligible as wrongs. For example, the tort of trespass
to land requires that the trespasser act with the intent of making contact with a
particular patch of land or structure on land. A driver who unwittingly veers
off of a road onto another's property has not committed trespass because he
372. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LiAB=IrY § 2(b) cmt. d (1998).
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had no intent to make contact with the land.373 But trespass also has a strict
liability component, because it does not require that the person who intends to
make contact with land have reason to know that the land is owned by
someone else.3 74 Thus, a driver who deliberately drives his car on what he
reasonably believes to be a public road, when in fact it is a private road, has
committed a prima facie trespass. Once trespass is understood as a tort that
combines an element of intentionality with an element of strict liability, it
becomes more comprehensible as a wrong involving an intentional using of
another's property without permission. 7
Finally, even when one encounters genuine strict liability in tort, one has to
know more about the rationales for its adoption before concluding that this is
an area in which tort law is not operating as a law of wrongs. If, for example,
the principal justification for adopting no-fault liability in manufacturing
defect cases is that victims face systematic difficulties in proving what went
wrong in the manufacturing process, there need not be any tension between
the imposition of strict liability and the notion of tort as wrongs-based. Rather,
the law is simply creating a presumption of wrongdoing. 1 6 For this to be a
convincing interpretation one would need to know more. (Is the presumption
rebuttable? By what sort of showing? Why does the presumption apply here
and not elsewhere?) The point for now is that one cannot simply conclude
from the existence of strict liability doctrines that they have nothing to do
with redress.
373. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 166, illus. 2 (1965).
314. See, e.g., Bums Philp Food, Inc. v. Cavalea Cont'l Freight, Inc., 135 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir.
1998) (applying Illinois law to hold that a fence reasonably but mistakenly built on
neighboring property constitutes a trespass).
37s. Again, the point is not that intentional but reasonably mistaken invasions are necessarily
blameworthy. Rather, they violate a legal norm of conduct that states, roughly: "Do not use
another's property without permission." Why the law might adopt this relatively stringent
norm for invasions of property is a separate question. The answer may lie partly in the fact
that possessors enjoy less legal leeway to engage in self-help to protect their property rights
than they do when protecting themselves. See, e.g., Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 660
(Iowa 1971). This might warrant making property owners the beneficiaries of a legal norm
that is relatively generous in its protection of their right to exclude.
376. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998) (identifying the
difficulties faced by victims of manufacturing defects in proving fault as a reason for
adopting a strict liability standard).
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2. A Law of Private Wrongs: Relational Duties and Injuries
To establish that modem tort law is concerned with wrongs is not enough
for present purposes. For as we saw above, the Prosserian and Posnerite
depictions of tort as regulation aiming for utilitarian loss-allocation or efficient
deterrence also treat modem tort law as in some sense a law of wrongs.
Specifically, each depicts tort suits as a response to conduct that is wrongful in
the particular sense of being socially undesirable -what Judge William
Andrews's dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. described as conduct
that is wrong "to the world."3" By contrast, to say that tort law is a law for the
redress of private wrongs is to say that it empowers a victim to seek redress
from a wrongdoer because that other has acted wrongfully toward him (or
persons such as him) -not merely because the actor acted in a sufficiently
antisocial manner for government officials to be justified in sanctioning him.1
78
As Cardozo explained, a tort suit involves a claim pursued by the victim "in her
own right," rather than as the vicarious beneficiary of a duty owed to the public
at large.
379
The key to grasping tort law's character as a law of private wrongs is to
appreciate that it is constructed around what Zipursky and I have described as
analytically relational duties."' Indeed, as Zipursky explained in a
pathbreaking article, some basic features of tort doctrine are inexplicable
without reference to the idea of relational duty."8' For example, defamation
actions include an "of and concerning" element that requires the plaintiff to
prove that the defamatory statement of which she is complaining is a statement
3T7. 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
378. Id. at loo (majority opinion) (Cardozo, 1.) ("What the [tort] plaintiff must show is 'a
wrong' to herself; i.e., a violation of her own right, and not merely a wrong to some one
else, nor conduct 'wrongful' because unsocial, but not 'a wrong' to any one.").
379- Id. at iol.
380. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 285, at 1812-32. Picking up on Cardozo's famous
observation that "negligence is a term that imports relation," Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at lol, we
have elsewhere analogized the contrast between analytically relational and analytically
simple (i.e., non-relational) duties to the contrast in English grammar between transitive
and intransitive verbs. GOLDBERG ETAL., supra note 3, at 302 (noting that, until one specifies
to which class of persons and with regard to what sort of harm a tort duty is owed, one has
not adequately specified the duty). To say that duties are analytically relational is not to say
(absurdly) that a victim must have enjoyed a pre-existing relationship with the tortfeasor in
order to be the beneficiary of a tort duty. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 147, at 707-09.
381. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1,
15-40 (1998).
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about her.38 2 The same idea of relationality is built into trespass. Suppose
driver D intentionally but unwittingly drives on a road located on private
property owned by 0. Suppose further that T happens to be walking along the
road without permission. If D runs over T, T cannot recover for his injuries on
a claim of trespass, even though D's trespass caused T's injury. The trespass
was not a trespass as to T, who has no property interest in the road' 8s
Relational duties are also at the heart of the flagship modern tort of
negligence. Indeed, this is precisely the point of Palsgraf8s: Mrs. Palsgraf was
denied recovery because she could not show that the defendant's employees'
conduct was careless as to the physical well-being of persons occupying the
position that she did relative to their conduct. The conductors may have been
careless as to the physical well-being of the passenger whom they pushed (he
might have fallen) or others in his immediate vicinity (who might have been
hurt if the passenger or his package were to fall on them). But they could not
plausibly be deemed careless as to the physical well-being of someone like Mrs.
Palsgraf, standing far away. Because its employees committed no wrong as to
her, and because tort law, as a law of redress, insists on proof of such a wrong,
the railroad was not liable, even though it had acted wrongfully toward others
in a manner that caused harm to her.
To conceive of tort law as a law concerned with private wrongs is thus to
conceive of tort law as built around relational duties. But it is also to conceive
of tort as built around the idea of injury. Part of what separates wrongs in their
public aspect from wrongs in their private aspect is that something different
has happened to a particular person so as to render his relationship to the
wrongful conduct distinct from the general population's. In short, for there to
be a private wrong there must not only be a wronging but a victim-a person
who suffers a special sort of adverse effect by virtue of being wronged.
The foregoing helps to explain why the notion of an inchoate tort is
oxymoronic. An attempted murder that fails, and of which the intended victim
remains unaware, is not a tort.""s This is so even if, unbeknownst to the victim,
the perpetrator were successfully prosecuted for the attempt. There is no
injury-here defined as the kind of adverse effect on the victim that
distinguishes her from the rest of the population-and hence no completed
382. Id. at 17-18.
383. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 157 (1965) (defining persons who possess land for
purposes of trespass claims).
384. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
385. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REv. 1625, 1636-37
(2002).
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wrong for which to seek redress., 86 Likewise, crimes such as unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, though criminal wrongs, need not be and
usually are not tortious as to anyone.
To say that the idea of injury is no less central to tort than the idea of
relational duties is not to suppose that there are always going to be easy
answers to the inherently normative question of what should count as an
injury. Interferences with autonomy, bodily integrity, and freedom of
movement are readily recognized as injuries that, if wrongly inflicted, give rise
to tort actions such as battery, false imprisonment, and negligence. Destruction
or damage to property has likewise long been understood to constitute an
injury to the property owner, supporting actions for trespass, conversion, and
negligence. Interference with other interests, including enjoyment of land and
economic expectancies (particularly those rooted in contract) can also count as
injuries. These translate into causes of action for nuisance, fraud, tortious
interference with contract, and negligent misrepresentation. And an important
innovation of modern tort law has been to confer on emotional distress the
status of injury. 8 7 The denial or withholding of certain benefits can also
amount to an injury. This is why an actor's nonfeasance -failure to protect or
rescue a person placed in peril by something other than an exercise of the
actor's agency-can sometimes generate tort liability. By contrast, annoyance
and moral outrage usually do not count as injuries, nor do exposures to risks of
harm that do not ripen into actual harms."' s
3. A Law for the Redress of Private Wrongs
The foregoing explains that tort law, as a law for the redress of wrongs,
conditions the imposition of liability on conduct that is wrongful toward, and
injurious to, the victim. The third feature that marks tort law as a distinctive
department of the law derives from the core idea of redress. Tort law is a law
for the redress of private wrongs because it empowers victims in particular
ways. 389 Most importantly, the decision to complain about an alleged wrong
lies uniquely with the victim. In Blackstone's phrase, the victim is the one who
386. Here, I am using "injury" to refer to the sort of adverse effect suffered by a victim that can
support a tort claim, as opposed to Locke's and Blackstone's use of the term to refer to the
wronging of the victim. See supra note 92.
387. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 695-702 (reviewing this development).
388. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 385, at 1650-6o.
389. See Zipursky, supra note 8o, at 632-36; see also Benjamin C. Zipurksy, Civil Recourse, Not
Corrective Justice, 91 GEo. L.J. 695, 733-40 (2003).
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decides whether to set the law in motion. 9° In this respect, tort stands in
contrast to criminal prosecutions and administrative proceedings that are
conducted at the behest of, and formally controlled by, government officials. A
right to redress is, as Zipursky has emphasized, a legal power conferred on a
victim to pursue an action against the alleged wrongdoer if she chooses.39' If
she sees no value in obtaining redress, concludes that its costs outweigh its
benefits, or prefers to deal with her injuries by channeling her energies into
social activism, the law takes no interest in the matter.3 92
The idea of redress, like the idea of a private wrong, is also relational. As
Ernest Weinrib has emphasized, an action for redress in tort is a suit that seeks
to assign responsibility to a wrongdoer for having wronged the victim.3 93 It
might well be desirable from a public policy perspective to have victims of
wrongs sue someone other than the alleged wrongdoer(s). 39 4 That such a
justification generally has not carried weight within our tort law demonstrates
that tort aims to provide redress for wrongs (as opposed, say, to achieving
efficient deterrence).
Tort redress is not to be confused with vengeance. Vengeance is an
unregulated response by which a victim seeks satisfaction directly and by the
means of her choice. For good reasons, Anglo-American law allows almost no
room for it. Because it is unmediated, vengeance runs high risks of error,
overkill, additional violence, and ongoing feuds, which tend to work against
the resolution of disputes and to undermine civil order. Even when the law
permits self-help-e.g., recapture of chattels-it limits the privilege by
requiring that it be done peaceably. Redress through law, as Locke and
Blackstone understood, is a substitute for vengeance.3 9'
While the idea of redress through law is hardly self-defining, it does
suggest a limited universe of possibilities. If successful tort claimants were
provided only with an apology, or a framed copy of the judgment that had
390. See supra text accompanying note 152.
391. Zipursky, supra note 389, at 733-40.
392. Thus, studies decrying the fact that a small percentage of potential tort claimants bring suit
ought not to presume automatically that this is a public policy problem-one needs to know
more about why people do not sue. To the extent such decisions are knowing and voluntary,
it might be a desirable feature of a system that places the decision to respond on the victim.
393. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 142-44 (1995).
394. For example, it might make sense to permit a victim who suffers a loss to hold liable a third
party who did not even cause the loss because that party happens to be in a good position to
prevent that sort of loss in the future. See Gumo CALABPEsI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGALANDECONOMICANALYSIS 137-38 (1970).
39s. Zipursky, supra note 381, at 85.
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been entered against the tortfeasor, it would fail to provide satisfaction, at least
to victims of egregious wrongdoing or to those who have suffered significant
harm196 The idea of satisfaction literally requires that the victim get "enough."
Locke, as we have seen, was prepared to suppose that, at least for certain
wrongs, the victim would be entitled even to claim the "services" of the
wrongdoer. 97 Medieval English law similarly allowed the victim to demand
the infliction of an appropriate punishment on the tortfeasor in the case of
certain (felonious) wrongs'9 8 Why, then, does modem tort law close off these
potential avenues of redress? The case is perhaps not as open-and-shut as one
might at first glance suppose. Some victims would fare better given the option
to initiate punishment, including most obviously those wronged by judgment-
proof wrongdoers3 99 Moreover, the relentless monetization of redress has
arguably introduced pathologies, including the commodification of injuries 400
and the transformation of some plaintiffs' lawyers from victim-representatives
to injury entrepreneurs.40' Still, a system of privately initiated prosecutions
poses enough problems to explain and justify the exclusive preference for
monetary redress. If the history of the old appeal of felony is any guide,
punishment may in practice tend to devolve into a system of payments as
tortfeasors attempt to buy off their prosecutors. 4 2 The greater threat value of
the prospect of imprisonment might also skew the system too much in favor of
victims, at least without the procedural protections granted criminal
396. This is not to deny the potential significance of apology as an appropriate response to the
commission of wrongs. See Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yam, On Apology and Consilience, 77
WASH. L. REV. 1121 (2002); see also Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating
Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85 (2004).
397- See supra note ioo and accompanying text.
398. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
399. This observation raises thorny questions about the interrelation of redress law to laws
pertaining to bankruptcy, corporations, insurance, and trusts. The legalization and growth
of liability insurance has generally enhanced the ability of victims to obtain meaningful
redress. Yet by limiting victims to monetary redress, our law has enabled savvy wrongdoers
to structure their affairs to avoid liability, while also disabling victims of impecunious
wrongdoers from obtaining redress. One can perhaps view the modern victims' rights
movement as an effort to forge an alternative avenue of redress through criminal law.
400. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX,
CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS 184-91 (1996).
401. This is not necessarily to lay blame exclusively or mainly at the feet of plaintiffs' lawyers.
Litigation has grown more complex and expensive in part because it is in defendants'
interests that it do so.
402. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 504 (4 th ed. 2002). It may be
independently desirable to give victims more of a role in criminal prosecutions that
nonetheless remain under the control of officials.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
defendants. In turn, the adoption of these protections might render civil justice
too hard to come by. And there are virtues associated with a system keyed to
reparations rather than punishment, including the ability of victims to attract
lawyers to take on their causes.
The appropriate amount of wealth to transfer from wrongdoer to victim is
also an open question. On this issue, redress theory differs significantly from
corrective justice theory. The latter is built around the idea that a tort suit aims
to restore the equilibrium between victim and wrongdoer. Alternatively, it
speaks in terms of the idea of a loss or "mess" being shifted from victim to
wrongdoer on the ground that, injustice, the wrongdoer ought to be the one to
bear it.4° 3 Either picture naturally sits well with the idea of returning to the pre-
tort status quo. By contrast, redress theory is not tied to a notion of restoration
or making whole. Tort suits and damages, in this view, do not aim to cancel
out or annul a wrong and its consequences. They are a means by which the
wrong is acknowledged, rather than erased, and by which the victim responds
to or retaliates against the wrongdoer.
4 4
Compared to a corrective justice conception of damages, a redress
conception carries with it certain descriptive advantages. Jury instructions do
not always or even typically direct juries to restore the status quo ante, instead
telling them to provide an amount of compensation that is reasonable in light
of what the wrongdoer has done to the plaintiff.4° s Moreover, the redress
model can explain why awards of punitive damages, at least in some instances,
do not involve an illicit blending of criminal with civil law.4, 6 Punitive
damages are quite intelligible if understood as a type of damage payment
reserved for victims of a particularly egregious kind of wrong, which, in turn,
generates an entitlement in the victim to a particular kind of response. This is
403. See Jules L. Coleman, Second Thoughts and Other First Impressions, in ANALYZING LAW 257,
302 (Brian Bix ed., 1998).
404. Tort law does not promise always to deliver a remedy that will provide a subjective sense of
satisfaction in the victim, as that would leave defendants completely at the mercy of victims'
felt needs. Rather, it promises a remedy that would provide satisfaction to a reasonable
person in the position of the victim.
405. See, e.g., CIVIL COMM. ON CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL
(BAJI) § 14.01 (2005) (stating that in a case of admitted liability, the jury should award
damages that will reasonably compensate the plaintiff); 1B COMM. ON PATrERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, ASS'N OF SUPREME COURT JusTICES, NEW YORK PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 2:277 (3d ed. 2005) (stating that the jury should award damages that will
fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for all losses resulting from her injuries).
406. By contrast, corrective justice theorists such as Ripstein and Weinrib see little place in tort
law for punitive damages. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 152-
55 (1999); WEINRIB, supra note 393, at 135 n.25.
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not to say that "making whole" is always or even usually an inappropriate
measure of redress. In the typical case of accidental harm, the victim perhaps
ought to be content if the law stands ready to force the wrongdoer to make
good on the losses that his carelessness has caused. There need not, however,
be a tight linkage drawn between tort law and the idea of making whole.
Finally, the notion of tort as a law of redress should be distinguished from
the notion that alleged victims of wrongdoings are entitled to a day in court, or
must otherwise have their claims treated and resolved on a highly
individualized basis. Tort causes of action are bound up with courts in that the
latter are prototypically the institutions to which aggrieved victims complain,
as well as the ones that secure the appearance of the alleged wrongdoer,
determine the validity of the claim, and, if it is valid, issue and order
enforcement of judgments. Yet to acknowledge this is not to commit to the
proposition, sometimes associated with justice-based views of tort, that it is a
desideratum of tort law that each alleged victim of wrongdoing will have the
validity of her allegations determined in open court, or that her claim will be
resolved by a judge or jury without regard to the resolution of any other actual
or potential claims, or that each suit will result in a published, merits-based
declaration as to whether the alleged wrong was committed.4°7 The core claim
of redress theory is that tort law's distinctiveness resides in conferring on
individuals (and entities) a power to pursue a legal claim alleging that she (or
it) has suffered an injury flowing from a legal wrong to her by another. How
that claim is pursued and resolved is, accordingly, a matter for the victim to
decide. If it is vitally important to her to obtain a public acknowledgment of
wrongdoing from her peers or a presiding official then she is entitled to ask for
a jury trial and pursue the claim to judgment. But she is also entitled to settle
the claim in a manner that she- with the advice of a lawyer, one hopes - deems
appropriate, or not to bring a claim at all. Assuming that there is a court system
available to claimants, as well as the opportunity for victims to obtain adequate
representation and make reasonably informed decisions as to whether and how
to pursue their claims (surely ideals of which our system regularly falls short),
redress theory is indifferent to whether claims are resolved by trial or by the
negotiation of settlements, whether individual or aggregate.
407- See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1572-73 (2004) (suggesting
that practices of "aggregate settlement" by lawyers on behalf of dusters of clients run
counter to justice-based conceptions of tort).
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4. Torts, Rights, and Duties
Armed with a better understanding of what it actually means for tort law to
be a law for the redress of private wrongs, we can appreciate why it has long
been understood, and should continue to be understood, as having an
important place within a polity such as ours. By identifying tort law's linkages
to liberty, democracy, equality, limited government, and the rule of law, I aim
to explain why even today courts and legislatures have reasons to take seriously
the idea that our Federal Constitution includes a right to a law for the redress
of wrongs.
As we have seen, the linkage of tort law to individual rights goes back at
least to Locke.4°' Government, by taking on the task of maintaining civil
society, obtains from individuals a variety of powers that they would otherwise
be entitled to exercise. Thus, apart from special cases such as self-defense, the
victim of a wrong is by law disabled from responding to the wrong on his own,
or with the aid of his friends or kin. If he attacks or seizes another or
expropriates her goods in an effort to obtain satisfaction for the wrong done to
him, he will be subject to liability for battery, false imprisonment, and/or
conversion, as well as criminal punishment. With resort to self-help blocked by
the law, government is obligated, at least to some degree, to provide an
alternative path for the attainment of satisfaction. Granting the victim a right
to redress is an obvious way for government to fulfill that duty, particularly
when the law declines to impose affirmative legal duties on officials to act in
other ways for the protection of individuals.40 9
Tort law also functions in other ways to articulate and vindicate rights and
interests that individuals are taken to enjoy under liberal theory. For example,
the tort of battery at once recognizes, defines, and protects the right of persons
to be free of unwanted intentional touchings by others. As Blackstone
suggested, we act in the belief that our physical selves are, in principle,
inviolable in part because the law recognizes that it is usually a wrong for
persons purposefully to touch others without consent. By the same token, the
tort of defamation articulates a right not to be burdened in our social
408. See Zipursky, supra note 381, at 85 & n.284.
409. By limiting the ability of individual citizens to demand official protection ex ante, decisions
like Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005), strengthen the case for
recognition of a right in the victim of wrongs to pursue a cause of action against
wrongdoers, including, when appropriate, officials or government employers. For example,
one could argue that a state law that grants immunity both to individual officials who have
committed otherwise actionable legal wrongs and to the government in its capacity as their
employer (as opposed to immunizing one or the other) violates, at least in some
applications, a victim's due process right to a law for the redress of wrongs.
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interactions by virtue of certain statements about us that cast us in a negative
light. Conversely, the absence of tort liability helps define realms in which we
are at liberty to act without regard to certain interests of others. The fact that,
today, tort liability cannot attach to defamatory political speech uttered in good
faith is understood as part of what it means to have a right of free speech.
Likewise, the absence of a general duty to take reasonable care against
interfering with others' economic prospects is a recognition that, in a capitalist
system, there is a legitimate sphere of economic competition that permits
actors to undertake actions that risk devastation to one's competitors.
Construed as a law for the redress of wrongs, tort law also confers on
individuals a certain status vis-a'-vis government and other citizens. Tort law
involves a literal empowerment of victims-it confers on them standing to
demand a response to their mistreatment. In this sense it affirms their status as
persons who are entitled not to be mistreated by others. It also affirms that a
victim is a person who is entitled to make demands on government. A tort
claimant can insist that government provide her with the opportunity to
pursue a claim of redress for the purpose of vindicating basic interests even if
government officials are not inclined to do so. Ex ante safety regulations, even
though they may protect individuals at risk of being wrongfully harmed, do
not confer the same sort of standing. Indeed, intended beneficiaries of such
regulations usually have no right to demand that the regulations be enacted for
their benefit, or even that existing regulations be enforced.4"' As such, tort law
contributes to political legitimacy. As a forum that is in principle available to
anyone who has been victimized in a certain way, tort law demonstrates to
citizens that the government has a certain level of concern for their lives,
liberties, and prospects.
For related reasons, tort law helps maintain and promote a nonhierarchical
conception of social ordering. As the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
understood, to render a person capable of suing (and being sued) for injuries
suffered (and caused) is to enforce a conception of equality. Each of us is in
principle accountable to each other; none is above or below the law. If, to
update Coleman's example, Bill Gates is run over by the careless driving of an
assembly-line worker, that worker has to make good, to the extent he can, on
the breach of the duty he owed to Gates. 411 More tellingly, if the tables are
turned, Gates is accountable to the worker. Four centuries ago, to the discredit
of English law, nobility were immunized by virtue of their status from many
410. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 385, at 1655-56.
411. JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 304 (1992).
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tort obligations. 412 While today some immunities remain, and wealthy
defendants undoubtedly enjoy important advantages in the litigation system,
tort law instantiates a notion of equality.
As explained above, tort law is built around relational duties of non-injury.
As such, it carves up the social world into "loci of responsibility"413 - i.e.,
particular contexts governed by norms of appropriate conduct that actors must
observe for the benefit of identifiable classes of potential victims. For example,
as applied to driving, negligence law reinforces and elaborates social norms of
safe conduct that drivers must observe for the benefit of other drivers, cyclists,
pedestrians, persons occupying storefronts, and storeowners. By the same
token, malpractice law generates norms of safe practices that doctors are
obligated to heed for the benefit of patients (and sometimes non-patients),
while product liability law articulates safety norms to be observed by sellers on
behalf of product users and certain others. The same goes for the range of torts
that can arise out of various different modes of social interaction- e.g.,
employer-employee, business-customer, lawyer-client, neighbor-neighbor,
carrier-passenger. Of course, tort is not solely responsible for the emergence of
the norms applicable to these sorts of interaction. It does, however, build on,
amplify, and revise obligations that are already recognized, in part because of
habits and customs that both shape and are shaped by law.
As a body of law that carves out these loci of responsibility, tort helps to
maintain a version of civil society that is distinctively liberal. First, the ties in
question consist mainly of negative obligations -obligations not to injure, as
opposed to duties of positive assistance. To say this is by no means to accede to
the standard charge that liberalism is wedded to an atomistic conception of
social life, as if the only duty one owes is to refrain from consciously injuring
others. The everyday operation of tort law, particularly negligence law, often
requires substantial investments of attention, time, and money on behalf of
others. For individuals, going about one's business with care for the well-being
of certain others requires routine self-monitoring ("How am I driving?"). It
may also require taking affirmative precautions, such as tending to slippery
surfaces on one's property. Needless to say, firms find that taking care is no
mean feat, requiring, for example, the installation of expensive safety
equipment, or the development of protocols to reduce the risk of accidental
injury (which is why they often complain bitterly over the imposition of these
obligations).
41u. HERZOG, supra note 36, at 131.
413. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 U. MD. L. REV.
364,403-04 (2005)-
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Second, the articulation of duties that are specific to roles and activities
that, in principle, might be assumed by a wide range of actors is compatible
with our relatively open and fluid society. The duties of tort law tend not to be
rarified or esoteric. They are everyday duties that inhere in ordinary conduct.414
As such, they remind us that we live within an elaborate network of relations
from which we benefit and to which we must attend. Nor are tort obligations
reserved in principle for a particular status or social group. Whoever assumes
the role of a driver or property occupant assumes a set of obligations associated
with those roles.
Third, the imposition of obligations provides a scheme of regulation that
operates, when working well, by reinforcing social norms rather than by
Holmesian prices.415 By imposing legal obligations whose basic contours are
already recognizable, the law enhances its own legitimacy. It also may permit
regulation to be achieved with less reliance on bureaucracy, which must rely on
carrots and sticks to impose alien standards of behavior. The point is not that
other forms of regulation are undesirable or inappropriate. Rather, it is that
tort law can claim as one of its advantages that, insofar as it regulates behavior,
it does so without requiring an elaborate administrative apparatus.
Fourth, tort law, by articulating and enforcing relational duties, treats
actors as agents who are responsible to others for the consequences of their
actions. One hallmark of liberal politics is the central place given to the
individual as autonomous agent. And when liberal politics are linked to
capitalist economics, the notion is that individuals ought to enjoy at least a
prima facie entitlement to a substantial portion of the fruits of their labors.
Holding persons responsible for some of the negative consequences of their
conduct is a related practice. The assignment of responsibility for outcomes
acknowledges agency.4'6 By contrast, a system that treats injuries as commonly
owned, however commendable for other reasons, removes one of the major
avenues through which law affirms agency.417
Fifth and relatedly, the responsibilities identified by tort law are owed by
persons and entities to other persons and entities. Although these include
obligations owed by individual government actors to citizens and entities (e.g.,
a police officer's duty to refrain from unjustifiably arresting or beating a
414. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARv. L. REv. 682, 689-90 (1931).
415. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 1o HARV. L. REv. 457,462 (1897).
416. See Stephen R Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IowA L. REv. 449, 489-90
(1992) (developing Honor6's concept of "outcome-responsibility").
417. RIPSTEIN, supra note 406, at 246-63 (critiquing a system of sharing adverse outcomes that
would negate the notion of individual responsibility instantiated through tort and criminal
law).
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person), they are for the most part obligations owed by nongovernment actors
to other nongovernment actors (or by and to government when it acts in its
capacity as private actor-e.g., as an entity with ownership rights in property).
In this respect, tort law operates predominantly as part of a liberal conception
of civil society-a realm of duties and rights operating between citizens. The
state plays a vital role, but it is that of a Lockean umpire. This understanding
differs from one in which duties are seen as imposed by and owed to the state,
even duties that, in the end, benefit other citizens. For example, in a statist
depiction, the duty owed by a doctor to provide competent medical care to a
patient is a duty imposed by and owed to the state for the benefit of patients
and perhaps society generally.4,8 As conceived by tort law, the state is not
regarded as the font or the object of such a duty. Instead, the doctor's duty is
properly described as owing to the patient.
Sixth, tort law is recognizably liberal in how it factors causal contingencies
into assignations of responsibility. A standard puzzle for tort theorists is why
outcomes should matter to such assignations. If A and B independently drive
badly in the same way under the same circumstances, but only B hits and
harms a pedestrian, B is subject to tort liability but A is not. From the
perspective of moral desert, A and B perhaps should face the same sanctions.
Tort law, however, is not a system for punishing on the basis of desert. It is a
system that empowers victims of wrongs to seek redress for those wrongs.
Thus, it is not at all mysterious that tort liability will attach only to B's
conduct. There is no one who is entitled to invoke the law of redress against A
because she did not wrongfully injure anybody. Wrongdoers who are in this
sense lucky enough not to injure others are, for purposes of tort law, granted
the benefit of that luck as part of the liberty of action that they enjoy.
In sum, tort law's distinctive features give it a unique role to play in our
legal and political system, which in turn helps make the case for interpreting
the Constitution as recognizing a right to it. Yet there is within this argument
an important implication cutting in the opposite direction. Obviously, I have
been arguing that tort law forms a basic component of our constitutional order
only insofar as it operates as a law for the redress of private wrongs. By
contrast, Fleming James's conception of tort law as an instrument of loss
spreading, if accurate, would not earn tort law fundamental status as a law of
redress. The same is true for Prosserian or Posnerite public-wrong accounts, or
the Naderite-populist conception of tort law as a lever by which ordinary
citizens can bring the powerful to heel. Because each of these is an avowedly
418. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 285, at 1753-56 (discussing Holmes's top-down
approach to duty).
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regulatory theory of tort, none connects up to liberal-constitutionalism in the
ways just described (although each may do so in other ways).
419
Finally, to fend off potential misunderstandings of this argument, it will be
worth reviewing what this Section has and has not established. That tort law
can be understood as a law of redress, and that such a law has a distinctive role
to play in a polity such as ours, does not by itself suffice to demonstrate that
the Constitution is best interpreted as recognizing a right to a law of redress.
However, when read in conjunction with the historical and doctrinal analysis
provided in Parts I and II, this analysis bolsters an already strong case that such
a right is enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment. The argument of this Part
also does not impugn the validity of other forms of law. Rather, it identifies the
distinctive contribution that tort law is in a position to make. Nor, as will be
discussed below, does it assert that our polity must, in the end, maintain a law
of private redress, or that a society that has no tort law cannot possibly be a
liberal-constitutional polity. Finally, it does not imply that tort law in principle
perfectly matches tort law in practice, or that procedural, substantive, and
remedial aspects of tort law could not benefit from reform. Again, the point is
merely to elaborate the reasons why one might think, and why various
important jurists have thought, that a law for the redress of private wrongs is a
basic component of our political regime.
C. Guidelines for Enforcing the Right to a Law of Redress
Supposing that the right to a law of redress was meant to be, has been, and
is part of our constitutional law, the question with which we began can finally
be addressed: What rules of decision or standards should courts use to
enforce it ?0
1. Possible Frameworks
Although it is conventional wisdom today, the rational basis test's appeal as
a rule for enforcing the right to a law for the redress of private wrongs is hard
419. An irony of modem debates over tort reform is that those most eager to argue that tort law
ought to be immune to substantial legislative revision are also those least attracted to the
picture of tort law as a law for the redress of private wrongs. They seem not to notice that
there is a profound tension between claiming that tort law is a form of social and economic
regulation and claiming that tort reform legislation ought to be evaluated under a more
stringent standard than rational basis scrutiny.
42o. See Berman, supra note 17, at 61-63 (explaining the difference between a right and a rule
adopted to enforce it).
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to fathom given that it entails rubber stamping even the most irresponsible
defendant-friendly reforms. Some might suppose that it is a bullet that must be
bitten; that it alone promises appropriate deference to legislative judgments.
Yet the Supreme Court's track record deploying the Munn-Humes floor-ceiling
framework hardly suggests that it entails a rabidly interventionist approach.42" '
Perhaps the main prop supporting the rational basis test is the failure to
identify a superior alternative. Certainly, it looks attractive relative to two
possible alternatives. The first is the vested interest model, under which
individuals enjoy a veto power over legislative tort reforms. One of several
problems with this model is the protean nature of the common law itself. To
which version of tort law are individuals entitled? Negligence with the privity
rule or without? Strict products liability or not? Contributory negligence or
comparative fault? Given that the history of American tort law is a history of
significant doctrinal variation, it seems bizarre to posit an entitlement to one or
another set of tort rules. This is presumably one reason why the model was so
decisively rejected by the Court in Munn v. Illinois.
The second alternative - the quid-pro-quo test - has some support in Court
decisions. For example, the Court reasoned in White that workers'
compensation laws passed constitutional muster in part because they contain
benefits for both workers (strict instead of fault-based liability) and employers
(scheduled damages instead of tort damages) that correspond to the loss of
potential advantages that they had enjoyed under tort law.4" In dicta, the
White Court also expressed doubt that a legislature could substantially interfere
with plaintiffs' or defendants' rights under the common law without providing
a "reasonably just substitute."
423
Yet White's holding and dicta are quite different. It is one thing to say that
the provision of a compensating benefit to adversely affected parties helps to
justify a given piece of tort reform. It is another to make its provision a
constitutional necessity. Wisely, Duke Power expressly declined to adopt a
quid-pro-quo requirement, and decisions stretching back through Silver to
Humes and Munn have upheld tort reforms that imposed costs unilaterally on
the actors challenging them.4" Should a legislature today really have to provide
a benefit to a husband who can no longer sue a third party for having an affair
with his wife? To those who are required to prove recklessness instead of
carelessness under an automobile guest statute?
421. See supra text accompanying notes 214-247.
422. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 202 (1917).
423. Id. at 2Ol.
424. See supra text accompanying notes 215-219, 262-268, 313-316.
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Recognition of the failings of these alternatives marks the path forward.
Although different in substance, rational basis analysis, the vested interest
model, and the quid-pro-quo test are all mechanical in two senses: They aim to
handle floor and ceiling challenges on the same terms, and they invite courts to
assess the constitutionality of tort reforms without attending closely to the
nature of the tort and the reform at issue. In my view, courts should abandon
the search for a single test in this area and instead recognize that discrete
questions are posed by ceiling and floor cases.425 And when it comes to
analyzing the floor, they should employ a framework that requires them to
consider carefully the justification for the reform legislation, the nature of the
tort under reform, and the effect of that reform on the interests of plaintiffs
who stand to invoke the tort.42
6
These considerations point toward a three-step framework for due process
floor challenges:
(i) What is the wrong that stands to be redressed by the tort cause of
action?
(a) Does the tort cause of action really aim to redress a wrong?
(b) What sort of interest of the victim does the tort action vindicate?
(c) What sort of interference does the tort identify as wrongful?
(2) What is the effect of the reform legislation on the tort cause of
action?
(3) What are the stated or implicit justifications for the legislation?
The first step calls for close analysis of the underlying tort cause of action.
It can, in turn, be broken down into three sub-steps. Sub-step one asks
whether the tort in fact aims to provide for the redress of wrongs, as opposed
to achieving some other goal. Given tort law's historic function as a law of
redress, the strong presumption will be that the action is so functioning. But
doctrines that fall under the heading of tort sometimes impose liability for
other reasons. For example, if, as Traynor supposed, the application of
products liability law to manufacturing defect cases really aims primarily to
spread victims' losses, then it is not entitled to constitutional protection out of
recognition of the right to a law for the redress of wrongs. By contrast, if
manufacturing defect doctrine is instead justified as a means of easing the
425. The remainder of this Section will develop floor guidelines. Section III.D briefly considers
ceiling issues.
426. Perhaps not coincidentally, this test somewhat resembles the test for procedural due process
violations put forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
victim's burden of proving fault, then it falls within the class of torts that
provide redress.
Once the court concludes that the tort cause of action is functioning as a
claim for redress, the court must next consider (in sub-step two) the individual
interest that the tort aims to vindicate. Is it the interest in bodily integrity,
liberty of movement, the ownership of tangible property, reputation, privacy,
wealth, emotional well-being, or some other interest? Because the common law
of tort itself distinguishes between these interests, giving greater protection to
the first trio and lesser protection to others, it will be more difficult for litigants
to establish a rights violation when the tort reform in question bears on torts
that protect interests such as the interest in accumulating intangible wealth.
Suppose, for example, a state had enacted legislation comparable to the federal
Y2K legislation, which eliminated liability for carelessly causing intangible
economic loss through the sale of defective software. 427 That statute would be a
candidate for more deferential judicial analysis. By contrast, laws abolishing or
limiting tort actions that respond to physical injuries, invasions of liberty, or
interferences with the use and enjoyment of tangible property will generally
warrant less deferential analysis.
Having determined the type of interest in question, the court must (in sub-
step three) consider the type of interference to which the tort responds. If the
tort claim responds to the sort of misconduct that has historically supported
punitive damage awards-i.e., conduct that is malicious, intentional, or
knowing as to the victim, or that displays reckless or contemptuous disregard
for the victim -there is a stronger case for invalidating tort reforms barring or
burdening the claim. Of the various ways that persons can mistreat and injure
one another, those that involve malice or contempt toward the victim prompt a
justifiably greater sense of victimization, and with it, a stronger claim for -and
perhaps a stronger urge for-redress.421 In operation, this sub-step probably
would have to be invoked on an as-applied basis. Thus, suppose a legislature
abolished the law of trespass to land, and a plaintiff complaining of a deliberate
and malicious trespass was thereby left without remedy. If she could prove that
427. 15 U.S.C. 5 6611 (2000).
42S. It might be said against this facet of the test that it sets the impossible task of rank-ordering
different forms of mistreatment. Such a task is hardly impossible. Tort law and criminal law
already draw such distinctions in their daily operation. For example, "intentional" torts such
as battery are treated, as a class, as relatively serious wrongs, which helps explain why they
are not barred by workers' compensation laws, and why liabilities for intentional wrongs are
not dischargeable in bankruptcy or covered by liability insurance. Moreover, a majority of
the Court has already demonstrated its willingness to engage in such ordering under the
reprehensibility prong of its ceiling test for excessive punitive damages. See BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-76 (1996).
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the trespasser acted with the requisite disposition, she would have a stronger
claim that the legislation should be struck down as applied to her. By contrast,
to the extent that the law applies to strict liability trespasses -i.e., intentional
use of land that the invader had no reason to know was owned by the owner-
it would be entitled to greater deference.4 9
With the first step complete, the court must in the second step consider the
severity of the legislation's interference with the plaintiffs tort action. Outright
abolition is the most significant form of interference. Across-the-board
limitations on remedies, such as the Virginia damages cap, are less intrusive,
but still substantial. Other measures, such as partial damage caps (e.g., on pain
and suffering damages) or additional evidentiary burdens may be less
intrusive, although this may again require as-applied analysis. For example, an
outright ban on punitive damages might, in the vast run of cases, amount to a
constitutional piece of tort reform with respect to cases in which a plaintiff, by
collecting full compensatory damages, is left with enough by way of redress.
Yet, as applied to a particular class of claimants -say, those who have suffered
an intentional violation of a core interest that generates little or no physical
harm-the ban might be constitutionally problematic because it essentially
prevents meaningful redress.
430
Finally, in the test's third step, the court should consider the purposes that
the legislation aims to serve. Here it is worth recalling Munn's observation, in
support of its influential "no vested interest" proposition, that "the great office
of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law .... ,41' The suggestion
seems to be that particular deference is owed to legislatures when they can
claim to be reforming tort law to enable it to operate more effectively on its
own terms. Thus, reforms that are plausibly construed as part of an effort to
weed out false claims, or reward valid claims, are entitled to relatively greater
deference. By the same token, legislation that is predicated on the notion that
the tort system is functioning properly, but that it has become too expensive
429. Sub-steps two and three help explain why typical automobile no-fault plans will likely pass
constitutionai muster, given that they generally bar claims for relatively modest amounts of
property damage or minor physical injuries and exclude from their ambit intentional
misconduct. See EPSTEIN, supra note 359, at 252 n.45.
430. Cf. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159-6o (Wis. 1997) (holding that a
willful trespass that causes no harm can provide the basis for a punitive damages award;
otherwise the violation of the plaintiffs property right would go unredressed). Or consider
the case of the flight attendant who secretly spikes an infant passenger's juice with a sedative
so as to render him docile, which results in no physical harm and of which his parents later
learn. If the suit has any hope of securing meaningful redress on the child's behalf for the
attendant's battery, it will only be if the court permits an award of punitive damages.
431. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
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for society to maintain, should invite more searching review. Intermediate
cases might involve legislation that restricts the reach of tort liability, but does
so in order to protect the same interests of the same class of persons as existing
tort law. Suppose a state enacts legislation that sets specific design standards
for a particular product in order to better secure the physical well-being of
product users, and that creates a meaningful enforcement apparatus to back up
these standards. If the law also exempts manufacturers subject to it from tort
liability arising out of acts that constitute statutory violations, it would be
entitled to greater deference than a statute restricting tort law in the name of
general prosperity.
2. Applying the Guidelines
To provide a better feel for the content of the foregoing guidelines, I will
briefly consider how they can help us to analyze familiar cases that implicate
the due process floor. Regrettably, the discussion here consists only of
suggestive remarks. I do not pretend to offer the sort of in-depth and context-
specific analysis that judges would undertake in resolving actual cases.
a. Workers' Compensation
In retrospect, it is not surprising that workers' compensation statutes of the
sort considered by the Supreme Court in White have overwhelmingly tended to
pass constitutional muster. The negligence law that such statutes supplanted is
a law of wrongs (Step l(a)). The interest at stake is the interest of workers in
protection from bodily injury (Step i(b)). Nonetheless, the protection that tort
law provided was for injuries caused by negligence, rather than intentionally
(Step i(c)). Here, it is important, not incidental, that workers' compensation
statutes tend explicitly to enable employees to sue in tort for workplace injuries
caused by intentional wrongs.
As discussed above in connection with White, workers' compensation
schemes do not simply leave victims high-and-dry, instead offering them
health benefits and lost wages (Step 2). 4 " Significantly, these schemes were
fashioned so as to retain the tort-based idea of the workplace as a locus of
responsibility. Even though, as a formal matter, tort law ceased to govern
workplace accidents, the idea of the employer being responsible for worker
432. It might be the case that judgments as to the constitutionality of workers' compensation
laws will change over time depending on, among other things, the compensation actually
being delivered by these schemes. See EPSTEIN, supra note 359, at 254.
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safety was retained, both symbolically and materially. A workers'
compensation claim is still a claim filed against an employer. And insurance
devices like experience-rating create incentives within workers' compensation
schemes for employers to attend to workplace safety and to the physical well-
being of their employees. Thus, the elimination of the tort right of action was
accomplished in a manner that did little to undermine the duty owed by
employers to their employees to maintain a safe workplace.433
Finally, the fact that these statutes were enacted in part as a result of
complaints by representatives of workers about the ability of the negligence
system to deliver reliable redress tells us something about their purposes (Step
3). It matters that a significant portion of the identifiable and relatively
cohesive class of persons who stood to be adversely affected by these reforms
were willing to accept them.4" In particular, their endorsement suggests that it
is unlikely that workers' compensation laws were an effort to trade off victims'
rights for an aggregate good such as economic prosperity.
b. Peaceful Picketing
If White represents a sensible application of due process analysis, Truax
does not. The claims there were for wrongs. However, as noted earlier, the
interest that the Truax majority was so eager to protect was not an interest in
autonomy, physical integrity, liberty, or property ownership, but instead a
mere economic expectancy. The protection provided to that sort of interest by
tort law has traditionally been quite modest. Absent some special undertaking
by the defendant to the plaintiff to look out for that sort of interest, no liability
will attach to careless conduct that causes a loss of business to another, even if
433. The terms on which the Supreme Court in White validated New York's scheme is very much
in keeping with the post-Bivens decisions of the modem Court, discussed above, which have
denied constitutional tort actions to litigants because of the availability of alternative
remedial schemes adequate to vindicate their protected interests. See, e.g., Schweiker v.
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983). But see Carlson
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20-23 (198o) (concluding that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not
provide an adequate substitute for a Bivens action for an Eighth Amendment violation).
434. This is not to say that majority approval by the class of persons who stand to be affected by
a given tort reform is necessary or sufficient to validate the reform. After all, a majority
might well approve (and, through their representatives, did approve) the Virginia damage
cap discussed in the Introduction. Part of the reason that this support was forthcoming was
that workers in the early twentieth century confronted several liability-restrictive tort
doctrines. But these were hardly set in stone- many were relatively new, some had already
been rejected in some jurisdictions, and others were under fire from an army of critics,
which meant that there was a respectable chance in many jurisdictions that workers would
benefit in the medium term from favorable doctrinal reforms.
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that loss was foreseeable. 435 Even with respect to intentional interference with
expectancies, tort liability is circumscribed. Typically, there is a requirement
not only that the interference be intended, but that it be motivated by malice
toward the victim or effected by independently wrongful means. 436 (Thus, in
Truax, Corrigan and his union were free to set up a competing restaurant
across the street, knowing that its success would entail the destruction of
Truax's business, so long as they did so out of self-interest rather than, or in
addition to, spite.) For these reasons, it is not at all clear that a case like Truax
warrants a finding of a legally cognizable claim. Even if it does, the lesser status
of the interest at stake and the presence of a countervailing right to free speech
(at least under modem conceptions of that right), strongly support the
conclusion that Truax was or is an indefensible over-enforcement of the right
to a law of redress, particularly insofar as it denied states the ability to
eliminate injunctive relief.
c. Anti-Heartbalm Statutes
"Anti-heartbalm" statutes were enacted primarily in the early twentieth
century to eliminate particular actions, including criminal conversation,
alienation of affections, seduction, and breach of promise to marry.
437
Application of the proposed due process framework to these statutes
demonstrates why attention to the nature of the underlying tort claim will be
critical to a court's constitutional analysis. It also demonstrates that the
proposed framework, although less deferential than the rational basis test,
would permit courts to uphold even the outright abolition of certian causes of
action.
From the late seventeenth century until the mid-nineteenth century,
actions for criminal conversation, alienation of affections, and seduction were
available only to husbands and fathers against third parties who had sex with,
or who kidnapped or enticed away, their wives or unmarried daughters. The
injuries redressed by these actions were conceptualized in patriarchal terms. In
435. To take a classic example, suppose truck driver T carelessly crashes his truck, as a result of
which a bridge is closed for a month, and that B, a business owner on the far side of the
bridge, loses a month's worth of revenue because the bridge provides the only access to his
business. B will not have a negligence action against T. See, e.g., Barber Lines A/S v. M/V
Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54-55 (lst Cir. 1985) (stating the majority rule and offering
justifications for it).
436. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 446, at 126o-63 (2000).
437. Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand so Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit'": A Feminist
Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 374, 394 n.85 (1993).
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criminal conversation actions, the injury was a trespass by the wife's lover
against the husband's "property" interest in his wife's body and services, or an
affront to his honor, or an interference with his line of succession (given that
the affair may have created uncertainty as to paternity).438 Likewise, seduction
was understood to harm the father's interest in his unmarried daughter's
household services. 439
Once women were granted the capacity to sue and be sued, courts and
legislatures were faced with the question of whether these statutes had
rendered wives eligible to bring actions such as criminal conversation, and
daughters eligible to sue for seduction. Many concluded that they did. In
extending the protection of the law, however, these courts were required to
reconceptualize the interests that stood to be vindicated by these torts, and the
wrongs they identified. Suits for criminal conversation and alienation of
affections were now suits alleging wrongful disturbance of the marital
relationship." 0 Suits for seduction now sought redress for the dignitary,
emotional, and economic injuries unmarried women suffered as a result of
being wrongfully induced into having sex."
In the early twentieth century, several state legislatures enacted laws
abolishing these actions.44 Legislators were entitled to doubt that some of
these redefined torts were actually defining legal wrongs. For example, a
typical claim for criminal conversation was predicated on the theory that a
third party had destroyed a sound marital relationship by "seducing" one of the
spouses, albeit with that spouse's willing participation. Given the problems
posed by such a theory with respect to causation and damages, as well as a
history of notable verdicts and evidence that a significant percentage of this
litigation was extortionate or collusive, legislatures could fairly have concluded
that this tort was failing to function as a tort. In other instances, as was the case
for claims of seduction, the newly recast actions still articulated serious wrongs
involving intentional interferences with core dignitary interests. Yet the wrong
in question- that of deceiving an unmarried woman into consenting to sex -
was already tortious as a battery under the law of every state. 443 While there
might well be reasons for legislatures to mark off a special subset of batteries
438. See PROSSER, supra note 290, S iol, at 919.
439. Id. at 932-33.
44o. Id. at 928-29.
441. Larson, supra note 437, at 386.
442. Id. at 395.
443. PROSSER, supra note 290, S 18, at 121-22 (noting that fraud vitiates consent defenses to
batteries involving intercourse).
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with a separate cause of action, they presumably also enjoy discretion to forego
that route and eliminate one of two redundant causes of action.
In short, given significant doubts about the continued functioning of
claims for alienations of affections as wrongs, and the minimal degree of
interference posed by the elimination of seduction claims in light of the
availability of the tort of battery, courts were quite reasonable to disregard due
process objections to the anti-heartbalm statutes in their typical application. 444
d. Trespasses and Takings
Consider next the application of the proposed due process test to a
variation on Nollan, discussed above. The analysis in the actual case turned on
the idea that a condition placed on the issuance of a building permit was
equivalent to a legislatively imposed easement granting beachgoers the right to
cross beachfront property intentionally, and that the imposition of such an
easement was a taking of private property. Now suppose that, instead, the state
legislature enacts a law that established the "beachgoer defense" to actions for
trespass brought by owners of beachfront property. This law differs from the
Nollan legislation because it does not render such crossings lawful in all
respects. For example, the trespasser might in principle still be punishable for
criminal trespass, or the landowner might still be entitled to put up a fence
around the property to dissuade persons from crossing it. Would such a law
violate the right to a law of redress?
It might. The interest at stake is the interest in controlling access to
tangible property owned by the victim-plaintiff. Moreover, the legislation
leaves the owner subject to both accidental and purposeful invasions of his
property-at least if they are undertaken for the right purpose (going to the
beach). And the main aim of the legislation, it would seem, is to render
nugatory property owners' rights to exclude so that others may benefit at the
expense of those owners. That fences (which could be lawfully scaled by
beachgoers) and police protection are in principle available is arguably
insufficient to vindicate the owners' interest in excluding others from their
properties, particularly if one presumes that police would not be making it
their business to arrest beachgoing trespassers.
444. Because the ani-heartbalm statutes abolished several causes of action, and because each
covers a range of misconduct, it may be that courts should find that certain applications of
these statutes are unconstitutional, even though many are not.
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e. Damage Caps
Damage caps are perhaps the provisions most closely identified with the
modern tort reform movement. Not coincidentally, their propriety and
constitutionality have been hotly contested. It would be misguided to suppose
that the general analytic framework offered here can spit out a uniquely
appropriate resolution of the difficult questions raised by caps. Rather, by
isolating considerations relevant to the assessment of their constitutionality
and ordering our thinking about them, this framework explains why caps pose
difficult questions.
One way of seeing why damages caps pose hard questions is to see how, as
applied to them, the guidelines I have identified point in opposite directions.
Consider, for example, caps on damages in medical malpractice cases. On the
one hand, they limit or even block claims that vindicate core interests in bodily
integrity and autonomy. And, while proponents sometimes argue that they
protect the integrity of the tort system by preventing juries from awarding
damages on the basis of passion or prejudice, they are at least as often justified
as implementing a regrettable but necessary sacrifice of victims' interests in the
name of aggregate goods such as cheaper or more available health care. In both
of these ways, such caps seem constitutionally suspect. On the other hand, the
tort claims at issue typically allege negligence rather than wrongs involving
intent, conscious indifference, or recklessness. And, at least with respect to
partial caps (e.g., caps on noneconomic damages), the degree of interference
with these claims seems on the surface to be moderate as compared to outright
abolition. These considerations favor a finding of constitutionality.
This analytic ambivalence suggests that courts ought not to approach caps
generically, but instead should consider their particular terms, as well as their
consequences for particular classes of claimants. There may be good reason for
distinguishing the Virginia flat cap discussed at the outset of this Article from
other caps, and for distinguishing between particular applications of caps. On
its face, at least, the Virginia cap seems uniquely odious. For, by limiting
recovery even of out-of-pocket damages, it disavows any interest in improving
the operation of tort law as a law of wrongs. Instead, it is fully prepared to pay
for improved public access to medical services out of the pockets of victims
with serious injuries and clear entitlements to readily quantifiable damages.
Step 2 of the proposed guidelines, in a manner roughly akin to the tailoring
requirement of intermediate equal protection scrutiny, suggests that the
crudity of this approach is simply unacceptable, given the availability of less
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regressive alternatives. 44s Indeed, by interfering almost gratuitously with the
rights of malpractice victims, the Virginia law presents itself as an out-and-out
dereliction of the legislative "duty to provide, in the administration of justice,
for the redress of private wrongs."
446
Now contrast the Virginia cap with a provision limiting noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice cases to $250,000. Whatever its merits as a
piece of health care policy, the latter stands a better chance of surviving
constitutional scrutiny precisely because it seems on its face to leave open a
meaningful avenue of redress. Yet it is conceivable that a court should strike
down even this more modest form of cap as applied to classes of plaintiffs
whose claims will effectively be wiped out by it. These might include, for
example, plaintiffs who will not have the sort of significant economic losses
that render them eligible to obtain meaningful redress, such as homemakers
and the elderly.44"7
D. Implications
1. Defendants' Due Process Rights
The framework articulated and applied above is designed to determine
whether a state has violated the right to a law for the redress of wrongs by not
445. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976). Needless to say, many other tort reform measures
aimed at improving access to health care, including possibly other forms of damages caps,
would pass constitutional muster. For example, if a state legislature were to remove from
the tort system a certain class of potential claims, such as claims for malpractice against
obstetricians, and set up instead a publicly funded program to pay medical and other
expenses of children who suffer injuries at birth, there would probably be no issue.
Likewise, measures aimed at improving the functioning of the tort system, such as screening
panels or enhanced proof requirements on elements such as breach or causation, would also
almost certainly pass muster.
446. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876). Certain applications of statutes of
repose might provide another example of tort reforms that violate the due process floor.
Suppose, for example, a state law sets a ten-year statute of repose on all product liability
claims running from the date of sale. Now suppose a manufacturer produces a defective
product that generates serious illnesses that could not be discovered by the victims until
fifteen years after use of the product. A court might, in my judgment, strike down such a
statute as applied to this class of plaintiffs. Less drastically, it might read into the statute a
"discovery rule" exception to save it from constitutional difficulty.
447. See Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly,
53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1281-1312 (2004); see also David M. Studdert et al., Are Damage Caps
Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts in California, 23 HEALTH MAE7. 54, 60-62 (2004)
(arguing that caps on pain and suffering damages unfairly burden certain malpractice
victims).
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providing such law. It does not speak to the question of the degree to which
states enjoy discretion to permit the imposition of liability for wrongs. Even in
the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court routinely allowed legislatures
to modify tort law in defendant-unfriendly directions by substituting strict
liability for negligence, providing damage multiples, abolishing common law
defenses, and enacting wrongful death statutes. As we have seen, few courts
found constitutional difficulties with these reforms.448 That courts granted
greater room for maneuver for expansionary tort reform than for liability-
contracting tort reform makes a certain amount of sense. The interest at stake
among tort defendants is usually that of retaining wealth. For this reason
alone, there is and should be ample room for revision of the law in ways that
impose additional burdens on tort defendants.
Nonetheless, in decisions stretching from Guy to Gore, the Court has
identified some due process limits on states' ability to regulate or redistribute
under the guise of providing redress." 9 And one can certainly imagine other
instances in which a defendant ought to have a winning due process objection.
Consider, for example, a statute enacted by state S that, in the name of
redressing wrongs, creates a new cause of action dubbed "strict software seller
liability." It holds any software manufacturer with more than fifty employees
that does business in S liable for injuries suffered by the faultless victims of car
accidents that occur in S. This statute is instrumentally rational as to
compensating car accident victims. Given that bargains can take place under
the shadow of liability, it might also be rational as a means of deterrence. (For
example, the software companies can pay auto manufacturers to make more
crashworthy cars.) Nonetheless, even if such a law would survive rational basis
analysis, it would be unconstitutional simply because the justification for
making a software company transfer assets to a car accident victim quite
evidently has nothing to do with the notion that the company wrongfully
injured the victim.
2. Federal Tort Reform
This Article has not discussed the issue of limits on Congress's power to
engage in tort reform. Those limits might come from various sources,
including restrictions built into its enumerated powers, as well as the Seventh
448. See supra text accompanying notes 222-227. On wrongful death statutes, see Witt, supra note
216; see also Owensboro & N. Ry. Co. v. Barclay's Adm'r, 43 S.W. 177, 178-79 (Ky. Ct. App.
1897) (upholding a wrongful death act against a due process challenge); Carroll v. Mo. Pac.
Ry. Co., 88 Mo. 239, 246-47 (1885) (same).
449. See supra text accompanying notes 228-232, 342-346.
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Amendment right to a jury trial. As a matter of original understanding, the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause probably was not meant to guarantee a
right to a law of redress. 40 Yet, if this is so, it is only because the Framers did
not contemplate-and in fact sought to avoid implying-that Congress would
be making or reforming tort law. Today Congress looms much larger in our
political system, and Article I has been interpreted expansively. Even under
United States v. Lopez,451 it seems highly unlikely, for example, that a court
would deny Congress the power to enact national products liability law. With
Congress now empowered to enter the business of tort reform, it would seem
logical that constitutional restrictions previously addressed to the states should
be brought to bear on Congress through reverse incorporation. In fact, the
Supreme Court long ago acknowledged the need for this sort of symmetry in
decisions like Taylor and Truax.4s2
Application of the due process floor guidelines articulated above may shed
some much needed light not only on Congress's ability to engage overtly in
tort reform, but also on the preemptive effect of federal laws and regulations.
Apart from obsessing over a snippet of legislative text, as the Supreme Court
has done in its ERISA preemption jurisprudence, 43 the courts ought to ask
what sort of interest is being protected by the underlying tort cause of action
against what sort of interference. They should then inquire about the degree to
which the federal statute or regulation undermines the protections of the tort
action, and the degree to which those burdened by its loss will benefit from the
federal scheme that has been put in place.454 Even if the application of this test
results in only a few decisions declining to give preemptive effect to federal
laws, it might serve as a signal to Congress and federal agencies that they are
obligated to consider the effects of their enactments on potential tort claimants.
450. See supra text accompanying notes 18i-i86.
451. 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995).
452. See supra text accompanying notes 225-226, 251.
453. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How To Fix It:
Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REv. 457 (2003) (criticizing as formalistic the
Court's ERISA-preemption decisions).
454. Apart from the issues posed to judges in reviewing legislation under due process principles,
there is the additional point that legislatures, as the bearers of the duty described herein,
ought to be mindful of this duty as they legislate. A legislature that goes about immunizing
HMOs from liability for negligent coverage decisions, if it is acting responsibly, ought to be
thinking about what it must do for those who will suffer injuries as a result of such
decisions.
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3. Structural Due Process
I suggested above that it might be helpful to conceive of the right to a law
of redress as one of a special set of due process rights that entitle individuals to
certain governmental structures and certain bodies of law. If this notion of
structural due process is sound, it will encompass more than just tort law,
understood as a law for the redress of wrongs. Contract, criminal, family, and
property law likewise seem plausible candidates for inclusion. To make this
claim is not to treat as natural or neutral a set of baselines for constitutional
analysis arbitrarily drawn from the common law. Quite the opposite, it is to
recognize and self-consciously theorize a connection between private and
public law. Indeed, one of the potential attractions of the concept of structural
due process is that it provides a framework for bridging the chasm that has
emerged between these two broad fields. Our tort law looks like it does because
it is grounded in the same notions of right as our constitutional law, and there
is no reason to think that this correlation is the product of some sort of mistake
by foolish turn-of-the-twentieth-century judges. As even a quick read of
Blackstone reveals, there is a long tradition of holistic thinking in Anglo-
American constitutional law, one that treats private law not as sub- or non-
constitutional, but as a part of an overall constitutional order.
Apart from reunifying public and private law, the concept of structural due
process might explain and justify other sorts of claims that do not fit neatly
into conventional categories. To take one example, the idea of an individual's
right to vote within a non-gerrymandered district is difficult to pin down
within a conventional negative rights framework.4"5 Perhaps it would be less
mysterious if the right was understood as an individual entitlement to certain
political institutions, operating in accordance with certain norms or principles.
The right to a vote that takes place under appropriate conditions, one might
argue, is a guarantee of structure of the same sort as the right to a law for the
redress of private wrongs, and the right to a government of separated powers.
Each is a modern-day articulation of what Blackstone called "auxiliary
subordinate rights" -rights to structures essential to the proper functioning of
our liberal-democratic government. 4s6
4S. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where To Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of
Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 578 (2004) (noting the poor fit of anti-
gerrymandering claims into the traditional rights frameworks and suggesting that the issue
be reframed in terms of governmental structure).
4S6. See supra text accompanying notes 132-136.
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Recognition of a due process right to a law of redress would set judicially
enforceable constraints on how legislatures may go about tort reform.
However, if they proceed in the right ways (e.g., by setting up meaningful
alternative remedial schemes) they perhaps can succeed in supplanting tort law
entirely. Thus, it is possible to imagine that our legal system will one day
operate with some combination of regulation and insurance schemes that take
the place of a law of redress. Nothing I have said here necessarily suggests that
a post-tort society would be, on balance, a worse society to live in, or a less just
society, or an illiberal society. This Article does suggest, however, that this
imagined polity would be fundamentally different from our own. In
Blackstone's terms, by undertaking this sort of transition, government would
be reconstituting the polity. At a minimum, then, legislators, courts, and
citizens must consider carefully its potential implications before embracing this
possibility as a desirable development. Whatever its advantages, a society
without a law for the redress of private wrongs may be a society more prone
than ours to accept a relatively thin, Holmesian notion of legal obligation, a
less robust civil society, and a more statist conception of how government
interacts with its citizens. And because its law will no longer assign downside
responsibility to individual actors for wrongfully caused harms, it may also be a
society that is less apt to assign upside responsibility to individuals who claim
to have merited or earned various goods.
CONCLUSION
Under one name or another, a law for the redress of private wrongs has
been a part of Anglo-American law since before the advent of liberal-
democratic government. That law has varied enormously in its substantive,
procedural, evidentiary, and remedial dimensions, and in its political,
economic, and cultural significance. This Article aims to make sense of this
historical record of discontinuity within a continuous tradition. The law of
redress is basic to our conception of liberal-constitutional government, and was
built into the fabric of our legal system. Yet the proper description of its
constitutional status must accommodate its protean nature, as well as the
obligation of government to attend to other vital concerns. Critics of judicial
decisions striking down modem tort reform statutes are correct to insist that
governments have considerable leeway in determining how to discharge the
duty that corresponds to the right to a law of redress. They are wrong,
however, to suppose that the state and federal governments enjoy plenary
power in this area. Courts are entitled to ask, and should ask, whether a given
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reform unduly burdens the ability of individuals to vindicate their rights and
interests by obtaining redress from others who have wrongfully injured them.
If a reform does so, courts may strike it down as a violation of the due process
right to a law for the redress of private wrongs.
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